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ABSTRACT
Freedom, Foreknowledge, and
the Necessity of the Past
(May 1984)
Larry Hohm, B.A., Calvin College
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by; Professor Fred Feldman
There is an ancient puzzle about divine foreknowledge
and human freedom. If God has already known that you will
do a certain thing tomorrow, then it must already be a
settled fact that God has known this. Since knowledge
entails truth, it must also be a settled fact that you
will do it. In that case, you really cannot avoid doing
it. If so, then when you do it tomorrow, you won't do it
f reely
.
This dissertation consists of a careful statement of
the puzzle and an examination of its principal solutions.
These are (a) fatalism, the view that nothing about the
past, present, or future is open, ( b) eternalism, the view
that God exists outside of time, (c) semantic indeter-
minism, the view that some propositions are neither true
nor false, and (d) Ockhamism, the view that some things
about the past are open.
In Chapter I the puzzle is stated carefully and its
VI
1
solutions are sketched. Chapters II through V each dis-
cuss one of the principal solutions. It is argued that
fatalism and semantic indeterminism are not adequate solu-
tions to the puzzle. These positions cannot accommodate
or adequately explain away our intuition that there is
something someone can but will not do. Eternal! sm is seen
to be a formally coherent view, but it also does not pro-
vide a satisfying solution to the puzzle. It is argued
that Ockham's solution succeeds where the others fail.
Finally, it is argued that although Ockham denies the
necessity of the past, endorsing his solution does not
force one to hold that we can literally change the past.
It is concluded that Ockham's solution accommodates our
n^tuitions about freedom and the future without charging
a price.
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CHAPTER I
THE PUZZLE
1. Introduct 1 nn
There is an ancient puzzle about divine foreknowledge
and human freedom. If God has already known that you will
do a certain thing tomorrow, then it must already be a
settled fact that God has known this. S ince knowledge
entails truth. it must also be a settled fact that you
will do it. In that case, you really cannot avoid doing
it. If so, then when you do it tomorrow, you won't do it
freely.
This puzzle has been stated in a variety of ways. In
Hfi Ver itate
,
Aquinas formulates it as an argument for the
conclusion that everything God knows is necessary.
7. In every true conditional, if the antecedent
is absolutely necessary, then the consequent is ab-
solutely necessary. But this conditional is true:
if something was known by God, that will be. There-
fore, since this antecedent, namely, this was known
by God, is absolutely necessary, the consequent will
be absolutely necessary. Therefore, it is necessary
that everything known by God exists absolutely.
That this is absolutely necessary, namely, this was
known by God, is proved thus: this is something said
about the past, so if it is true, it is necessary;
because what was cannot n^t have been. Therefore,
it is absolutely necessary.
Jonathan Edwards uses essentially the same conclusion in
his detailed formulation.
1
1. I observed before, in explaining the nature ofnecessity, that in things which are past, their past
of having already made sureexistence, tis too late for any possibility of
thar^^f^*^
respect: 'tis now imposslLe,
should be otherwise than true, that thatthing has existed.
2. If there be any such thing as a divine fore-knowledge of the volitions of free agents, thatforeknowledge, by the supposition, is a thing which
already has, and long ago had existence? and so, nowits existence is necessary; it is now utterly impos-
sible to be otherwise, than that this foreknowledge
should be, or should have been.
3. 'Tis also very manifest, that those things
which are indissolubly connected with other thingsthat are necessary, are themselves necessary. Asthat proposition whose truth is necessarily con-
nected with another proposition, which is neces-
sarily true, is itself necessarily true. To say
otherwise, would be a contradiction; it would be in
effect to say, that the connection was indissoluble,
and yet was not so, but might be broken. If that,
whose existence is indissolubly connected with
something whose existence is now necessary, is
itself not necessary, then it may pass 1 h
1 y not
gx l st. , notwithstanding that indissoluble connection
of its existence.—Whether the absurdity ben't
glaring, let the reader judge.
4. 'Tis no less evident, that if there be a full,
certain and infallible foreknowledge of the future
existence of the volitions of moral agents, then
there is a certain infallible and indissoluble con-
nection between those events and that foreknowledge;
and that therefore, by the preceeding observations,
those events are necessary events; being infallibly
and indissolubly connected with that whose existence
already is^ and so is now necessary, and can't but
have been.
The conclusion of Edwards's argument seems to be that
1. Thomas Aquinas, Dfi Ver i tate
.
qu. 2, art. 12. I
thank Robert Sleigh for this translation, which is from
Qpera Omnia, ed . Stanislai Eduardi Frette, vol. 14 (Paris:
Ludovicum Vives, 1889), p. 376.
3since God has full, certain, and infallible foreknowledge
of future events, those future events are necessary.
The puzzle can also be stated as an argument for the
conclusion that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with
human freedom. If such an argument were successful, it
would deal a serious blow to the Jewish and Christian
religions. These religions teach that God is omniscient;
many versions of them also teach that at least some human
actions are free. Presumably, if God is* omniscient then
God has knowledge of the future. Thus, if divine fore-
knowledge is incompatible with human freedom, it would
appear that many versions of these religions are inconsis-
tent .
This dissertation consists largely of a careful
statement of the puzzle, and an examination of its princi-
pal solutions. In this introductory chapter, I clarify
the puzzle and survey the responses that could be given.
Later chapters consist of detailed discussions of the so-
lutions.
2. Jonathan Edwards, "Freedom of the Will," (1754),
sec. 12; where reprinted as "Foreknowledge Inconsistent
with Contingency," in Read ing s in the Philosophy oL
Re 1 ig ion . ed . Baruch A. Brody (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 393-94.
3. See Nelson Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary
Action," Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 27-46.
4The puzzle can be seen to rest upon six assumptions.
A. Some propositions about the future are contin-gent.
B. God has always been omniscient.
C. Every proposition about the future is either
true or false.
All true propositions about the past are neces-
sary.
E. Knowledge entails truth.
F. Whatever follows from something necessary is
itself necessary.
A is a consequence of human freedom. If you freely do a
certain thing tomorrow, then as of now, it is a contingent
matter that you will do it. B and C together imply that
God has always had foreknowledge. D says that the past is
necessary; in the words of Aquinas, "what was cannot not
have been." E and F seem to be beyond question- These
assumptions are plausible; and yet, we shall soon see that
they are inconsistent.
In sections one and two of this chapter, I discuss
the salient concepts that appear in the puzzle: necessity,
contingency, the past, and the future. In section three I
state the puzzle carefully, and in section four I sketch
its principal solutions. Each of these consists in
denying one of the above assumptions. In the final
section I briefly describe my view.
52
. Necess i ty and Cont i ngenry
Essential to the puzzle is the notion of necessity.
Necessity can be treated either as a property
,
or as a
moda l ity . Treating it as a property, we would ascribe
necessity to- statements or propositions in much the same
way as we ascribe properties to material objects. We
might say that the proposition, everyth i ng i h sel f -
ldgnt i ca
.1 , is necessary. Thus a statement ascribing
necessity to a proposition p might be symbolized best in
first order logic; for example, as Np, where 'N' is a
predicate letter and 'p' is a constant.
On the other hand, if necessity is treated as a
modality, then we would express it by prefacing statements
with some such phrase as 'it is necessary that'. We might
say, "it is necessary that everything is self-identical."
Prefaced statements such as these are perhaps symbolized
best within modal logic; for example, as []P, or LP, where
'[]' and 'L' are sentential operators.
So far as I know, none of the issues surrounding the
puzzle with which we are concerned turns upon our choice
between these alternative treatments. When the discussion
is informal, I shall use whichever treatment is more con-
venient; but when the discussion calls for precision, I
shall treat necessity as a modality.
6There are, of course, many senses of 'necessary'.
For example, a given proposition might be logically neces-
sary, metaphysically necessary, physically necessary, or
temporally necessary. The strongest of these senses is
logical necessity, which applies to all and only the
truths of classical logic. It is liigically necessary
, for
instance, that every puzzle is a puzzle. A moment's re-
flection will show that this sense of 'necessary' does not
give us an interesting interpretation of the puzzle. if
we interpret the fourth assumption with this sense of
'necessary', then it asserts that all true propositions
about the past are logically necessary. That claim is not
true: although Descartes invented analytic geometry
centuries ago, that he did is no truth of classical logic.
A weaker sense of 'necessary' is metaphysical neces-
sity. The basic idea here is that a proposition is meta -
phys i cal ly aecessary if it "could not have been false," or
it is "true in all possible worlds." All logically
necessary propositions are metaphysically necessary, but
others are too. For example, it is metaphysically neces-
sary that no one is taller than oneself. This sense of
'necessary' also fails to produce an interpretation of our
puzzle that is worthy of detailed discussion. Interpreted
with this sense, the fourth assumption says that all true
propositions about the past are metaphysically necessary.
7But it is also not metaphysically necessary that Descartes
invented analytic geometry; Mersenne could have invented
it instead.
Another sense of 'necessary' is physical necessity.
To say that a proposition is physically necessary ig to
say, roughly, that it is required by the laws of physics.
For instance, it is physically necessary, and not surpris-
ing, that my car never travels faster than the speed of
light. This sense of 'necessary' also yields an unsatis-
fying interpretation of our puzzle, as can be seen via the
same example. The laws of physics do not entail that
Descartes invented analytic geometry.
Temporal necessity provides another interpretation of
the fourth assumption. A proposition is tempera 1
1 y n e c e
s
-
if it is, always was, and always will be, true. It
is easy to see, however, that this sense of 'necessary'
also produces an implausible interpretation of the fourth
assumption. Although it has been true since Descartes's
time that he invented analytic geometry, it was not true
before then.
These observations about various senses of 'neces-
sary' are obvious, but important. The, puzzle isn't
puzzling without a suitable sense of ' necessary ' --a sense
in which it is plausible to assume that the past is neces-
sary. There is such a sense of 'necessary', which I call
8mia l terflhi 1 ity . Roughly, the Idea Is this: it is maitax-
ahlfi that P as of a time, t, If there is nothing any group
of people can do as of t such that, were that group of
people to do it, it would not be true at t that P. (i
assume here that a group may contain only one member. I
also assume that the quantifier, 'any group', is
restricted to groups that do not contain any omnipotent
members.) it is unalterable as of now, for example, that
the sun will set tomorrow, that you are now reading this
sentence, and that I grew up in Omaha. Saying that a
proposition is unalterable, in this sense, is similar to
saying that it is unpreventable
, irrevocable, inevitable,
or unavoidable.
More will be said about unalterability in sections
five through seven of chapter five. For now I want merely
to point out that unalterability will provide a plausible
interpretation of the fourth assumption of our puzzle. It
is natural to assume that the past is unalterable. What's
done is done. Descartes invented analytic geometry, and
no one can take that distinction away from him now. I
planted my tomatoes too early this year, and they were
killed by a late frost. Nothing can be done now to save
them
.
For each sense of 'necessary' we mentioned, there are
corresponding senses of 'possible' and 'contingent'.
9Unalterability is the sense of 'necessary' in which we are
interested; I call the corresponding sense of 'possible'
access i hi l i fy . Roughly, it is accessihlp that P as of t,
If there is something some group of people can do as of t
such that, were that group to do it, it would be true at t
that p. Thus unalterability and accessibility are duals
of each other. It is accessible that P as of t if and
only if it is not unalterable as of t that
-P; it is unal-
terable as of t that P if and only if it is not accessible
as of t that
-P
. The corresponding sense of 'contingent'
is what I call openness . It is ofifin that P if and only if
it is accessible as of t that P and accessible as of t
that
-P. Presumably, it is accessible as of now that you
will read the rest of this chapter. There is something
(reading the rest of this chapter) that some group (your
singleton) can do such that, were that group to do it, you
would read the rest of this chapter. Presumably, it is
also accessible as of now that you do not read the rest of
this chapter. If so, then it is open as of now that you
will read the rest of this chapter. If it is not open
that P then I say it is f ixed that P.
3
. About thfi Past and ths Fni-nr ^
The puzzle Is concerned with propositions about the
past, and propositions about the future. ‘ l know of no way
to delimit precisely these classes of propositions.
However, we will never have need in this dissertation to
delimit them precisely. The notions of "about the past”
and "about the future" can be made clear enough for our
purposes by way of examples. By and large, sentences in
the past tenses express propositions about the past, and
sentences in the future tenses express propositions about
the future. That the sun set yesterday is a proposition
about the past; that it will set tomorrow is a proposition
about the future. Other examples abound.
Propositions about the past need not mention any time
in the past. For example, the following are all proposi-
tions about the past: Sam sailed; Sam sailed yesterday;
Sam sailed in 1975. (I write this in 1983.) Similarly,
propositions about the future need not mention any time in
the future. The following propositions are all about the
future: Sally will sail; Sally will sail tomorrow; Sally
will sail in 1995.
Some propositions that are about the past have not
always been about the past. For example, consider the
proposition that I plant, planted, or will plant peppers
in 1975. As of now (1983), this proposition is about the
11
past: but ten years ago, In 1973, It was about the future.
Likewise, some propositions that are about the future will
not always be about the future. For example, consider the
proposition that I plant, planted, or will plant peppers
in 1995. As of now (1983), this proposition is about the
future: but after 1995 it will be about the past.
Strictly speaking, then, we should speak of propositions
being about the past aa n£ a aiii.en tima, or being about
the future as oX a giyen time, when [ say simply that a
proposition is about the past, I will mean that it Is
about the past as of now. Likewise, when I say simply
that a proposition is about the future, I will mean that
it is about the future as of now.
It will be easier to state the puzzle clearly if i
first introduce the notion of a temporal 1y stable proposi-
tion. Some propositions are true at some times but not at
others. An example is the proposition that it is raining
in Omaha. Other propositions never change their truth
values; these are the temporally stable ones. Some
examples are:
There is, was, or will be a time at which it rains
in Omaha.
I plant, planted, or will plant peppers at noon on
May 1, 1984.
Two is less than three.
Something exists.
12
living tht^gs^'" the re
If a temporally stable proposition is ever true
IS always true. Likewise, if such a proposition
false, it is always false.
are no
t then it
is ever
4
. The Puz7 1
e
The puzzle can now be stated carefully. This is done
by showing that the following six assumptions are incon-
s istent
.
A. Some propositions about the future are open.
B
.
God has always been omniscient.
C. Every proposition about the future is either
true or false.
D. All true propositions about the
ter able
.
past are unal-
E. Knowledge entails truth.
F . Whatever follows from something
itself unalterable.
unalterable is
The inconsistency of these assumptions is established
the following argument.
1. There are some open propositions about the
future that are temporally stable; let 'Q'
express one of them, and let ' -Q ’ express its
negation, (from A)
2. Either it was true yesterday that Q, or it was
true yesterday that -Q. (from C)
3. If it was true yesterday that Q, then God knew
yesterday that Q. (from B)
13
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10 .
11 .
If God knew yesterday that Q, then it isterable that God knew yesterday that Q.
unal-
( from D)
If it is unalterable that
Q, then it is unalterable
God knew yesterday that
that
. ( f rom E
,
F )
li is unalterable that Q then itthat Q. ( def
.
)
is not open
Thus, if it was
not open that Q.
true yesterday that Q then(from 3-6) i t is
If it was true yesterday that
-Q,
yesterday that
-Q. (from B)
then God knew
If God knew yesterday that
-Q, then it is unal-terable that God knew yesterday that
-Q. (from D)
If it is unalterable that God knew yesterday that
-Q, then it is unalterable that -Q. (from E,F)
li
it is unalterable that
-g then it is not openthat Q
.
( def
.
)
12. Thus, if it was true yesterday that then it is
not open that Q. (from 8-11)
13. It is not open that Q. (from 2,7,12)
Assumption (1) says that it is open that Q, but that con-
flicts with (13). Hence A through F are inconsistent.
Steps ( 1) , ( 5) , and ( 10) need some explanation.
Regarding (1), it is important to note that if there are
any open propositions about the future ("future contin-
gents"), then some of them are temporally stable. Let p
be an open proposition about the future, and let t^ be now
(noon on June 2, 1983). Then "p is, was, or will be true
at tj^" is temporally stable, and open. And if p is about
the future as of now, then so is "p is, was, or will be
true at t^." Thus, A entails (1).
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To see that (5) follows from E and F
, assume the an-
tecedent of (5): It is unalterable that God knew yesterday
that 0. we need to show the consequent, namely, that It
is unalterable that Q. From E we can Infer that if God
knew yesterday that Q, then it was true yesterday that Q.
By hypothesis, Q is temporally stable. Hence, if it was
true yesterday that Q, then it is still true that g.
Putting these two claims together, we can conclude that
(a) if God knew yesterday that g, then it is true that Q.
From F, (a), and our initial assumption (that it is unal-
terable that God knew yesterday that Q) it follows immedi-
ately that it is unalterable that Q.
A similar argument will show that (lo) follows from E
and F. Simply replace each occurrence of 'Q' in the
preceding paragraph by '-Q*.
The puzzle could be cast as an argument against any
one of the six assumptions upon which it rests. For
example, we could assume for reductio that some proposi-
tions about the future are open. By taking assumptions B
through F as premises, we could then derive a
contradiction. From that it would follow that no proposi-
tions about the future are open.
The argument can be shown to be valid using no more
than propositional logic. Thus the only way to avoid
inconsistency here is to reject at least one of the as-
15
sumptions. I assume without argument that It Is pointless
to deny E or F. Thus, we are left four solutions to our
puzzle: one could reject A, B, c, or D. Each of these so-
lutions will be developed In detail m a later chapter.
In the remainder of this chapter I will sketch these solu-
tions to the puzzle. No arguments for or against any one
of them will be considered until later chapters.
5
. The Soluh 1 nnpt
The first solution is based on the idea that no prop-
ositions about the future are open. This view is commonly
called f ata l ism istith respect Ld. tiie future
,
and is a con-
sequence of the more general fatalistic doctrine that no
propositions are open. In simple terms, fata 1 i .qm is the
view that no person or group of persons can do anything
about the past, the present, or the future. What happens
is never up to us. Every proposition is fixed; no propo-
sition is open.
Among the early proponents of fatalism is Diodorus
Cronus, who taught after Aristotle and before the Stoics."^
It is doubtful that Diodorus ever considered the puzzle
4. Richard Sorabji, Necessity, ilaLLa^, and Blame :
Perspectives on Aristotle ' s Theory (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1980), p. 64.
16
about divine foreknowledge with which we are concerned.
But he offered an apparently fatalistic argument, known as
the Master Argument, which bears important similarities to
our puzzle. its principal premises are:
a. What is past and true is necessary.
b. The impossible does not follow from the possl-
The conclusion is:
z. Nothing else is possible other than what is orwill be true.
Diodorus took the conclusion as his definition of possi-
bility. Thus the argument is sometimes construed as a
defense of his definition. Hintikka reports that "this is
virtually all the direct information we have concerning
the Master Argument. On the basis of this information,
many philosophers have tried to reconstruct the argument.
Chapter two contains a discussion of the attempts by
Eduard Zeller, Jaakko Hintikka, Nicholas Rescher, and
Arthur Prior.
Perhaps the foremost recent proponent of fatalism is
Richard Taylor. Taylor advances an argument for fatalism
which is based upon some assumptions that he takes to be
beyond question. His argument is also discussed in
5. Jaakko Hintikka, Time and Necessity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 181.
17
chapter two.
The second solution consists in rejecting the idea
that God has always been omniscient. This is the response
one would expect from an atheist. it should be noted that
it is not essential to the puzzle that it be cast in terms
of the knowledge God had y£at£xday-any time in the past
will do. Thus the puzzle could be reformulated with the
weaker assumption that there was at least one time at
which God was omniscient. Anyone who adopts the second
solution must be prepared to deny that God was ever omni-
scient. The atheist, of course, is prepared to do that.
It is initially surprising that this solution was
also endorsed by many medieval philosophers, including
Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas. These philoso-
phers did not, of course, deny that God exists. Nor did
they deny that God 1s omniscient. They denied that
strictly speaking, God h a s always been omniscient, on
their view, God is eternal. By this they do not mean that
God exists now, always has existed, and always will exist.
To say that would be to say that God is everlasting, or
sempiternal. The medieval concept of eternity is more
radical than that. By claiming that God is eternal, the
medievals mean to assert that God is not a temporal being;
God exists outside of time. I call this view eternal ism .
According to eternalism, God's knowledge is not subject to
18
time in the way that ours is. On this view, it is not
proper to say that God has iiirfiknowledge
. For God's
knowledge of an event does not happen before the event,
on the view in question, God's knowledge is atemporal.
Medieval philosophers who hold this position insist
that God is both omniscient and eternal. Somehow, God
knows everything that is true, but God's knowledge is
eternal. To distinguish between temporal knowledge like
ours, and eternal knowledge like God's, the medievals
invoke a distinction between know i ng aa future and knowing
aa present . Their solution turns upon this distinction,
and the medieval view of eternity upon which it is based.
These topics are taken up in chapter three.
The third solution consists in denying that all prop-
ositions about the future are either true or false. To
accept this solution is to commit oneself to the view that
some propositions are neither true nor false--a view that
I call 5-eman
t
i c J.ndet grm in i sm . This solution is consistent
with divine omniscience; if open propositions about the
future are not true, then of course an omniscient being
need not know them.
What has come to be called the "traditional" inter-
pretation of Aristotle characterizes him as a semantic
indeterminist
. Richard Taylor expresses this view
succinctly:
19
asserts or statement which
tha^lt ifoo !' a contingent event?
falL th»® w neither true
reaard to th^»
^ being as yet indeterminate with
tS.^ existence or nonexistence of such
Taylor naturally bases this claim on Aristotle’s Da mt^r -
Ptet atinne
, chapter nine, where Aristotle says things that
suggest this interpretation. He offers some arguments to
establish that if of every pair of contradictory proposi-
tions, one must be true and the other false, then
everything takes place of necessity and is fixed (18b
4-31). He then describes the consequent of that claim as
an awkward result. This suggests that he may have
concluded, via modus tollens, that it is not necessary
that affirmations or denials must be either true or false.
Also, he concludes the chapter by saying, "it is therefore
plain that it is not necessary that of an affirmation and
a denial one should be true and the other false" (19a 39-b
2). On this interpretation, then, Aristotle accepted
indeterminism because he wanted to escape fatalism.
Richmond Thomason is a contemporary proponent of
semantic indeterminism. He has proposed a semantic theory
of tenses according to which future contingents are
neither true nor false. His theory is an application of
6. Richard Taylor, "The Problem of Future
Contingencies," Phi losoph i ca 1 Review 66 (1957): 1.
20
van Fraassen'a aupervaluatlons to tenae logic. Thomason's
theory is the topic of chapter four.
The fourth solution consists in denying that every
proposition about the past is unalterable. on this view,
some propositions about the past are open. ,n particular,
some propositions about what God knew in the past are
open. Suppose that Sam will sail tomorrow, but that it is
accessible to him as of now that he refrains. Thus, it is
open that Sam will sail tomorrow. According to the fourth
lution, it is also open that God believed in the past
that Sam will sail tomorrow.
William of Ockham is among the earliest proponents of
the fourth solution to our puzzle. He presents the
fundamental idea of this solution in Predestination p.nH . „
flQieknQW] edge
, Futnr e Cont i ngent a •
P'^°P°®itions are about the present as regards
?se^nH
wording and their subject matter(^^cu dum :^Qcem .at a£.cunduni juam) . where such [prop-ositions] are concerned, it is universally true thatevery true proposition about the present ^ha^ [cor-responding to It] a necessary one about thepast e.g. 'Socrates is seated,' 'Socrates iswalking, Socrates is just,' and the like.
Other propositions are about the present as
regards their wording only and are equivalently
about the future, since their truth depends on thetruth of propositions about the future. Where such[propositions] are concerned, the rule that everytrue proposition about the present has [correspond-ing tc^ It] a necessary one about the past is not
t rue .
And again in Qrdinat in :
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t r:rthrpr:r:n^hL% true at
necessary propo%?u:rab: t'
therefore it 'Us true' itTr^"^ "T afterwards;
contingent proposition),
'A wartrue' win^alway^betrue and nece«^«iArv T»^ +-u t. a ys b
e^^;;v:^:nt^“t^"
a proposition ^bour^^^
'"prlse^t^lf
.Jp^na t^: t:uth-:r:ii?Cre^^rp^op^^!tL“^r* -
under'dt^cussion 8 ^ -“er
Consider a proposition about the present as regards both
its wording and its meaning: Socrates is seated. if this
13 true now, says Ockham, it will be necessary ever
afterwards that Socrates was seated. By contrast,
consider a proposition that is about the present as
regards its wording only, but which is equivalently about
the future: it is now true that Socrates will be seated at
t, say, sometime next week. According to Ockham, this may
be true now, but if so, it is not necessary that from now
on, it was true that Socrates will be seated at t. As of
tomorrow, for example, it still will be a contingent
matter that Socrates will be seated at t ; on Ockham's view
7. William Ockham, Eiedest inat
i
on
,
God ' s Forpknnw-
l.edge r and Eutur e Contingents r ed. Marilyn McCord Adams
and Norman Kretzmann (New York: Appleton-Century-Cr of ts
,
1969 )
, pp . 46-47
.
8
. Ibid
.
,
p, 92
.
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it 3till Will be a contingent matter that it was true that
Socrates will be seated at t. Ockham's solution to the
puzzle is developed in chapter five.
6
. Mx V i (=>w
I argue in this dissertation that fatalism,
eternalism, and semantic indeterminism are not adequate
solutions to our puzzle. These positions cannot
accommodate, or adequately explain away, our intuition
that there is something someone can do but will not do. I
argue further that Ockham's solution succeeds where the
others fail. Finally, I argue that although Ockham denies
the necessity of the past, endorsing his solution does not
force one to hold that we can literally change the past.
Ockham's solution accommodates our intuitions about
freedom and the future without charging a price.
CHAPTER I I
FATALISM
1 • Introdiict i nn
According to the first solution to our puzzle, there
are no open propositions about the future. This solution
IS based upon fatalism, which is the more general view
that, no propositions are open. Fatalism entails a view
that I call imalter ab i l i sm : whatever is true is unalter-
able,- or, whatever is accessible is true.^
Fatalism is an initially unattractive view. it seems
obviously true, for example, that you can read the rest of
this chapter; but it is equally obvious that you can
refrain from reading the rest of it. Which alternative
will become actual is up to you. So, consider the
folJ.owing claims:
You will read the rest of this chapter.
You will not read the rest of this chapter.
1. Unalterabilism is easily confused with a view that
I call determinism. Determinism is the view that
everything that happens is caused (or perhaps, causally
determined). This is different from unalterabilism— the
view that everything that happens is unalterable. This
terminology is unfortunately not used uniformly in the
1 i t. e r a t u r e .
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Neither is unalterable, and both are accessible. Hence,
it is open that you will read the rest of this chapter.
From time to time I encounter striking examples of
such propcsitions.
, have never been one to plan ahead.
realize that dinner time has arrived without
warning, and that I have no plans for dinner. On such
occasions, the questioh inevitably arises, "where should I
eat?" I am soon overcome by indecision. I could eat at
home, or I could eat out; I could have pizza, or Mexican
food, or Chinese food. After running down the usual list,
I eventually make a decision. But no matter where I
decide to go, it is as clear as could be that I could have
gone elsewhere. Friday night I went to Joe's for pizza.
But I could have gone to Bub's instead. on Friday
afternoon, it was accessible to me that I would dine at
Joe's that night, and also accessible to me that I would
dine at Bub's. Thus it was open that I would dine at
Joe's that night; it was also open that I would dine at
Bub's.
With such apparent counterexamples at hand, one
wonders why anyone would accept fatalism. The question
naturally arises: what can be said in favor of fatalism?
Is there good reason to suppose that these examples only
to be counterexamples? Two arguments for fatalism
will be examined in this chapter. They are the ancient
25
Master Argument of Diodorus Cronus, and a recent
put forth by Richard Taylor.
argument
2. Tile Master Argument-
Diodorus Cronus was a logician and philosopher who
taught after Aristotle and before the stoics. His “Master
Argument" was famous In antiquity, and again has become
popular. 2 unfortunately, the entire argument is not known
to us. What we do know of it comes to us from Epictetus:
The Master
with some s
an incompat
os it ions, "
necessary "
,
poss ible"
,
sible". s
the convinc
establish
neither is
Argument seems to have been formulated
uch starting points as these. There isibility between the three following prop-
Everything that is past and true is
The impossible does not follow from the
and "What neither is nor will be is pos-
eeing this incompatibility, Diodorus usedingness of the first two propositions to
the thesis that nothing is possible which
nor will be true.
Relevant to this argument are Diodorus' definitions of
2. See Herbert Guerry, "Rescher's Master Argument,"
^urna l fll Hlilosophy 64 (1967): 310-312; Jaakko Hintikka,
and N e c e
s
,s i t
.y (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1973), chap. 8; Martha Kneale, "Logical and Metaphysical
Necessity," Eroceed ings oL Lh& Aristotel i;:.n society 38(1937-38): 253-68; Martha Kneale and William Kneale, The
Be ve lopment oL Log i c (Oxford: clarendon Press, 1962), pp.117-123; Frederick Seymour Michael, "What is the Master
Argument of Diodorus Cronus?" Amer i can Phi Insnph i re
1
Quarter .1 y 13 ( 1976): 229-35 ; Arthur Prior, "Diordoran
Modalities," Ehilosoph i ca 1 Quarterly 5 (1955): 205-213;
idem., "Diodorus and Modal Logic," Philosophical Quarter 1
y
8 (1958): 226-36; Nicholas Rescher, "A Version of the
'Master Argument' of Diodorus," Journal of Ph i 1 osnphy 63
(1966): 438-45.
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various modal terms, which are recorded by Boethius:
Diodorus defines the possible as that which either
ble a^ that ^ fiJlii), the impossi-i s which, being false, will not be true
If^hST' ^hi?T iifiJLum), the necessaryas that w ich, being true, will not be false (auod
tAlaim), and the nonnSfU ? that which either is already or will bealse (ant ant ant erit la-Lanm) .
Benson Mates observes that the definitions of 'impossi-
ble', 'necessary', and 'nonnecessary' "show clearly that
the definition of 'possible' was slightly elliptical; it
should have been, 'The possible is that which either is or
will be true.'"^ Thus we know that the Master Argument had
the following propositions as two of its premises.
a. Every true proposition about the past is neces-
sary
.
b. An impossible proposition never follows from a
possible one.
Its conclusion was:
z. No proposition which neither is nor will be true
is possible.
3. Epictetus, Dissertationfts aJa Arr iano Pigestae . ed
.
H. Schenkl (Leipzig, 1898), il, 19, 1; quoted in Kneale
and Kneale, p. 119.
4. Boethius, Commentar i 1 In Librum Aristotel is
Secunda Edlt i o , ed. Meiser, C. (Leipzig, Teubner
,
1877),
p. 234; quoted in Kneale and Kneale, p. 117.
5. Benson Mates, Stoic Logic
,
University of
California Publications in Philosophy, vol. 26 (1953;
reprint ed
. ,
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1961), vol. 26, p. 37.
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This means that every possible proposition is or will be
true. TO put it yet another way, only what is or will be
true is possible. And we also know from Boethius that
Diodorus accepted the following definitions.
P is possible
-df either p is true or p will betrue
P is impossible =df p I 3 false and never will be
true
p 13 necessary =df p is true and never will be
false
P is nonnecessary
-df either p is false or p will befalse
The contemporaries of Diodorus did not question the
validity of his argument. cleanthes, a Stoic, rejected
the first premise, while Chryslppus, another Stoic, denied
the second .
^
In the words of Jaakko Hintikka, "this is virtually
all the direct information we have concerning the Master
Argument. On the basis of this information alone, it
seems rather difficult to say very much concerning the ar-
gument."^ One thing we can say safely is that it is not
obvious that the argument is valid. Thus, many philoso-
phers have asked, what plausible assumptions, if any,
could be added to Diodorus' premises so as to entail the
6 . Mates, 5.tQic Log ic, p. 38.
7. Hintikka, lime and Necess i ty , p. 181.
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conclusion?
It would be improper to add Dlodorue' definitions as
premises, because the conclusion is tantamount to his def-
inition of possibility. Indeed the purpose of the Master
Argument, according to Alexander, is to establish this
def inltlon.
®
Essentially the same point can be made by asking,
which senses of
-necessary’ and
-possible- are relevant to
the argument? If the argument is to be understood with
Diodoran necessity and possibility, then the conclusion is
trivial. For it would say that no proposition which
neither is nor will be true is or will be true. Thus
understood, we should not waste our time searching for an
argument to support it. If the argument is to be
interesting, Diodoran modalities must not be used.
Moreover, if the argument is to be relevant to fatalism,
as we have defined it, then unalterablllty and accesslbll-
ity must be used.
A. ^ ll er 's Reconstruction. Eduard Zeller states the
Master Argument as follows:
From something possible nothing impossible can
proceed.* Yet it is impossible that something pastbe different than it is. Thus, had this been possi-
8. Mates, Rt.oic Loijlo, p. 38, n. 53.
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ble at an earlier
would have preceded
never possible. it
that something will
happen .
"
point of time, an impossibilityfrom a possibility. it was thus
13 consequently quite impossible
happen that does not really
caotuJe !n Th translate order top r i the German the ambiguity of the Greekexpression, which indicates not only tLporal orderbut also the logical and causal sequence ^
And again:
something were possible, which neither is nor
impossibility would follow from apossibility; but no impossibility can follow from apossibility; thus, nothing is possible which neither
presupposition, that from apossibility no impossibility can follow, is consid-
a granted assumption [als anerkannt
vorausgesetzt ]
. The hypothetical consequent, on the
other hand, requires further justification, and itgets this by means of the statement that everythingpast is necessary. For, when of two mutually
exclusive states of affairs the one obtains, thepossibility of the other is thereby cancelled, [and
thus] since ^that has once taken place cannot be
altered [ttock fTcK/osXyyX-yeos tov ] , this second
state of affairs is now impossible; had it thus been
possible earlier, so would it have been the case, as
Diodorus believes, that an impossibility had
proceeded from a possibility." ^
Zeller states the argument as a reductio that proceeds
roughly as follows. Suppose for reductio that there is a
9. Eduard Zeller, Die Philosoph i e der Gr 1 ech^n in
-Lb.firer gesch i cht li chen Entwicklung
,
6th ed., vol. 2, pt. 1(Hildesheim, 1963), pp. 269-70. I thank Wendy Wegener for
this translation from the German.
>
10. Eduard Zeller, "Uber den k~[yyoit^^Vde3 Megarikers
Diodorus," in S itzungsber ichte der kon ig1 i r.hf-.n
Preuss ischen Akademie dex Wissenschaf ten (Berlin, 1882),
pp. 151-59; quoted in Mates, Stoic Logic
.
p. 38, n. 53.
Again I thank Wendy Wegener for this translation.
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proposition which is possible, but which neither is nor
will be true. Then its negation is true and always will
be true. As soon as the present becomes past. the
negation of the propos it ion '^ill become necessary
(according to Diodorus' first premise). But if its
negation becomes necessary, the proposition itself becomes
impossible. Thus a proposition which was possible will
have become impossible, in violation of Diodorus' second
premise
.
Mates finds this version of the Master Argument
unsatisfying
.
It rests, in the first place, on the notion thatDiodorus confused temporal succession with logical
consequence. But this hardly seems likely, forDiodorus himself was in the center of a very
sophisticated debate over the nature of logical con-
sequence^. The word used in Epictetus' account is
,
which is the same word used by Diodorus
for "is a consequent of" in this debate. Further,
It seems unlikely that Chrysippus would have
overlooked so elementary a confusion; indeed, he
objected to Diodorus' second proposition, but not on
the grounds that it did not refer to logical conse-
quence .
In addition to these historical difficulties,
Zeller's reconstruction also faces serious philosophical
11. This summary of Zeller's reconstruction is
essentially the same as Mates ' s summary in Stoic r.og i c
,
pp. 38-39.
12. Mates, S.t.olc Logic
,
p. 39.
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problems. His argument Is a reductio for the conclusion
that no proposition which neither is nor will be true is
possible. Thus his assumption for reductio must be simply
that there is such a proposition, say, p. He cannot
strengthen this assumption by also assuming, say, that p
is about the present, or that ifs negation is about the
past, without either weakening the conclusion or losing
validity. Nonetheless, Zeller presumes, a few steps
later, that when the present becomes past,
-p will become
a proposition about the past. This presumption is
unwarranted. To be sure, some propositions behave in the
appropriate manner. If p is the proposition that today is
sunny, or perhaps, the proposition that June 2, 1983 is
sunny (l write this on June 2, 1983), then by tomorrow,
-p
will become a proposition about the past. But other prop-
ositions behave otherwise. if p is the proposition that I
will drink tea on New Year's day in 1995, then
-p will not
become a proposition about the past as soon as the present
becomes past. It will remain a proposition about the
future for a long time. Hence the argument is invalid.
From the assumption that p is possible but neither is nor
true, it does not follow that as soon as the
present becomes past,
-p will become a proposition about
the past.
32
There is a further problem with Zeller’s reconstruc-
tion. He interprets Diodorus' second premise as follows:
c. No possible proposition ever becomes impossible.
Given a natural assumption, (c) is inconsistent with the
conclusion of the Master Argument. it is natural to
assume that there is a proposition that was true but
neither is nor will be true. For example,
d. Diodorus is alive.
(d) was true in 308 B.C., and hence was possible at that
time. But if (d) was possible, then by (c) it still is
possible. Hence by the conclusion of the Master Argument,
namely (z), it either is or will be true. This
contradicts our hypothesis that (d) neither is nor will be
true. According to Zeller’s reconstruction, then, the
second premise of the Master Argument is inconsistent with
the conclusion.
H int Ikka * s E-econstr uct 1 on . According to Jaakko
Hintikka, the modes of reasoning that Diodorus used are
likely to have been similar to those of Aristotle. He
believes, furthermore, that they shared some of the tacit
presuppositions of the logical and philosophical
13enterprise. For these reasons Hintikka tries to
reconstruct the Master Argument using Aristotle as a
guide. The details of the argument, admits Hintikka, "may
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be Impossible to reconstruct, but the main trend is
obvious enough. ”(191) The main trend, with Hintik)ra's
numbering system, proceeds as follows.
(10) It is possible that p. (assumption for
reduct io)
(11) It is not the case that p nor will it be the
case at any later moment of time, (assumptionfor reductio)
(1)
* Any true statement concerning the past in
necessary, (premise)
(2)
* If a possibility is assumed to be realized, noimpossible conclusions follow, (premise)
(10)
* [There is a time t later than now such that]
at time t^ it will be true that p. (from 10)
(12) [There is a time t, one day later than t such
that] at time t, it will be true that p Sasthe case yesterday, (from (10)*)
(11)
* At time t^ it will be false that p. (from 11)
(13) At time t, it will be false that p was the
case yesterday, (from (11)*)
(13*) At time t^ it will be true that it is impossi-
ble for p to have been the case yesterday.
(from (1)* and 13)
But (13)* shows that (12) is impossible. .Hence the
original set of premisses is inconsistent. ^
It appears initially that the conclusion of this argument
13. Hintikka, Hmfi and Necessity
,
p. 181. Further
references to this book are made in the text of this
section by enclosing page numbers in parentheses.
14. These steps are collected from sec. 8, pp.
191-92.
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13 that the original set of premises, presumably comprised
of (10), (11), (1)*, and (2)*, is inconsistent. However,
Hintikka often speaks as if the conclusion is that
(4) the possible is that which is or will be true.^^
Since we know from Epictetus that that was Diodorus* con-
clusion, I shall assume it is also Hintikka's. Moreover,
Hintikka thinks of the Master Argument, and presumably his
reconstruction, as a reductive proof
.( 179 , 188 ) Since
accepting (4) is tantamount to denying that both (10) and
(11) are true, we may think of (10) and (11) as assump-
tions for reductio, as indicated above.
Hintikka intends his reconstruction to be interpreted
with the Diodoran sense of 'possible*. This is not
obvious from Hintikka's discussion, but in sections eleven
and twelve he says things that appear to imply it. He
there argues that when criticizing the Megarians,
Aristotle presupposed a concept of possibility on
which a statement of the form 'it is impossible that
p' (with a temporally unspecified sentence p)implied that it is false to say that p at the timethe statement is made and that it will remain false
to say so at all later times.
. . . When in our recon-
struction of the Master Argument we made the step
from (10) to (10)*, we in effect assumed that
something like this notion of possibility is used in
(10). The fact that we have now found this notion
in Aristotle serves to justify our step ox posh
facto
.
( 198
)
15. See pp. 181, 182, and esp. 202.
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And on the following page:
The concept of poesiblllty which we have lustfound in Aristotle was not employed qu^teconsistently by him. However, It was employedconsciously by Diodorus: It was exactly the Say ^e
ity”(199)*^*"*'^
notion (his notion) of posslLl-
Apparently it Is the Dlodoran sense of 'possible' that is
relevant to the argument.
Hintikka's use of Diodoran possibility makes his
reconstruction uninteresting. When interpreted with that
sense of 'possible', (10) says that p either is or will be
true. This makes the argument obviously invalid, because
Hintikka infers from (10) that p will be true at some time
in the future (step (10)*). Clearly it is consistent with
this interpretation of (10) that p is true now, but will
never be true in the future. Furthermore, (11) immedi-
ately contradicts (10) so interpreted; hence the desired
inconsistency is at hand and the rest of the argument is
superfluous. Moreover, when interpreted with Diodoran
possibility, the conclusion becomes the trivial claim that
no proposition that neither is nor will be true, is or
will be true. Thus Hintikka's reconstruction, when
condensed, amounts to the following.
Assume for reductio that
a. -[ (p V Fp) (p V Fp)
]
This is tantamount to the following two claims.
b. p V Fp (Hintikka's 10 interpreted with Diodoran
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possibility)
~P ^ “Fp (Hintikka's 11)
but (c) implies that
d.
-(p V Fp)
This contradicts (b). Thus by reductlo
e. (p V Fp) (p V Fp)
Hintikka',s reconstruction can be improved by using a
different sense of 'possible', for Instance, metaphysical
possibility or accessibility. Unfortunately this move
will improve but not save the argument. For in either of
these senses of 'possible', from the fact that p is possi-
ble It does not follow that p will be true at some later
time. Hence the inference from (10) to (10)* Is still
invalid
.
Hintikka's remarks suggest another attempt to salvage
his argument. Perhaps he intended (10)* to be an assump-
tion for reductio, just as (10) and (11) are. This is
suggested in his remarks that motivate the introduction of
( 10 ) * :
Because of (2)*, Diodorus could replace assumption
(10) by the assumption that the possibility in
guestion is or will be realized. (Cf. section 5
above.) if the original premiss (10) leads to no
impossibilities, the new one will not do so either.
More accurately, because of the assumptions
discussed in section 7, Diodorus thought he could
assume that the possibility in guestion is realized
at some particular moment of (future) time. In
other words, he thought he could move from (10) to
[(10)*]. (191)
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If we think of the argument in this manner then there Is
no need to invalldly Infer (10)* from (10). Unfortunately
this revision is unsuccessful. Suppose that the assump-
tions for reductio are (10), (11), and (10)*, and that a
contradiction is extracted from them. it would not follow
that the conclusion is true iu , .e., that if p 13 possible
then it either is or will be true. The conclusion says,
roughly, that either (10) is not true or (11) is not true.
What would follow from the proposed revision is only that
either ( 10 ), or ( 11 ), or ( 10 )» is not true. Hence the ar-
gument would be invalid.
Furthermore, if (lO), (H), and ( 10 )* were the as-
sumptions for reductio, then the rest of the argument
would be superfluous. (10)* says that p will be true
sometime in the future, but that contradicts ( 11 ). It is
thus immediately evident that at least one of the assump-
tions for reductio is not true.
Perhaps Hintikka is aware of the weaknesses of his
reconstruction. It is difficult to tell because it is not
clear that he ever evaluates it. He does, however,
evaluate another argument whose premises are alleged to be
"very closely related" and "essentially tantamount" to the
assumptions of the above reconstruct ion
.( 205 - 206 ) To
present this argument, let 'Tp,t* represent 'p is true at
t', let 'MA' represent 'it is possible that A', and let t
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range over moments of present or future time, what seems
to be Hintikka’s second reconstruction of the Master Argu-
ment, again with his numbering system, is as follows.
(18) M3tTp,t (assumption for reductio)
(21) Bt-Tp,t (assumption for reductio)
(20) Ht(-Tp,t — >
-MTp,t) (premise)
But these assumptions are inconsistent. Therefore
(19) 3tTp,t
Hintikka explains that
(18) is clearly very closely related to assumption
^ reconstruction of the Master Argument,
and (21) is essentially assumption (11). The use ofthe original premiss (1)* was to give us (20).
It is not clear that (20) follows from (1)*. Nor is there
a premise in Hintikka's original reconstruction that is
analogous to (20). Thus his second reconstruction is
substantially different from his first. Does it fare any
better ?
On Hintikka's ' assessment, the above reductio is
invalid because (18), (21), and (20) are consistent.
On the most natural assumptions concerning modal
notions that we can make, it can be shown that the
set of formulas (18), (20), (21) is consistent.
Intuitively, the way in which the three can be
compatible may be explained by saying that although
under the actual course of (future) events p is
never true and although it therefore follows that at
each moment of time during the actual course of
events it is true to say that it is impossible that
p should be the case, some alternative course of
(future) events may still be possible under which p
would have happened
.( 206
)
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Hintikka seems to have something like the following In
n>ind. Let a be the actual course of future events, and
suppose that p never becomes true In «. Suppose that there
are some alternative courses of future events still possi-
ble as of now in which p is or will be true. suppose
further that in any such alternative course of events,
p becomes true for the first time at some time, t, next
week. Finally, suppose that as of t (next week), no such
alternative course of events, f3
,
will be a possibility.
In this situation, (18) is true, because in some relevant
^ , p is true next week at t. (21) is also true, because
P never becomes true in or. Finally, (20) is true, because
in any relevant p, there is never a time at which p is
true in
^ and at which /s is still possible relative to
a. What this shows is that (18), (21), and (20) are at
least consistent. It follows that the reductlo which
depends upon their inconsistency is invalid. Thus
Hintikka is correct: what I have called his second recon-
struction of the Master Argument is Invalid.
Before concluding his discussion, Hintikka suggests
what seems to be yet another reconstruction of the Master
Argument. He notes that Diodorus "could have derived a
contradiction if he had instead of (18) the closely
related premiss [(18)* 3tMTp , t ] . " ( 206 ) The argument is
this: let t^ be some moment of time satisfying (18)*.
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Thus we have MTp,t^. From (20) we get
-Tp,t^ ->
-MTp,t
and from (21) we have
-Tp,t^. An application of modi
ponens gives us
-MTp.t^, which contradicts our first step.
From this it is concluded that (19) 3tTp,t.
We should note that as stated, this reductio is
invalid. The conclusion, (19), is equivalent to the claim
that (21) is not true. if the argument is to be valid,
the conclusion must say only that at least one of the two
assumptions for reductio is not true. (19) should be
replaced by something equivalent to the denial of the
conjunction of (18) and (21). l suggest the following:
(19)* M3tTp,t — > 3tTp,t
Given the restricted range of t, this is similar to
Diodorus' conclusion that if p is possible then p either
is or will be true. With this conclusion, the argument is
valid
.
Hintikka's criticism of this argument is that
Diodorus was not justified in making the transition from
(18) to (18)*, because the claim that they are equivalent
is unacceptable
.( 207-209
)
It is true that it has been accepted by certain
modal logicians; [42] it is even true that it is
provable in some formal systems logicians have
devised
; [43 ] but a closer analysis of the assump-
tions that underlie systems of modal logic shows
that there is no general justification for
it. (209)^°
The "closer analysis" is presented in Hintikka's "Modality
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and Quantification. -i’ to which he refers the reader m
footnote 44.
This criticism appears to miss the point. Diodorus
-y Simply grant that the equivalence does not hold; he
can point out that his argument, as characterized by
HlntlKka's third reconstruction, does not presuppose
otherwise. Rather than assuming (18) and Inferring (18)*,
the argument simply assumes (18)*. Thus the question
remains, is this valid reconstruction convincing or sound?
My answer is no. i • i. .1 nave three objections to
HlntDrJra's third reconstruction. The argument depends
upon assumption (20) which says that if p is not true at
some moment of present or future time, t, then it is im-
possible that p is true at t. My first objection is that
this assumption is false. If there are any possible prop-
ositions that are not true, then (20) is false. This
premise was first introduced in section 13, where Hintikka
says that both the Master Argument and a similar argument
from Aristotle
i-u
footnotes 42 and 43 Hintikka lists examples ofthe modal logicians and formal systems to which he refers.
17. Reprinted in his Models f or Mod a 1 i t i ee(Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1969), nn57-70
.
^ ^ •
42
at some particular moment of time t then it io ^
(excent\f"f P tRe :Lf T
whensserterart'" 1" «hich 'possibly ^^ ^ ^ Simply means that p happens atacme future or prSsent
—moment of t ime ).( 202-203
)
The parenthetical comment suggests that the sense of 'pos-
sible' relevant to (20) is not Diodoran possibility. Let
us consider the other senses of 'possible' that were
discussed in chapter one. If (20) is Interpreted with
either logical, metaphysical, or physical possibility, it
13 easy to find counterexamples. Consider the proposition
that my bicycle is red. This is logically, metaphysi-
cally, and physically possible; but it is not true. That
leaves accessibility. Ate there any accessible proposi-
tions that are not true?
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that
such propositions are easy to find. l gave an example
about Joe's and Bub's in which I claimed that as of Friday
afternoon, it was accessible that I would dine at Bub's on
Friday night. In that example, however, it was not true'
that I would dine at Bub's on Friday night. in my view,
that example proves that there are accessible propositions
that are not true.
Although I am convinced by my first objection, I
realize that some readers may not be as easily persuaded.
A serious fatalist with his wits about him will surely
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realize that hia position forces him to deny my claim
about Bub's. To maintain his position, the fatalist must
insist that it was not accessible as of Friday afternoon
that I would dine at Bub's on Friday night. Although i
think this view is mistaken, I do not protest against
those Who hold it; all are entitled to their opinions.
However, the Master Argument is not a mere assertion of
fatalism and its consequences. it is Intended to be an
argument in support of fatalism. Hlntlkka's reconstruc-
tion of the argument employs (20) as a premise. i object
to this use of (20), because (20) is quite implausible.
Even the fatalist will admit, perhaps reluctantly, that it
asema as if some things about the future are accessible
but not true; he insists, of course, that such appearances
are illusions. But (20) is initially implausible; if a
fatalist uses it to support his position, he needs either
to give an argument for it, or at least to explain away
its implausibility
. Hintikka does neither on behalf of
the fatalist. So, my second objection is that without
some sort of defense of (20), it is Inappropriate in this
context
.
My third objection is that (20) has a distinctively
fatalistic flavor. If everything that's not true is im-
possible, then only what is true is possible. Hintikka
describes it as a form of determinism, and argues that the
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Master Argument turns essentially upon It.^® But the
Master Argument Is supposed to be an argument
determinism, or what I have called fatalism. Thus
Diodorus cannot gracefully use (20) as a premise.
Hintikka concludes his article by saying that the
Master Argument "fails even if we grant the deterministic
assumption, for It Involves too narrow a view of the
relation of possibility to time. "(213) We have seen that
what I have called Hlntikka's third reconstruction Is
valid, and its only premise Is the deterministic assump-
tion to which Hintlkka refers, namely (20). Thus if we
grant that assumption then the argumeht succeeds.
Hintlkka has suggested several reconstructions of the
Master Argument, of which some are complicated ahd others
are relatively simple. Like Hintlkka, we have been unable
to find a successful argument among them.
C. Rescher
'
s Reconatnictinn. Nicholas Rescher has offered
a sophisticated and clever reconstruction of the Master
19Argument. To facilitate his exposition, Rescher
i^^troduces the following "chronologized” modalities:
202 .
18. Hintikka, lime emd Necess ity
,
sec. 13, esp. p.
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Tt(p) FOR p is true at the time t
Pt(p) FOR p is possible at the time t
Nt(p) FOR p is necessary at the time t
To indicate the present, we set t - n (tor “now"). The
variable 'p' ranges only over "chronologically definite
statements”—statements that do not change their truth
value with the passage of time. Rescher's example 1s, "it
rains in Athens on January 1, 1966." Presumably, 'rains'
is intended to be "tenseless . " A somewhat clearer example
might be, "it is, was, or will be, raining in Athens on
January 1, 1966." Rescher's reconstruction uses the
following premises.
(la) ytBt'{[Tt(p) & t < t'] — > Nt'(p)}
What is past and true is necessary thereafter.
(2) BtUt'{[Pt(p) & t < f] — > Pt'(p)}
What is once possible is always possible
thereafter
.
EM: Bt[Tt(p) V Tt(-p)
]
(The Law of the Excluded Middle.)
The conclusion is:
19. Nicholas Rescher, "A Version of the 'Master Argu-
ment' of Diodorus," Jxaurnal £lL Philosophy 63 (1966),
438-45. Further references to this article are made in the
text of this section by enclosing page numbers in
parentheses
.
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Pn(p) 3t[n jC t & Tt(p)]
Whatever Is possible either is or will be true.
The first assumption is the generalized version of the
Diodoran premise that what is past and true is now neces-
sary: Ht([Tt(p) s t < n] — > Nn(p)).(440) The second as-
sumption is Rescher's temporal interpretation of the
odoran premise that the impossible does not follow
(from? after?) the poss ible
.
(439 , 440) The third assump-
tion is an additional premise which is needed for the ar-
gument. (442)
The reconstruction can be divided into two stages.
The first stage consists of the following sequence of
maneuvers. (la) is equivalent to
(A) ytyt
' { [-Nt
' (p) & t < f] — >
-Tt(p)}
What is not necessary was never true.
By uniformly substituting '-p* for 'p' we obtain
(B) ytyf{[-Nt’(-p) & t < f] — > -Tt(-p)}
If it is not necessary that not-p, then it was
never true that not-p.
By the usual equivalence of P with -N- we obtain
(c) ytyt
' { [ pt ' (p) & t < t'] -Tt(-p)}
If it is possible that p, then it was never true
that not-p.
This together with EM yields
(D) ytyt
' { [Pf (p) & t < f] --> Tt(p)}
Whatever is possible has always been true.
The second stage is a reductio that proceeds as
follows
.
Suppose something is possible that neither is
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nor will be true:
(3) Pn(p^) & yt[n i t —
This leads to a contradict!
(a) Pn(p )
(b)
-Tn+A(p )o
(C) Pn+2A(p^)
(d) Tn+A(p )o
But (d) contradicts (b),
(e) Pn(p) — > 3t[n 1 t &
(e) says that whatever i
true. Pictorially, we have
> Tt(p )] for some p
)n as follows.
by (3)
by (3)
from (a) by (2)
from (c) by (D)
thus
Tt(p)]
possible either is or will be
the following situation.
T(p )
P(P„)
-T(p°) P(p^)
n n+A n+2A
Rescher's reconstruction is valid, it uses both
Diodoran premises, and it has Diodorus' conclusion.
Furthermore, the only additional assumption required by
the reconstruction is the eminently plausible Law of the
Excluded Middle. Does it succeed?
Rescher suggests that the "most convenient" exit from
the deterministic conclusion is
the denial of the applicability of the Law of the
Excluded Middle in the context of a temporally
relativized conception of truth. We would be able
to maintain "Tt(X-at-t )" whenever tit, but
reject both this and Tt (Not : X-at-t )" wRenever
t < t^, avoiding the deterministic consequences at
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issue and making room for
contingency.
" (444)
a doctrine of "future
I believe, however, that the argument le unsuccesaful
even If „e grant EM. Reecher doesn’t say explicitly which
senses of necessity and possibility are relevant to his
reconstruction. Some of his remarks suggest, however,
that he has something akin to Dlodoran modalities in mind.
He claims that "given the chronologized concept of neces-
sity operative within, the context of the discussion," the
principle
Tf (p) ytTt(p)
leads to
Tt
' (p) — > utNt(p)
He doesn't explain the chronologized concept of necessity
that he has in mind. His remark at least suggests that he
accepts the principle
HtTt(p) — > HtNt(p)
That in turn suggests that he thinks Nt(p) means simply
Ht'Tt'(p), or perhaps Ht'[n 1 t' Tt'(p)]. if so, then
Pt(p) means 3t'Tt'(p), or perhaps 3t'[n
.i t ' & Tt'(p)].
However, the conclusion becomes trivial when interpreted
with these modalities. So interpreted, (e) becomes
(f) 3t'Tt'(p) —
>
gt[n 1 t & Tt(p)J
or perhaps
(g) at'tn i f s Tt'(p)] —1 3t(n X t S Tt(p)J
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(f) is trivial in light of the fact that the range of p ia
restricted to chronologically definite propositions.
,f
such a proposition is true at any time, then it is true at
all tlmee. Thus if there is a time at which p is true,
then there is a time in the present or future at which p
is true. (g) is also trivial.
Perhaps I have read more into Rescher's remarks than
he Intended. Perhaps he did not Intend to use anything
like Dlodoran modalities. Rescher may have wanted to
leave necessity and possibility as undefined notions that
are relativized to times. This would be similar to our
treatment in chapter one of logical, metaphysical, and
physical necessity, and of accessibility and unalterabll-
ity. rf so, then my criticism above does not apply. How
does the argument fate with any of these modalities?
If we Interpret the argument with either logical,
metaphysical, or physical modalities, then the first
premise is totally implausible. It says that for any
chronologically definite statement p, if p is true once
then it is necessary thereafter. But consider the state-
ment
(4) Descartes invents, invented, or will invent
analytic geometry in 1637.
This statement was true in 1637, and is still true today.
But it does not follow that it is now logically, metaphys-
ically, or physically necessary. It is not a law of
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logic, nor is it true in all possible worlds, nor is it
required by the laws of the natural sciences. Thus on any
of these interpretations the argument fails.
This leaves unalterability and accessibility. How
does the argument fare when interpreted with these
nioc33.Xiti©s? Not wpll a.n e . The first premise does become
plausible. It now says that once a chronologically
definite statement la true. It is thereafter unalterable.
Although this sounds plausible, we know by Rescher's own
maneuver that it is equivalent to
(h) HtHt
' { [Pf (p) & t < f] — > -Tt(-p)}
Interpreted with accessibility, this means that if a
chronologically definite statement p is accessible at a
time, then it was never true earlier that
-p. But it
seems that we are always letting opportunities pass us by.
As I suggested at the beginning of this chapter, it was
once accessible that I would dine at Bub's last Friday
night; but I ate at Joe's instead. Let q be the proposi-
tion that I am dining, was dining, or will be dining at
Bub's at 8:00 on Friday evening, June 3, 1983. As of
Thursday June 2, q was accessible. Nonetheless,
-q was
true at earlier times. Hence when P is interpreted as
accessibility, (h) is false, as are (1) and (la).
Furthermore, if we interpret the argument with acces-
sibility and unalterability then the second premise is
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also suspect. So interpreted, (2) says that if a
chronologically definite statement p is accessible at a
time, then it remains accessible from then on. Again, we
are always letting opportunities pass us by. Last week q
was accessible; now it is not.
It is worth noting again that a staunch fatalist
might deny that q was ever accessible. It is also worth
replying again that the Master Argument is intended to be
an argument supporting fatalism. if the argument rests
upon assumptions such as (h) or (2) that are as
implausible as fatalism itself, then it will not be a
convincing argument.
Rescher's reconstruction of the Master Argument is
concise and valid; but it is not convincing. if inter-
preted with temporal modalities, the conclusion becomes
trivial. If interpreted with non-temporal (though
time-relativized) modalities, then at least one of the
premises becomes implausible and false. It fails to
provide good reasons either for accepting the Diodoran
conclusion or for giving up the Law of the Excluded
Middle
.
D. Rxior '
3
Reconstruction. Arthur Prior has produced the
most plausible reconstruction of the Master Argument. He
restates the two Diodoran premises as follows.
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(a) When anything has been thehave been the case.
case
,
it cannot not
(b) If anything is impossible
necessarily implies it is
then anything
impossible
.
that
To fill out the argument he adds two premises
(c) When anything
the case that
is the case, it has always
it will be the case.
been
(d) When anything neither Is not will be theIt has been the case that it will not beC ^ 3 C
case
,
the
From these he deduces the conclusion:
(z) What neither is nor will be trueble . ' is not possi-
The argument can be formalized by introducing the
following symbols.
Mp for It is (now) possible that pLp for It is (now) necessary that pFp for It will be the case that pPp for It has been the case that pHp for It has always been the case that p
Hp is defined as an abbreviation for
-P-p, "it has not
been the case that not p.” The four premises then become:
(a) Pp — > -M-Pp
(b)
-Mq — > (L(p — > q) — > -Mp)
(c) p HFp
(d) (-p & -Fp) — > p-Fp
And the conclusion becomes:
20. Prior, "Diodoran Modalities."
"Diodorus and Modal Logic."
See also his.
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(z) ( p & -Fp) -Mp
These strings of symbols are to be regarded not as
formulas but as schemata. This is clear because Prior
treats 'p', 'q', «r', etc. as schematic letters (not as
atomic formulas), replaceable by any formula we please.
They ultimately represent propositions, and it is assumed
that the same proposition may be true at one time and
false at another. Prior explains the argument by
considering an example in which it is contended that there
is a shell at the bottom of the sea that can be seen,
although in fact it is not being seen and never will be
seen. Letting p be the proposition that the shell is
being seen, we can present the argument as a reductio.
1. The shell is not being seen and never will be
seen
.
~P ^ "^P (assumption for reductio)
2. The shell can be seen.
^P (assumption for reductio)
3. It has been the case that it will not be seen.
P"fP (l,d)
4. It cannot (now) not have been the case that it
has been the case that it will not be seen.
-M-P-Fp (3, a, substituting -Fp for p)
5. That the shell is now being seen entails that it
has always been the case that the shell will be
seen
.
L(p — > -P-Fp) (c, by the law of
necess itation)
21. Prior, "Diodoran Modalities," p. 205.
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6. The shell cannot be seen.
(4,5,b, substituting
-P-Fp for q)
But 6 contradicts 2, thus
(z) What neither la nor will be true, is not poasl-
(-p & -Fp)
-Mp (1--6)
Like Rescher's reconstruction, this argument is valid, it
uses the Diodoran premises, and it has the Diodoran con-
clusion. Furthermore, the only additional premises, (c)
and (d), are reasonable. Does the argument succeed?
Prior does not present a full evaluation of this ar-
gument. He is content to note that an exponent of
three-valued logic may escape the Diodoran conclusion by
rejecting (d). He suggests two reasons that can be given
for denying that statements of the form (-p & ~Fp) --^
P-Fp are in all cases true. First, "if it is
indeterminate whether p is or will be the case, the
assertion that it has been the case that p will not be the
case is false, so that ... we shall have an implication
with a neuter antecedent and a false consequent, making
the whole not true but neuter. He assumes, of course,
22. For our purposes, we can state the law of neces-
sitation as follows: if a broad statement about the past
and future, such as (c), is true at all, then it is neces-
sarily true.
23. Prior, "Diodoran Modalities," p. 213.
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that an implication with a neuter antecedent and a false
consequent is itself not true but neuter. This assumption
holds in the three-valued logic of Lukasiewicz which Prior
presents in "Three-Valued Logic and Future Contingents."^^
This objection to (d) is based upon the assumption
that propositions admit of three truth-values. Prior
writes as if his readers have reasons to be sympathetic to
three-valued logic, but he makes no attempt to supply such
reasons. In "Three-Valued Logic and Future Contingents,"
Prior attempts to remove the initial repugnance that most
of us--including Prior--have to three-valued logic. in
that article he lucidly presents the three-valued logic of
Lukasiewicz, and relates it to the problem of the
truth-value of propositions about contingent future
events, as raised in Aristotle's Interpretatinnf>--a
problem which motivated Lukasiewicz's development of a
three-valued system. But only two reasons for admitting
three truth-values are presented in the article. First,
Prior claims that "Aristotle speaks of some propositions
about the future as being neither true nor false when they
are uttered, on the ground that there is as yet no
24. Arthur Prior, "Three-Valued Logic and Future Con-
tingents," Philosophical Quarterly 3 (1953), 317-26.
25. Ibid. This goal is made clear on page 317.
definite fact with which they can accord or conflict.
Second, Prior observes that
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,,26
adan^Pr^r""^.^! logic is admirablypted to the expression of this way of regardinastatements about contingent future events" Th^
arp dpfinif
of course, attaches to statements whiche e tely true, either because they refer to
that
'2 + 2 = 4'I or because
of which they speak has already come to pass orIS a ready coming to pass, or because its coming topass is already determined; the value 'O' to state-
ments which are definitely false for analogous
statements about theundetermined future.
These are not convincing reasons to believe that proposi-
tions admit of three truth values. They are based upon
the assumption, which Prior attributes to Aristotle, that
propositions about future contingent events are neither
true nor false. That assumption is just as implausible as
the intended conclusion that propositions admit of three
truth-values. Consider Aristotle's example:
7. There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
Common sense suggests that this proposition is either true
f^J-se. Afterall, there seem to be only two
possibilities for tomorrow's events: either they include a
sea battle or they don't. The proposition in question
seems to be true if they do, and false otherwise.
26. Ibid., p. 322.
27 . Ibid., p
.
323 .
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Of course conunon sense cannot always be trusted. if
it could be shown that the assumption that (7) is either
true or false leads to a contradiction, or perhaps to
fatalism, then perhaps we should think seriously about
giving it up. in that case, three-valued logic may begin
to look attractive. Perhaps arguments similar to the
Master Argument can be used to establish that the assump-
tion of exactly two truth-values leads to trouble. But
until that has been established. Prior’s first reason for
doubting (d) is weak.
In his book, £aai. Present
,
and £ntlirfi. Prior
presents a further reason to doubt (d). He first observes
that (d) can be defended by reasoning that if p is now
false and always will be false, then "it was the case at
least at the moment just gone that it would be always
2 8false thereafter." Assumption (d), however,
had begun about 1960 to strike me as dubious.
Theses which appeal, in order to gain intuitive
plausibility, to what was the case at 'the moment
just past', are liable to commit one to the view
that time is discrete. What if there is nfl 'moment
just past', but between any past moment, however
close to the present, and the present itself, there
is another moment still past? On this supposition,
[d] in fact fails.... It could be that p is now
false for the first time, though it will never be
true again; and in this case it has always been true
that p will be true; even in the very near past.
28. Arthur Prior, Present
,
and Future (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 33.
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bringing us as close as we like to the f
of its falsehood, 'it will be-true' mus
a tiny interval to verify it. ^
irst moment
t still have
Prior's second reason for doubting (d) is much
stronger than the first. Consider a proposition such as
8. No American is or has been the World ChessChampion
.
This proposition was true for a very long time. Sometime
during 1972, however, it became false due to the efforts
of Bobby Fischer. It has been false ever since, and will
remain false forever. If we accept this example, and if
we assume that time is uniform and connected and that
there is at least one moment of time before Fischer became
the world champion, then (d) implies that time is
discrete that is, (d) implies that time is isomorphic to
some subset of integers. To see this, let p be the propo-
sition (8), and let t be the moment at which Fischer
became the world champion. Hence at t, we have
-p & ~Fp.
By (d) we have P-Fp. Let s be a moment of time prior to
t, at which -Fp holds. Assume for reductio that time is
not isomorphic to any subset of integers. From this, and
0 n
the assumption that time is uniform. We know that there
is no moment directly preceding t. Thus there are some
moments (indeed infinitely many) between s and t. Since
29 . Ibid
.
,
p. 49
.
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-Fp holds at 3, -p must hold at all moments between s and
t. But This contradicts our assumption that t is the
first moment at which Fischer became champion (and hence
at which p became false). We may conclude that (d) Is
true only if time is discrete.
Is it reasonable to think that time is discrete? it
is true that we often speak, for example, of
-the moment
just preceding this one," or "one moment after midnight,"
etc. But upon reflection it is clear that in principle,
for each pair of moments there is a third inbetween them.
No matter how close together a pair of moments are, they
mark an interval of time. No matter how short the
interval, it is always in principle possible that some
event begins when that interval begins, and ends before
the interval ends. For instance, it seems to be in
principle possible for computers to make calculations at
ever increasing speeds. What takes a computer dozens of
nanoseconds to do today might be accomplished in fractions
of a nanosecond tomorrow. It is hard to imagine an
interval so short that it cannot, even in principle, be
divided
.
30. I assume that if time is uniform, then if the
whole of time is not isomorphic to any subset of the
integers then neither is any substantial segment of time.
A substantial segment of time includes more than one
moment
.
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I think this objection Is strong and convincing.
Accordingly, l follow Prior and reject (d).
There is another objection to Prior's reconstruction
of the Master Argument, an objection which I think is more
serious than the two presented by Prior. According to the
first premise, what is past is necessary: Pp
-M-Pp.
This plausible assumption lies at the heart of the Master
Argument, and it is also essential to the puzzle presented
in chapter one. In spite of its initial plausibility, I
think it is false. I shall argue in chapter five that if
any part of the future is open then so are at least some
parts of the past. I argue also that some parts of the
future are indeed open.
3
. Taylor ' a Argument
Richard Taylor describes the consequences of adopting
a fatalistic attitude towards life:
The consequences of doing so are obviously
momentous. To say nothing of the consolation of
fatalism— a consolation which enables one to view
all things as they arise, with the same undisturbed
mind with which he contemplates even the horrors of
remote history--the attitude of fatalism relieves
one's mind of all tendency toward both blame and
approbation of others and of both guilt and conceit
in himself. It promises one that a perfect
understanding of everything is at least possible,
even if never actually possessed. This thought
alone, once firmly grasped, yields a sublime
complacency toward everything that life offers,
whether to oneself or to his fellows; and while it
thereby reduces one's pride, it simultaneously
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enhances the feelings, opens the .heart, andenormously broadens one's understanding.^^
Perhaps some thinkers—unable to resist such enticement-
have become fatalists due to considerations such as these.
We need not pause to dispute the accuracy of Taylor's
alluring description. He does not base his argument for
fatalism upon the consequences of accepting it.
Instead, he bases his argument upon six claims, "each
of which recommends itself to the ordinary understanding
as soon as it is understood, and hardly any of which have
very often been doubted even by the most critical
philosophical minds, many of whom, however, have failed to
see their implicat ions .
"
( 57) For a list of all six, I
refer the reader to Taylor. The most important ones are
the first, third, and fifth. So far as I can tell, they
are the only ones used in the argument. The others are
used to meet various objections.
His first supposition is that "any proposition or
statement whatever is either true, or, if not true, then
false. "(57) This is simply the law of excluded middle.
His third supposition is that "if any change or state of
affairs is necessary for some other change or state of
31. Richard Taylor, Metaphys ics (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 57. Further references to
this book will be made in this section by enclosing page
numbers in parentheses.
62
affairs at the same or any other time, then the latter
cannot occur without the former occurring too, even though
they are logically unconnected ."( 58 ) By making this
supposition, Taylor means to Introduce the notion of one
state of affairs, q, being necessary for another state of
affairs, p. He adds.
A perhaps clearer
that if one state
another, then the
Oxygen, for instance,
means that we cannot
though it is Tiot
should
-
( 58
)
way of saying the same thing is
of affairs is essent i a 1 for
latter cannot occur without it.
is essential for life, which
normally live without it, even
logically impossible that we
When he says that q is necessary for p, or alternately,
that q is essential for p, he does not mean that q is
logically necessary for p, which is to say that p entails
q. Rather, he seems to mean something like, ”q is
physically necessary for p," which is to say that it is
physically necessary that if p then q. We said in chapter
one that a proposition is physically necessary, roughly
speaking, if it is required by the laws of physics. A
slightly broader notion may be useful here. A proposition
is physically necessary in a broader sense, if it is
required by the laws of any of the natural sciences.
Propositions required by the laws of biology or chemistry,
for instance, are physically necessary in this broader
sense. Taylor does not mention this notion, nor does he
ever explain what sense of "cannot occur without" he has
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in mind. But his remarks suggest this interpretation. I
think Taylor is suggesting, for example, that it's a law
of biology that If there Is life then there Is oxygen.
Hence, the proposition that there Is oxygen Is, In our
sense, essential for the proposition that there is life.
Taylor's fifth assumption is that "no agent can
perform any given action if there is lacking, at the same
or any other time, some condition or state of affairs
necessary for the occurrence of that act. "(58)
Argument . With these assumptions in the background,
Taylor describes a hypothetical situation upon which his
argument for fatalism is based.
Now let us imagine that I am a naval commander
about to issue my order of the day to the fleet. We
assume, further, that within the totality of other
conditions prevailing, my issuing of a certain kind
of order will ensure that a naval battle will occur
tomorrow, whereas if I issue another kind of order
this will ensure that no such battle occurs.
Now then, I am about to perform one or the other
of these two acts; namely, one of issuing an order
of the first sort or one of the second sort. We
shall call these alternative possible acts 0 and O'
respectively. And let us call the two propositions
"A naval battle will occur tomorrow" and "No naval
battle will occur tomorrow," Q and Q' respectively.
We can now assert that if I do act 0, then my doing
such will ensure that there will be a naval battle
(i.e., that Q is true), whereas if I do O' my doing
that will ensure that no naval battle will occur
(or, that Q' is true). (61)
Taylor then sets forth the following argument.
1. If Q is true, then it is not within my power to
do O' (for in case Q is true, then there is, or
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will be, lacking a condition essentdoing O', the condition, namely, of
no naval battle tomorrow)
.
i a 1 for my
there being
2. But if Q' is true, then it is not within mypower to do 0 (for a similar reason).
3. But either Q is true or Q' is true.
4. Either it is not within my power to do O, or itis not within my power to do O'.
In view of the fact that probably everything
anyone does, and certainly everything of any
significance that anyone ever does, has consequencesfor the future, so that, his act being sufficientfor those consequences, they are in turn necessary
conditions of his act, we can generalize upon this
conclusion by saying that, for any such act A,
either it is not within one's power to do A, or it
is not within his power to refrain from doing it,depending of course on which consequences are in
fact going to ensue
.( 61-62
)
^ Object i on . The first premise of Taylor's argument
says that if a naval battle will occur tomorrow, then it
is not within Taylor's power to issue an order of the
second sort. At first glance this premise is as
implausible as fatalism itself. It. seems obvious that he
can issue an order of the first sort, and also that he can
issue an order of the second sort. Even if he in fact
will issue one of the first sort, and even if doing so
will result in a naval battle tomorrow, he still could
issue an order of the second sort. It appears, then, that
(1) is simply false.
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We cannot, however, dismiss Taylor's first premise so
easily, because he offers an argument to support it. His
first premise is based upon these two assumptions:
a. There being no naval battle tomorrow is
essential for Taylor's issuing an order of the
second sort.
b. is essential for p, and q is not true, then
p is not within anyone's power.
Although assumptions (a) and (b) entail Taylor's first
premise, neither is true. Taylor speaks of "a certain
kind of order," and "another kind of order," though he
doesn t say what kinds he has in mind. It is natural to
assume that he had in mind some garden-variety kinds of
order, paradigms of which are, 'Batten down the hatches!',
'Hoist the mainsail!', 'Attack!', and 'Retreat!' If he
had these kinds of command in mind, or any kinds of
command likely to be used by a naval commander, then
surely (a) is false. For any ordinary kind of command, k,
there being no naval battle tomorrow is not essential for
Taylor's issuing an order of kind k. No matter how
despotic Taylor is as a naval commander, and no matter how
obsequious is his fleet, it is still not physically neces-
sary that if he gives an order of a certain kind then
there will be no naval battle tomorrow. The laws of
physics, chemistry, and biology do not rule out the possi-
bility that his fleet will disobey his order. Nor do they
rule out the possibility that his fleet obeys but screws
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up, or obeys but is unable to engage in battle, etc.
Even if we set aside this difficulty, a deeper one
remains. Assumption (b) appears to be a more careful
statement of Taylor's fifth supposition, namely "that no
agent can perform any given action if there is lacking, at
the same or any other time, some condition or state of
affairs necessary for the occurrence of that act. "(58)
This is one of the claims that, according to Taylor,
"recommends itself to the ordinary understanding as soon
as it is understood. "(57) But, if we interpret this claim
as (b), there is little to recommend it. If there is one
proposition that is within someone's power, but is not
true, then (b) is false. For let r be such a proposition.
It is clear that r is essential for r. Thus, if we
replace both p and q in assumption (b) by r, the anteced-
ent is satisfied. Yet, the consequent is false because by
hypothesis r is within someone's power.
Are there any propositions that are within someone's
power, but are not true? I suggested at the beginning of
this chapter that such propositions are easy to find. I
gave an example about Joe's and Bub's in which I claimed
that on Friday afternoon it was accessible that I would
dine at Bub's on Friday night, even though I in fact dined
at Jog's. Although I described that example in terms of
accessibility, essentially the same point can be made in
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terms of power. As of Friday afternoon it was within my
power to dine at Bub’s on Friday night, although it was
not true that I would do so. Perhaps in Taylor's
imaginary situation, it is within his power to issue a
command of the first sort, but false that he will do so.
If I am correct about these examples, then (b) is
false. From the facts that q is essential for p, and that
q is not true, it does not follow that p is not within
anyone s power. It does follow, however, that p is not
true, and hence that no one has in fact seen to it that p
is true. Thus, if anyone has it within their power to see
to it that p, that power will remain unexercised.
Once again, the staunch fatalist could simply refuse
to accept my examples. Taylor could insist that on Friday
afternoon it was not within my power to eat at Bub's on
Friday night. But Taylor is using (b) in an argument to
support fatalism. He tries to pass it off as an assump-
tion that is obvious, or self-evident. If his argument is
to be convincing, he must either give an argument for (b)
,
or at least attempt to explain away its implaus ibility
.
He owes us an explanation of (b).
I have argued that (b) is false; however, it is not
the only interpretation of Taylor's fifth supposition.
That supposition could also mean,
c. If q is essential for p, then it is not within
anyone's power to see to it that both -q and p.
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Given our sense of 'essential', this assumption does
indeed recommend itself to the ordinary understanding as
soon as it is understood. it is natural to assume that
none of us can change the laws of nature. If so, then if
it is physically necessary that if p then q, then no one
can see to it that p and -q. if we interpret Taylor's
fifth assumption as (c), then it's true, but it won’t help
his argument. Assumptions (a) and (c) are not strong
enough to entail the first premise, namely,
1. If there will be a naval battle tomorrow, then
it is not within [Taylor's] power to issue an
order of the second sort.
They do entail that if there will be a naval battle
tomorrow, then it is not within Taylor's power to see to
it that both there is a naval battle tomorrow and Taylor
issues an order of the second sort. But that result is of
no use to the argument.
To summarize my objection, Taylor's first premise is
false. No matter which sort of order Taylor will in fact
issue in the hypothetical situation he describes, he could
just as easily issue an order of the other sort.
Moreover, the argument he offers in support of (1) does
not help him, because both of its premises are false. If
the second premise, (b)
,
is replaced by (c), then the ar-
gument supporting (1) becomes invalid.
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C. Tay lor ' s Rep ly . Taylor is aware of criticisms such as
mine
.
The most philosophically sophisticated criticism
of fatalistic arguments of the kind here presented,
and one which is centuries old, amounts essentially
to denying our fifth datum, to the effect that no
agent is able to perform any given act in the
absence of some condition necessary for its
accomplishment. It is often claimed that' all this
means, really, is that it is impossible, as a simple
matter of logic, ][iQth that an agent should perform a
certain act, and that there should be lacking some
condition necessary for his doing that act. From
this it does not follow, it is claimed, that the
agent is unable to do that act, but only, that he
iinaa. not do it and this is perfectly consistent
with his still having the ability to do it.
Thus, a gymnast does not lift a weight if he has
no weight to lift, but the absence of this necessary
condition for lifting a weight does not diminish his
strength or his ability to lift weights. Indeed, if
the absence of a weight were a necessary condition,
not merely of his lifting it, but of his ahi 1 i ty tolift it, then it would logically follow that his
mere ability to lift it would be a sufficient
condition for a weight's being present, that his
strength would by itself guarantee the perpetual
presence of a weight! Gymnasts are sometimes able
to lift weights even when none are present, just as
musicians are able to make music even when they are
not doing so, and horsemen are able to ride horses
even when they are walking. The argument for
fatalism is, then, it is suggested, a simple non
sequitur
.
Now all this is true in the usual sense of
ability, which consists in having the skill,
strength, equipment, or knowing how. But to make
that point is really to miss the point. If there is
lacking some condition C, necessary for my doing a
certain act A, or which is such that A cannot occur
without it, then not only do I not do A, I cannot do
it, no matter what my natural or acquired abilities
might be. This is perfectly obvious when one
considers necessary conditions which are lacking in
the past. It should be no less obvious when one
considers necessary conditions which are lacking in
the future
.
(64-65
)
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In the first paragraph, Taylor isolates the objection
which I have raised against (b). in the second he
elaborates upon it, and in the third he presents his
reply. His response is best understood as having two
parts. First, he draws attention to the sense of ability
or power upon which he thinks the objection rests. Then
he replies to the objection, understood with that sense of
ability or power.
What Taylor calls the "usual sense of ability” is
different from our notion of accessibility. Taylor's
sense of ability "consists in having the skill, strength,
equipment, or knowing how.” The differences between
Taylor s sense of ability and our sense of accessibility
can be drawn out by using examples. Suppose that George
is a gymnast of sound mind and body, who is sunbathing at
the beach at time t. There are no weights at this beach.
In Taylor's sense, presumably, it is within George's power
as of t to lift a weight at t. The absence of weights
"does not diminish his strength or his ability to lift
weights.” Or suppose that no naval battle occurred yes-
terday, and no headline describing a battle appears in
today's paper. In Taylor's sense of ability, nonetheless,
"I have the ability to read a certain kind of headline--my
vision is all right, I know how to read, and so on--and
hence am able to do something sufficient for the
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occurrence of a naval battle yesterday, even though there
was no such battle, and therefore so.e condition is
lacking, necessary for there being any such headline tor
me to read. "(65) Taylor apparently places little weight on
notion of equipment. George the gymnast has the
ability, in this sense, to lift a weight at t, even though
me necessary equipment--a weight
— is lacking. Taylor
has the ability, in this sense, to read a headline of a
certain kind, even though some necessary equipment
—
a
newspaper with the that kind of headline-is lacking. it
would have been less misleading had Taylor omitted the
notion of equipment from his comments about his sense of
ability.
By contrast, in our sense of 'accessible', it is not
accessible as of t that George lift a weight at t. George
cannot lift a weight at t for the simple reason that no
weights are there for him to lift. Nor is it accessible
that Taylor read a headline describing a naval battle that
occurred yesterday. There simply is no such headline for
him to read.
What is Taylor's reply? He first grants that in his
sense of ability or power, there are unactual states of
affairs within someone's power. George isn't lifting a
weight at t, yet it is within his power, in Taylor's
sense, to do so. "But to make that point," he continues.
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is really to miss the point. if there iqsome condition c, necessary for my doinq a certain
tt! d^ rri:/rl
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natural or acquired abilities "mighte. is IS perfectly obvious when one consldLsnecessary conditions which are lacking In the oast
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At first glance It looks as though Taylor Is merely
reiterating his fifth datum. But I suspect he is saying
more. l think he is saying that his notion of ability is
not relevant to his fifth datum-our (b)-because his
fifth datum uses a notion of ability or power that is akin
to our notion of accessibility. He says of act A that "I
cannot, do it, no matter what my natural or acquired
abilities might be.” This explanation of Taylor's remarks
would explain why the observation that there are some
unactual states of affairs within someone's power, in his
sense of power, "misses the point."
My suspicion is confirmed in Taylor's next paragraph.
For example, we noted that if conditions are such
that a naval battle yesterday is a necessary
condition for there being a certain kind of headline
today, then, given that no such battle occurred, we
can conclude not only that I do not read such a
headline, but that I cannot , that it is not within
my power [i.e., accessible], for there is just no
such headline for me to read. This is perfectly
consistent with my knowing how to read it, having
the requisite skill and vision, and so on, and thus
being able in that sense [i.e., Taylor's sense]. (65)
Taylor can therefore agree that in his sense, there are
some unactual states of affairs within his power. It does
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not follow that in our sense, there are some unactual
states of affairs that are accessible. He claims further
that the criticism in question rests upon his notion of
ability or power. But it seems that something like our
notion of accessibility is relevant to his fifth datum.
It is true that remarks about Taylor's notion of
ability or power do not bear directly upon his fifth
datum, because that datum appeals not to Taylor's notion
of power, but to something like our notion of accessibil-
ity. But this observation does not meet the objection I
raised against (b)
. That objection was stated not in
terms of Taylor's notion of power, but rather in terms of
a notion of power akin to accessibility. The objection,
briefly, is that it was within my power, in our sense, to
dine at Bub's, even though I went to Joe's instead. That
implies that there was an accessible proposition that was
not true, namely that I will dine at Bub's. Hence (b) is
false. Taylor's reply does not bear upon this reasoning.
4 . Conclus ion
Fatalism provides us with a solution to our puzzle
about divine foreknowledge. But the price we must pay is
too high. Fatalism is itself an unpalatable position;
moreover it leads to unalterabilism, which in turn forces
us to give up the intuition that there is something
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someone can but will not do. m the absence
successful argument for fatalism, it is best to look
other solutions to our puzzle.
of a
for
CHAPTER I I I
ETERNAL ISM
1 • IntroHuct i nn
According to the second solution to our puzzle, there
never was a time at which God was omniscient. This is the
solution endorsed by medieval philosophers such as
Augustine, Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas. To be sure,
they held that God is omniscient; but they insisted that
God is also eternal. On their view, God's knowledge is
not properly called f^ineknowledge
. God does not know
things before they happen, because God is not a temporal
being. Rather, God exists outside of time. God's
knowledge is not subject to time in the way that ours is.
In this chapter, I reconstruct a medieval version of
the puzzle, and a medieval response—both to be found in
Aquinas. Aquinas's response is based upon the doctrine
that God is eternal. Some philosophers think that this
doctrine is incoherent. I think some sense can be made of
1. For example, Anthony Kenny, Aquinas
, a Collection
Critical Essays (London, 1969), p. 264: "The whole
concept of a timeless eternity, the whole of which is
simultaneous with every part of time, seems to be
radically incoherent."
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the medieval concept of eternity. i try to explain
eternity by contrasting the medieval topology of time with
the standard topology of time. I argue in the end,
however, that the medieval view of eternity, sophisticated
though it may be, does not provide an adequate solution to
the puzzle.
2. A Med i eva
1
Statement of hhft Prnhl Pm
In Dfi i t ate f Aquinas asks whether God knows
singular future contingents. He then considers the
following argument for the negative answer.
7. In every true conditional, if the antecedent
IS absolutely necessary, then the consequent is ab-
solutely necessary. But this conditional is true:
if something was known by God, that will be. There-fore, since this antecedent, namely, this was knownby God, is absolutely necessary, the consequent willbe absolutely necessary. Therefore, it is necessary
that everything known by God exists absolutely.
That this is absolutely necessary, namely, this wasknown by God, is proved thus: this is something said
about the past, so if it is true, it is necessary;
because what was cannot not have been. Therefore,
it is absolutely necessary.
In this passage Aquinas poses a problem concerning God's
knowledge of future contingents. This problem may appear
superficially to be different from the problem of fore-
2. Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate
.
qu. 2, art. 12. I
thank Robert Sleigh for this translation, which is from
Omnia, ed. Stanislai Eduardi Frette, vol. 14 (Paris:
Ludovicum Vives, 1889), p. 376
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knowledge and freedom. But they boll down to the same
issues. If we have freedom, then there are contingent
statements about the future that describe alternative
courses of action that are still open to us. if God knows
in advance what actions we will perform, then God must
know the relevant future contingents which describe those
actions
.
The argument in the above passage turns upon the as-
sumption that if something true is said about the past,
then it is necessary. Aquinas speaks here of absolute
necessity, and it is natural to interpret this as either
logical or metaphysical necessity. But we saw in chapter
one that the past is neither logically nor metaphysically
necessary. To make the argument plausible we must inter-
pret "absolute necessity" in some other way. As one might
expect, I suggest that we use the concept of unalterabil-
ity.
In the argument, Aquinas speaks of "true
conditionals." Conditionals come in many kinds, of
course: there are material, subjunctive, and many
varieties of strict conditionals. I think it is fair to
interpret Aquinas's conditionals as strict conditionals,
because his notion of absolute necessity plays such a
prominent role in the argument. I interpret absolute
necessity as unalterability
. Thus a conditional, on my
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interpretation o£ Aquinas, Is a statement o£ the form, it
is unalterable that if A then B.
3
.
The Argument ReconstructpH
Aquinas's argument can now be formulated. The three
principal assumptions are:
1. If the antecedent of a true conditional is unal-terable, then the consequent is unalterable.
2. It is unalterable that if God knew that A then
A.
3. If it was true that A, then it is now unalter-
able that it was true that A.
From these premises it follows that whatever God knew is
now unalterable. To see this, suppose that God knew, say
yesterday, that A. By ( 3 )
,
it is now unalterable that God
knew yesterday that A. From (2), it is unalterable that
if God knew yesterday that A, then A. Thus by (1), it is
now unalterable that A. Hence
4. If God knew that A then it is unalterable that
A.
The argument is not yet complete. Its conclusion is that
whatever God knows (in the present) is unalterable. We
can reach that conclusion by adding the assumption that
5. If God knows that A, then God knew that A.
From (4) and (5) it follows that
6. If God knows that A then it is unalterable that
A.
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There are two minor problems with this argument.
Premises (2) and (5) are false. (2) says in effect that
whatever God knew in the past is still true in the
present. But there are many propositions that were true
in the past, and presumably were known by God, that are
not true in the present. Consider the proposition: I am
seventeen years old. This was true, and presumably was
known by God. But it is true no longer.
Premise (5) is false for similar reasons. it says
that everything God knows now was known by God in the
past. But like us, God can know only things that are
true. And there are many things that are true now that
have never been true in the past. For example, I am 9740
days old. (I write this on June 2, 1983.) This was never
true before, and hence was never known by God.
Both of these problems can be solved by assuming for
the sake of argument that some statements are tenseless.
Examples that are often suggested are the truths of
mathematics. Consider the statement, '2 < 3'. It is
suggested that the less-than sign is in neither the
present tense, nor the past tense, nor the future tense.
^
On the suggestion in question, the less-than sign simply
3. See W. V. 0. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge,
Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1960), chap. 5, sec. 36, esp. pp.
170-71.
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has no tense. it merely expresses a mathematical relation
that holds timelessly between two and three. other
examples are drawn from philosophy. Philosophers often
use expressions such as "p is true at f or ”s believes p
at t,” in circumstances under which t is allowed to range
over past, present, and future times. This seems to
suggest that the 'is' or 'believes' in such phrases has no
tense at all. Let us indicate the tenseless form of a
verb by placing a bar above it."^ Thus ' loves
' ,
and
'kisses' are examples of tenseless verb forms.
Among the statements we can make with tenseless verbs
are a special class that will help us solve the problem
with premises (2) and (5). These are what I call time-
indexed tenseless statements. The canonical form for such
a statement is "A at t," where t rigidly designates a time
and A is a tenseless statement. For example,
Reagan is elected at 8 P.M. on November 4, 1980.
Breshnev dies at 2 A.M. on November 10, 1982.
Such statements often sound like headlines that appear in
newspapers. Every time-indexed tenseless statement has an
important feature: when used normally, it expresses a
4. I borrow this notational device from Nicholas
Wolterstorf f
,
"God Everlasting," in God and the Good . ed
.
Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1975), pp. 181-203.
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proposition which Is true at all' times If true at any
time. Let us call the propositions expressed by time-
indexed tenseless statements, time-indexed tenseless prop-
03 it ions
.
Premise (2) is true if the schematic letter 'A' is
restricted to time-indexed tenseless statements. Let A be
time-indexed and tenseless. Suppose that God knew at some
earlier time t that A. Then it was true at t that A.
Since A is time-indexed and tenseless
,
it is true now that
A. This reasoning will hold for any possible world; hence
it is necessary that if God knew that A then A. And
surely, whatever is necessary is unalterable
;
hence
premise (2). Premise (5) is also true when A is
restricted to time-indexed tenseless statements, provided
that God has always been omniscient. Let A be time-
indexed and tenseless, and suppose that God knows that A.
Then it is true that A, and hence was true, say yesterday,
that A. If God was omniscient yesterday, then God knew
yesterday that A. Let us assume hereafter that the
schematic letters in our argument are restricted to time-
indexed tenseless statements.
The argument is now impressive. It is valid, and the
premises seem undeniable. Given our interpretation of
'true conditional', (1) says that if the antecedent of an
unalterable material conditional is unalterable, then the
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consequent is unalterable. It Is reasonable to demand
that a condition such as this hold for any acceptable
sense of necessity, we have just seen that (2) Is true
when restricted to time-indexed tenseless statements. (3)
seems difficult to deny. (5) is also true when restricted
to time-indexed tenseless statements, provided that God
has always been omniscient. Finally, the conclusion Is
equivalent to
7. If it is not unalterable that A then God does
not know that A.
(7) entails that if it is open that A then God does not
know that A. Put briefly, "God knows no contingents."
From this result it follows that divine omniscience
is incompatible with human freedom. For if we are free,
then there are many open statements describing our future
acts. Consider
I plant peppers at noon on May 1, 1984.
I refrain from planting peppers at noon on May 1,
1984. ^
If I can freely plant peppers, then both of these state-
ments are accessible as of now; hence both are open. Thus
if God knows no open propositions, then God knows neither
of these statements. Yet, one of them is true: assuming
that I live long enough, one of them describes an act that
I will execute in the Spring. It follows that God is not
omn isc lent
.
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4 • Aq u i n 1^ s ' fi Respnnfiia
When responding to this argument, Aquinas defends it
against many objections. He defends the first three
premises and indeed, grants that in some sense the conclu-
sion is true. in some sense of
• knows
’, whatever God
knows is unalterable, or alternatively, God knows no con-
tingents. Lest someone should infer that omniscience
conflicts with freedom, Aquinas hastens to add that the
claim in question is ambiguous. It could mean that God
does not know any contingents aa future, or it could mean
that God does not know any contingents aa present , Aquinas
admits that God does not know contingents as future, but
insists, of course, that God does know them as present.
This move might sound to some like the ad hoc reply
of a desperate philosopher who refuses to give up either
God's omniscience or our freedom at any cost. But I think
it isn't. No doubt, giving up either God's omniscience or
our freedom was never a serious option for Aquinas. But
that does not make his reply ad hoc. His reply is based
upon fundamental features of the medieval view of God.
According to the medievals, God is eternal. God exists
outside of time. Thus God's knowledge is not temporal,
like ours. To express the distinction between temporal
knowledge and eternal knowledge, medieval philosophers
speak of knowing as future versus knowing as present. To
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understand Aquinas's response, we must first understand
the distinction between knowi ng as future and knowing as
present. To do that, we must first understand the
medieval doctrine that God Is eternal. it will be useful
to start with an explanation of what it is for a being to
be temporal.
5. Temporal i ty and Etemify
Time can be characterized in first-order logic by
interpreting the domain of quantification as the set of
all instants or moments of time, and by selecting a binary
predicate to represent the earlier-than relation. The
following axioms characterize what has come to be called
the standard topology of time.
Tl. yt-(t < t)
T2. Hsyt(s < t — > -(t < s))
T3. WrHsyt(r < g < t — > r < t)
T4. ysyt(s t (s < t V t < s))
T5. yrys3t(r < s — > r < t < s)
T6. ys3t(s < t)
T7. ys3t(t < s)
Tl ( ir r ef lex ivity ) asserts that no moment is earlier than
itself. T2 (asymmetry) asserts that if s is earlier than
t then t is not earlier than s. T2 entails Tl. T3
(transitivity) asserts that if r is earlier than s and s
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is earlier than t, then r is earlier than t. T4 (con-
nectedness) asserts that if s and t are distinct moments,
then either s is earlier than t or t is earlier than s.
Tl, T2, T3, and T4 together guarantee that time is linear.
T5 (density) asserts that between any two distinct moments
there is a third distinct moment. T6 (non-ending) asserts
that there is a moment after any given moment, and T7
(non-beginning) asserts that there is a moment before any
5given moment.
Talk about past, present, and future times can be
formalized by selecting a constant, say, n (for 'now') to
designate the present moment of time, and by selecting
three unary predicates, say, p, q , and F, to mean
respectively, "is past," "is present," and "is future."
The following axioms characterize pastness, presentness,
and futureness.
T8. Ut(Pt t < n)
T9. yt(Qt 4-> t = n)
TlO.Bt(Ft n < t)
These axioms say that a moment is past if and only if it
is earlier than now, present if and only if it is now, and
future if and only if now is earlier than it. T8
,
T9, and
5. For an illuminating discussion of the topology of
time, see W. H. Newton-Smith, The Structur e of T 1 me
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), chs. 3-6.
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TIO are not intended to comprise an informative
philosophical theory of pastness, presentness, and
futureness. Nor are they intended to provide a
satisfactory account of the way in which 'now' functions
in English. They are intended to show merely that the
past, the present, and the future can be characterized in
first order logic. A given interpretation of axioms T1
through TIO will depict a "slice of time;" that is, it
will depict the temporal relations and properties that
apply to the moments of time, as of a given time.
According to this characterization of time, the
defining feature of temporality is the earlier-than
relation. This suggests a simple way to characterize a
temporal being:
Dl: X is temporal =df x exists at some moment that
is either earlier or later than some other
moment
.
With this notion of temporality in mind, we now turn to
the medieval notion of eternity.
How do medieval philosophers describe eternity?
Augustine writes in his rnnf j nns •
Your years neither go nor come, but our years pass
and others come after them, so that they all may
come in their turn. Your years are completely
present to you all, at once, because they are at a
permanent standstill.
Boethius offers his classic definition of eternity in book
five of The Consolation of. Philosophy :
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Eternity is the complete possession of an endlesslife enjoyed as one simultaneous whole fAneternal being] must necessarily always be its ’’whole
^*^changingly present to itself and I-Hp
present
Anselm says in his Proalnginn^ .
Thou
tomor
art
;
tomor
t ime
.
exist
noth i
exist
thee
.
rnw-^hnh y®3terday, nor wilt thou be
or'
y«®terday and today and tomorrow thou
' neither yesterday nor today norrow thou art; but simply, thou art, outside allFor yesterday and today and tomorrow have noence, except in time; but thou, althoughng exists without thee, nevertheless dost notgin space or time, but all things exist in
Finally, Aquinas writes in his auiiuna Theologi;^P that
two things
existing in
lacks both
regarded
characterize eternity. First, anything
eternity is
.unending, that is to say,beginning and end (for both may be
as ends). Secondly, eternity itself exigts
dJistantaneoi i fi whole lacking successiveness.
These writers
eternity. First,
suggest three main ideas concerning
to say that God is eternal is to say
6. Augustine, £.onf eaa 1 ons
,
trans. R. s. Pine-Coffin
( Harmondsworth
,
Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1961),bk. 11, chap. 13, p. 263.
7. Boethius, The CimaQlat ion nl Philosophy , ed . and
abr. James J. Buchanan (New York: Frederick Ungar
Publishing Co., 1957), pp. 62-63.
8. Anselm, Eroalogium, in Saint Anselm : Basic
Mrit inga
,
trans. S. N. Deane (La Salle, Illinois: Open
Court, 1962), chap. 19, p. 25.
9. Thomas Aquinas, Suinina Theolog iae
,
ed
. Thomas Gilby
(Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books, 1969), vol. 1, pt . 1, qu.
10, art. 1, p. 144.
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that God's life is unending. By this they mean that God's
life has no beginning and no end. Second, to say that God
is eternal is to imply that God is not subject to time in
the way that we are. in Augustine's words, "[God's] years
neither go nor come, but our years pass and others come
after them." As Aquinas puts it, eternity "lacks
successiveness." Third, to say that God is eternal is to
imply that God sees or experiences everything as if it
happened all at once. In Augustine's words "[God's] years
are present to [God] all at once, because they are at a
permanent standstill." m the words of Boethius, "the
infinity of changing time must be as one present before
[God]." In the words of Aquinas, eternity exists as an
"instantaneous whole." There are, of course, many ways to
articulate these ideas. The last two, that eternity lacks
successiveness and that eternity exists as an
instantaneous whole, suggest that eternity is an instant
or moment of time that is neither earlier nor later than
any other moment of time. The medievals seem to be
suggesting that there is only one such moment, and that an
eternal being is a being whose entire life occurs at that
moment. That is,
D2 : X is eternal =df eternity is the only moment at
which X exists.
If a being x is eternal in this sense, then there is a
sense in which x's life has a beginning and an end.
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Eternity is the first and last moment of x's life, since
there are no earlier moments of x's life, and no later
moments of x's life. But it is odd to speak this way.
The life of an eternal being is outside of the ordinary
temporal array (the set of moments that are connected by
the earller-than relation). The "first” moment of its
life never passes, and neither does the "last." it is
more useful, in this context, to observe that the life of
an eternal being never began and will never end. To say
that x's life began is to say that there is a moment
earlier than now that is the first moment of x's life. To
say that x's life will end is to say that there is a
moment later than now that is the last moment of x's life.
Since no moments in the life of an eternal being are
earlier or later than now, an eternal life never began and
will never end.
We can characterize the medieval view of eternity by
modifying the above axioms. Instead of assuming that all
moments of time are connected by the earlier-than relation
(T4), we assume that all moments except eternity are con-
nected by the earlier-than relation. Instead of assuming
10. By speaking of "the medieval view of eternity” I
do not, of course, mean to imply that all medieval philos-
ophers endorse the view in guestion. Ockham is a
noteworthy exception.
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that ever
by some
eternity
moment
.
medieval
following
y moment is followed by some moment, and preceded
moment, we assume that every moment except
is followed by some moment, and preceded by some
The resulting view, which we may call the
topology of time, is characterized by the
axioms
.
El. Bt-(t < t)
E2. UsHt(s < t — >
-(t < 3) )
E3. HrHsUt(r <3<t--> r < t)
E4. WsWt(s f e y t y s —
>
( 3 < t V t
E5. BrBs3t(r < 3 — > r < t < 3)
E6. Us3t(s f 0 1 1 'V CO t)
E7. Ws3t(s y e — > t < 3)
E8. Bt-(t < <5 V e < t)
E9. Wt(Ws-(s < t V t < 3) --> t = e)
El ( irref lexivity)
,
E2 (asymmetry), and E3 (transitivity)
are the same as before. E4 (a restricted version of con-
nectedness) asserts that for any two distinct moments that
are each distinct from e (eternity), one is earlier than
the other. E5 (density) is unchanged. E6 (a revised
version of non-ending) asserts that any moment other than
e is followed by some moment. E7 (a revised version of
non-beginning) asserts that any moment other than e is
preceded by some moment. E8 (eternity) asserts that e is
an eternal moment. E9 (uniqueness) asserts that e is the
90
only eternal moment. An equivalent eet of axioms is
obtained by deleting E8 and changing the conditional in E9
to a biconditional.
It might sound puzzling to suggest that there could
be a moment of time that is neither earlier nor later than
any moment of time. it is tempting to believe that if a
particular item is neither earlier nor later than any
moment of time, then it simply cannot be a moment of time.
This temptation is based upon the intuition that all
moments of time are essentially related to other moments
of time by the earlier-than relation. In spite of this
unimpeachable intuition, the medieval suggestion that
there is a unique eternal moment is not formally
incoherent. We have just seen that this suggestion can be
characterized using nothing more than the earlier-than
relation and first order logic.
Since eternity is a moment of time, the medievals can
say sensibly that propositions are true at eternity. This
suggests a simple characterization of eternal truths. A
proposition p is an eternal truth if and only if p is true
at eternity. By contrast, a temporal truth is a proposi-
tion that is true, but is not an eternal truth.
Before turning to the distinction between knowing as
present and knowing as future, it will be helpful to make
some observations about simultaneity. Simultaneity can be
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thought of 33 either a binary relation between moments
time, or a binary relation between events. The follow!
are two plausible characterizations of the simultaneity
of
ng
of
moments
.
V
with t if and only if -(3 < t
9. 3 is simultaneous with t if and only ifUr((r < 3 <-> r < t) & (s < r 4-> t < r))
(8) asserts that s is simultaneous with t if and only if
neither is earlier than the other. (9) asserts that s is
simultaneous with t if and only if every moment earlier
than one is earlier than the other, and every moment later
than one is later than the other. On the standard
topology of time, (8) and (9) are equivalent. Axioms T1
( irref lexivity) and T4 (connectedness) are enough to
guarantee that equivalence. Furthermore, it is a theorem
that s is simultaneous with t if and only if s = t.
However, on the medieval topology of time, (8) and (9) are
not equivalent. Given the medieval topology and (8), for
example, each moment is simultaneous with itself, and each
moment is simultaneous with eternity. On this view, s is
simultaneous with t if and only if s = t or s = e or
t = e. Given the medieval topology and (9), on the other
hand, each moment is simultaneous with itself, but the
only moment simultaneous with eternity is eternity itself.
On this view, s is simultaneous with t if and only if
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3 = t .
Given the standard topology of time and either (8) or
(9), simultaneity is transitive. That is, for any moments
r, 3, and t, if r is simultaneous with s and s is simul-
taneous with t, then r is simultaneous with t. This
result also holds given the medieval topology of time and
(9). On the other hand, given the medieval topology of
time and (8), simultaneity is not transitive. For let r
be some ordinary" moment, let s be eternity, and let t be
some "ordinary" moment distinct from r. Then r is simul-
taneous with s, and s is simultaneous with t, because s,
being eternity, is simultaneous with every moment. Yet, r
is not simultaneous with t. However, given the medieval
topology of time and (8), simultaneity is transitive when
restricted to "ordinary" moments of time—moments other
than eternity. That is, for any moments r, s, and t, if
I 7^ e , s f e, and t ^ e, then if r is simultaneous with s
and s is simultaneous with t, then r is simultaneous with
t
.
The simultaneity of events can now be characterized
in terms of the simultaneity of moments. Let e and f be
events. Then,
10. e is simultaneous with f if and only if Bt[(e is
occurring at t 3s(s is simultaneous with t &
f is occurring at s)) & (f is occurring at t -->
3s (
s
is simultaneous with t & e is occurring at
s))]
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This says that e Is simultaneous with t It and only If
each moment at which one Is occurring Is simultaneous with
eome moment at wh Ich the other Is. occurr ing
. Given the
standard topology of time and either characterization ot
the simultaneity of moments (either 8 or 9), (lo) is
equivalent to the following.
11. e is simultaneous with f if and only if utfe isoccurring at t f is occurring at t)
This says that e is simultaneous with f if and only if
they are both occurring at exactly the same moments of
time. Given the medieval topology of time and (9), it
also turns out that (10) is equivalent to (11). However,
given the medieval topology and (8), (10) is not
equivalent to (11). Given the medieval topology, (8), and
(10), any event that is occurring at eternity is simultan-
eous with every event. Whereas, given the medieval
topology, (8), and (11), an event that is occurring only
at eternity is not simultaneous with any event that is not
occurring at eternity.
We have now seen two characterizations of simultane-
ity for moments, (8) and (9), and two for events, (10) and
(8) (10) will be particularly useful in
reconstructing the medieval view of God and time.
Henceforth, the view expressed by El—E9, (8), and (10)
will be called the medieval view of time.
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6. Knowing ia Enture aa* Knowing proaont-
We turn now to the distinction between knowing as
future and knowing as present. Aquinas characterizes this
distinction in He Ver i taf p
••• it would be impossible for God to
futur^^^
future contingents if He knew them asure Now, something is known as future when an
stands between the event
H
’^'^o'^ledge. This order, however, cannot be
qent thinr^wh^f knowledge and any contin-g ng whatsoever; but the relation of theivine knowledge to anything whatsoever is like thatof present to present. ^
A simple way to characterize this distinction is by
appealing to the ordinary notion of knowledge at a time,
and the notion of a proposition being "about the future"
of a given time. The first is clear enough: obviously,
what a person knows at one time may differ from what that
person knows at another time. The second is not as clear.
But we will have no need to place much weight upon the
notion of "about the future." So, I think it is clear
enough for our purposes. With these two notions, we can
define knowledge as future as follows.
D3: X knows as future at t that A =df x knows at t
that A and A is about the future as of t.
For example, to say that I know as future now that I will
11. Thomas Aquinas, TnULh, trans. Robert W. Mulligan
(Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952), vol. 1, gu. 2, art.
12, p. 119.
95
plant peppers is to say that (a) I know now that I will
plant peppers and (b) the claim that I will plant peppers
IS a claim about the future as of now. it is plausible to
suppose that the proposition in question Is. about the
future as of now, for if it is true now, then there is a
time in the future of now at which I plant peppers. As
Aquinas would put it, an order of past and future stands
between the event—my planting peppers
— and the
knowledge—my knowing now that I will plant them. So,
knowledge as future is ordinary temporal knowledge of some
proposition about the future.
By contrast, something is known as present,
presumably, if no order of past and future stands between
the event and the knowledge. For example, you know now
that you are reading this paragraph; and it is true now
that you are reading this paragraph. Since the event is
neither earlier nor later than the knowledge, Aquinas
would say, presumably, that you know as present that you
are reading this paragraph. So, one way to know something
as present is to have ordinary temporal knowledge of some
proposition that is "about the present."
Given the medieval view of time, there is another way
to know something as present. No order of past and
present stands between eternity and any ordinary moment of
time. Thus, whenever someone knows at eternity of some
96
temporal event, the event in question is neither earlier
nor later than the knowledge of it. These remarks suggest
the following definition of knowledge as present.
D4: A being x knows as present at t that A
-dfeither X knows at t that A and A is about the
eternity^^ ^ ^ is
For example, if you know now that you are reading this
sentence, and if the proposition that you are reading this
sentence is about the present as of now, then you know as
present now that you are readihg this sentence. If God
knows at eternity that I plant peppers at noon on May 1,
1984, then God knows as present at eternity that I plant
peppers at noon May 1, 1984.
7. Mhat Does Giid Know ?
According to medieval philosophers, then, God is
eternal and omniscient. These two attributes may appear
to conflict. Presumably a person cannot know something at
a time t unless he or she exists at t. And the only
things a person can know at t are things that are true at
t. On the medieval view, then, the only time at which God
can know anything is eternity, and the only things God can
know then are things that are true at eternity— the
eternal truths. It follows that God does not know any
temporal truths. God does not know that you were born,
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nor that you are alive, nor that you will die. God does
not know that Reagan was elected president, nor that
Breshnev died. Although these things are true in the
temporal present (now), they are not true at eternity. it
Is not true at eternity that Reagan Mas elected president,
because there is no time earlier than eternity; hence
there 1s no time earlier than eternity at which Reagan
could have won an election. It is not true at eternity
that you ars alive, because you are not an eternal being.
It is not true at eternity that you will die, because
there is no time later than eternity at which you could
die. So, there are many truths that cannot be known by an
eternal God.
In addition to the above examples, there are many
time-indexed truths. For example, let t^^ be the time at
which you were born, let t
2
be now, and let t
3
be the time
at which you will die. The following are examples of
time-indexed truths.
You were born at t,
.
You are alive at t^.
You will die at t^T
Reagan was elected president on November 4, 1980.
Breshnev died November 10, 1982.
These truths also cannot be known by an eternal being. It
is true at a t ime t that you were born at t only if t^ is
ear 1 ier than t
.
It is true at t that you are alive at 4
(where "are" is in the present tense) only if t = 4 . It
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13 true at t that you Mill die at t
3
only If t Is earlier
than tj. Since eternity is neither earlier than, nor
Identical with, nor later than t^, t^, or tj
, these three
claims are not true at eternity. Thus on the medieval
View of time, God cannot know them.
Consider next the chronologically definite truths.
Some examples are:
You are, were, or will be born at t
You are, were, or will be alive at i*
You die, died, or will die at t^ . ^
Each of these propositions is, always has been, and always
will be, true. Yet they are not eternal truths. The
second of the three, for example, amounts to the following
disjunction:
Either (a) you are alive at t
,
or (b) you were
alive at t«, or (c) you will be alive at t
^ 2
Neither (a), nor (b), nor (c) is true at eternity for
reasons we have already seen. Eternity is neither earlier
than, nor identical with, nor later than t^. Thus it
cannot be true at eternity that you are alive at t^, nor
that you alive at nor that you wi 1
1
alive at
^2* eternal God cannot not know even chronologically
definite truths.
So, there is a rich body of facts that escape God's
knowledge. Any fact that we express in the past, present,
or future tense cannot be known by an eternal God.
History is full of such facts about emperors and kings.
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victories and defeats, Inventions and discoveries.
Astronomy is full of such information about the origin of
the stars, the behavior of the planets, and the nature of
our galaxy. Geology, anthropology, and sociology are
filled with temporal truths. If the medieval view of God
and time is correct, then God must be ignorant of all of
this information.
These observations may appear to imply that
eternalness is 'incompatible with omniscience. However,
that is only an appearance. When the medievals say that
God is omniscient, they mean of course that God is omni-
scient at eternity. To say that a being x is omniscient
at a time t is to say that x knows at t everything that is
true at t. Thus God is required to know only eternal
truths. God’s ignorance of temporal truths is,
technically, no stain on God's omniscience.
It would be dissappoint ing nonetheless, if God were
completely ignorant of temporal matters. I should think
it would disturb any reflective theist to think that such
an immense body of information is completely unkown to
God. What exactly does God know?
On the medieval view, God knows all and only eternal
truths. What sorts of propositions are true at eternity?
We have seen that no propositions that we express in the
past, present, or future tense can be true at eternity.
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If there are any expressible propositions that are true at
eternity, they must be expressible with tenseless
sentences. If we grant that verbs have a tenseless form,
we thereby open the door to eternal truth. it is
plausible to think that the theorems of mathematics and
logic are eternal truths. But that is only the beginning.
Consider some time-indexed tenseless statements.
You are_bo rn at t .
.
Reagan is elected on November 2, 1980.
Breshnev dies on December 17, 1982.
It is plausible to think that each of these statements is
true if and only if its chronologically definite correlate
is. It is also plausible to hold that if any one of these
statements is true at any time, then it is true at all
times, including eternity. If so, then there are lots of
eternal truths. Corresponding to each temporal truth is a
time-indexed tenseless statement which expresses an
eternal truth. For example, corresponding to the fact
that you were born, is the proposition that you are born
at where is the time of your birth. Every truth of
history and astronomy, geology and anthropology, will be
represented among the eternal truths by a time-indexed
tenseless counterpart. In this way God can have knowledge
of temporal matters. If God knows all of the eternal
1 2truths, then God's knowledge is vast indeed.
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addition to claiming that God is eternal and omni-
scient, and that God knows the future not as future but as
present, medieval philosophers assert that God sees
everything as if it were present to God all at once. That
assertion can be interpreted in light of our remarks about
Simultaneity. Given (8), (10), and the medieval topology
of time, every event is simultaneous with God's knowledge
of that event. For any event f, and time t, if f is
occurring at t then f is simultaneous with the event of
God's knowing that f is occurring at t. For f is
occurring at t, and God's knowledge of f is occurring at
eternity. According to (8), t is simultaneous with
eternity. Hence by (10), f is simultaneous to God's
knowing that f is occurring at t.
12. There may, however, be some troublesome cases.
^ temporal truth that it is now June 2,1983. What this means, I think, is that the second day ofJune 1983 has the property of being present. If so, then
the corresponding time-indexed tenseless proposition is
something like this: the second day of June 1983 has the
property of h.e.lng present on the second day of June 1983.
Since the latter proposition is trivial, but the former is
not, it would appear that they are significantly different
pieces of information. Thus there may be temporal truths
that^have no "genuine" cor relates--cor relates that convey
the same" information among the tenseless truths known
by God. Nevertheless, there is a rich body of temporal
truths that do have genuine correlates among the tenseless
truths known by God. If God knows all tenseless truths,
then God's knowledge is guite extensive.
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I now summarize my reconstruction of the medieval
view of God and time. Time Is connected, save for one
moment, eternity. God exists at eternity and God knows as
present all and only the eternal truths. We can express
eternal truths by using tenseless statements. This allows
for a rich body of eternal truths, which include
correlates of most temporal truths. There is a sense in
which God sees temporal events as if they were happening
all at once. God's knowledge of all events Is eternal,
and eternity is simultaneous with every moment of time.
Hence God's knowlede of all events Is simultaneous with
all of those events.
8
. A Reply Aqu 1 nas
Let us return at last to the problem facing Aquinas.
The following argument alleges that everything God knows
is unalterable.
1. If the antecedent of a true conditional is unal-
terable, then the consequent is unalterable.
2. It is unalterable that if God knew that A then
A.
3. If it was true that A, then it is now unalter-
able that it was true that A.
4. If God knew that A then it is unalterable that
A. (1,2,3)
5. If God knows that A, then God knew that A.
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6. U God^know3 that A then it is unalterable that
It is assumed that A ranges over propositions that are
time-indexed and tenseless. The argument is valid and
Aquinas accepts the first three premises. But the argu-
ment, says Aquinas, is ambiguous. Premise (2), premise
(5), and the conclusion all speak of knowledge, which can
be interpreted as either knowledge as future, or knowledge
as present. First let us ask, how does the argument fare
when knowledge is taken to be knowledge as future? So
interpreted, premise (2) says, in effect, that it is unal-
terable that every time-indexed tenseless proposition that
God knew as future is true. On Aquinas's view, it is im-
possible for God ever to know anything as future. Hence
(2) is vacuously true. The same holds for premise (5): it
is vacuously true that whatever is known as future by God,
was known as future by God. The same also holds for the
conclusion. For Aquinas, it is a vacuous truth that
everything God knows as future is unalterable, or alterna-
tively, God knows no contingents as future. This conclu-
sion is harmless. It won't show that divine omniscience
conflicts with freedom, because divine omniscience, on
Aquinas's view, does not require knowledge as future.
Next let us ask, how does the argument fare when
knowledge is taken to be knowledge as present? So inter-
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preted, the conclusion says that evety time-indexed
tenseless proposition that God knows as present is unal-
terable. This conclusion, if true, would cause serious
trouble for Aquinas. On his view, God knows as present
every eternal truth. Among the eternal truths are some
time-indexed tenseless propositions that describe our
future actions. if those propositions are unalterable,
then we are not free.
Apparently, Aquinas sought to avoid this result by
denying premise (5). He seems to have reasoned as
follows. Suppose that God knows at eternity that A.
Since A is time-indexed and tenseless, it is always true
if ever true. Thus it follows that it was true at some
time in the past that A. But it does not follow that God
knew at some time in the past that A. On Aquinas's view,
eternity is the only time at which God knows anything.
I say that this appears to have been Aquinas's
reasoning. Whether it was or not, it is not a
satisfactory response to the argument. This can be seen
by taking a closer look at (5). It says that if God knows
that A then God knew that A. This conditional is
ambiguous because both the antecedent and the consequent
speak of knowledge. If we interpret knowledge as
knowledge as present, then (5) amounts to the following
claim
:
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5a. If God knows as present that A then God knew aspresent that A.
This means, in effect, that If God knows at eternity that
A, then there was a time in the past at which it was true
that God knows at eternity that A. But this 1s a direct
result of Aquinas's view of eternity. By their very
nature, eternal truths ate, always have been, and always
will be eternal truths. Thus, if it is true now that it
is true at eternity that A, then it has always been true
that it is true at eternity that A. Likewise, if it is
true now that God knows at eternity that A, then it has
always been true that God knows at eternity that A. I see
no way for Aquinas to deny this.
Perhaps Aquinas interpreted (5) as follows:
5b. If God knows at eternity that A, then God knew
at some time in the past that A.
This is, in effect, to interpret the 'knows' in the ante-
cedent as knowledge as present, and the 'knew' in the con-
sequent as knowledge as future (or perhaps, as "knowledge
as past"). It is easy to see why Aquinas would want to
deny (5b). Given his views of God and time, it is clearly
false. However, the argument in question does not need
(5b); (5a) will work for its purposes.
It is not easy to see that Aquinas has an objection
to the argument, when knowledge is interpreted as
knowledge as present. The first premise is:
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® conditional is unal-erable, then the consequent is unalterable.
This is beyond question, when interpreted with knowledge
as present, the second premise is:
^haiVthenT^'"
To say that God knew as present that A is to say that it
was the case that God knows as present that A. Given that
A IS restricted to propositions that are time-indexed and
tenseless, surely this is true. The third premise is:
it unalter-
able that it was true that A.
This premise says that the past is unalterable. Aquinas
could challenge (3), but he never shows any interest in
doing so. From these three premises it follows that
4a. If God knew as present that A then it is unal-
terable that A.
The final assumption of the argument is
5a. If God knows as present that A, then God knew aspresent that A.
We have seen that this is a direct consequence of
Aquinas's view of eternity. And from (4a) and (5a) it
follows that
6a. If God knows as present that A, then it is unal-
terable that A.
This argument does not trade on the ambiguity of 'knows'
and 'knew'. it speaks explicitly about knowledge as
present. It seems to me that the only weakness of this
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argument is the third premise. if
it appears that he does, then
avoid the conclusion that whatever
unalterable.
Aquinas accepts it, as
I see no way for him to
God knows as present is
Aquinas was aware of the problem that arises from
foreknowledge, freedom, and the necessity of the past. He
sought to solve the problem by appealing to the doctrine
that God is eternal, and to the distinction between
knowing as present and knowing as future. But Aquinas's
views about God and time, sophisticated though they may
be, do not give him a satisfactory solution to the
problem. If Aquinas grants that the past is unalterable,
then he is forced to admit that God knows no contingents
as present. That, in turn, commits him to the view that
divine omniscience is incompatible with human freedom.
13. There are, of course, other ways to interpret the
medieval view of eternity. See for example, Eleonore Stump
and Norman Kretzmann, "Eternity,” Journal £lL Phi lo^ophy 78
(1981): 429-58; and Nicholas Wolterstoff, "God
Everlasting." Perhaps one of these accounts of eternity
will provide Aquinas with an objection to the argument.
They will not be discussed in this dissertation.
CHAPTER IV
SEMANTIC INDETERMINISM
1. Intrndiirl-
According to the third solution to our puzzle, not
all propositions about the future are either true or
false. Alternatively, some propositions about the future
are neither true nor false. This view is a species of the
weaker view that some propositions are neither true nor
false. I call the latter weaker view semant
i
r
Indetermim nm . Many who hold this view also believe that
some propositions are open. Also, they often hold the
view that all open propositions are neither true nor
false. The view that some propositions are open and all
open propositions are neither true nor false, is a view
that I call open semant i c Indetermin i .qm , a consequence of
open semantic indeterminism is that all open propositions
about the future are neither true nor false. This view is
often stated as the view that "future contingents are
neither true nor false." This view is interesting only if
accompanied by the view that there are some "future con-
tingents"— some open propositions about the future. As it
turns out, propositions about the future are most often
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cited by open semantic indeterminlsts (also known as
gappers") as examples of open propositions.
Another consequence of open semantic indeterminism is
the negation of the law of excluded middle. This “law”
says that every proposition is either true or false.
According to open semantic indeterminism, there are some
open propositions, and all of them are counterexamples to
this law.
A third consequence of open semantic indeterminism is
unalterabilism—the view that whatever is true is unalter-
able. To see this, assume that
1. If it is open that A then it is neither true
that A nor false that A.
This is the second conjunct of open semantic
indeterminism. We need to show that
4. If it is true that A then it is unalterable that
A.
It is open that A if and only if it is neither unalterable
that A nor unalterable that
-A. Thus from (1) it follows
that
2. If it is neither unalterable that A nor unalter-
able that
-A then it is neither true that A nor
false that A.
The contrapositive of (2) is
3. If it is either true that A or false that A then
it is either unalterable that A or unalterable
that
-A.
Now, if it is true that A, then it is not unalterable that
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-h. Likewise,
terable that
1£ It Is false that a, then It Is not unal-
A. From these tacts and (3), we get the
following claims:
4. U it is true that a then it is unalterable that
^
that'^-a^
false that a then it is unalterable
These are two forms of unalterabilism.
The above argument works backwards as well; thus it
shows also that the second conjunct of open semantic inde-
terminism is a consequence of unalterabilism*
Richmond Thomason elegantly articulates the view that
future contingents are neither true nor false, in his
terse article, " Indeterminist Time and Truth Value Gaps.”^
In the next section of this chapter, l summarize
Thomason's semantic theory of tenses; in section three I
use his theory to state open semantic indeterminism. In
section four I present two objections to this view.
Finally, I conclude my discussion in section five.
1. Richmond Thomason, "Indeterminist Time and Truth
Value Gaps," Theor l a 36 (1970): 264-81. Further references
to that article will be made in the text of this chapter
by enclosing page numbers in parentheses.
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2. Thomaann « Thanry
Thomason presents a semantic theory of tenses which
IS an application of van Fraassen's super valuat ions to
tense logic. it thus assigns truth-values to formulas in
a way that allows truth-value gaps. To interpret the
future and past tense operators F and P, and the unalter-
ability operator Thomason uses (1) a set K of times
ordered by a relation <, and (2) a supervaluation V which
IS a function that assigns truth-values Va(A) to various
(though perhaps not all) formulas h at various times a in
3
K. Such a set K together with an ordering relation < is
called a model adructure
.
and represents the underlying
structure of time. (265)
Thomason's primary concern is with nonlinear model
structures. He supposes that < is a treelike ordering, in
that it allows branching into the future but not the past;
that is, for all a, p, y e K, if /? < « and ^ < «, then
2. Thomason speaks of inevitability where I speak of
unalterability
. As near as I can tell, this is merely a
terminological difference. For convenience, I will
continue with the terminology used in earlier chapters.
3. 'A', 'B', etc. will be used as metavariables
ranging over formulas. 'Q', etc. will be used as
sentence letters. Thus italic is a sentence letter,
whereas roman 'P' is the past tense operator. As Thomason
remarks about his similar usage, this should cause no
confusion
.
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either or or < ^ . He also assumes that < is
transitive: if a < and
^ ^ then « < ^.(266) A history
on a model structure is a linear pathway through the
structure; that is, a history is a subset h of K such that
(1) for all a,
^ €
h, either a=y8oro;<^oryS<a(< is
connected on h)
, ahd (2) if g is any subset of K such that
for all a, p €. g, either a = ft oz a < ft or ft < a, then if
h £ g then g - h (h is a max ima l ghain on the model
structure). The set of histories containing « is denoted
by ^a. (267)
The truth-values assigned by V are determined by a
two-stage process. First, V assigns a truth-value V^(A)
to each formula A with respect to each history h and time
a in h.(277) These asignments characterize the notion of
truth-in-a-history-at-a-t ime
. They are bivalent (they
contain no gaps) and are classical (they preserve the
truth of all classical tautologies). Second, V assigns a
truth-value Va(A) to some, but not necessarily all,
formulas A with respect to each time a in K. These
assignments characterize the notion of truth-at-a-t ime
,
and are not relative to histories. They allow gaps, but
preserve classical tautologies. To illustrate the first
stage, consider any formula of the form FA, PA, or LA.
V^(FA) = T if y^(A) = T for some >3 e h such that
a < ft
= F otherwise
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vij(PA) T if \^(A) = T for some /3 c h such that
P \ a
= F otherwise
vi^(L&) - T If v9(&) - T for all g c
” F otherwise
such an assignment is called a Mvalent iralnation.
The second stage of assigning truth-values is as
follows
.
( 274
)
Vor(a) - T if v£(A) = T for all h e
F if '&(&) = F for all h e
is undefined otherwise
such an assignment V is called a suoerva 1 ,.at i According
to such a supervaluation, and the preceding bivalent
valuations, the special cases in which A is of the form FB
or LB have the following truth conditions.
Vq:(FB) = T iff for all h e ^at there is a yS g h
such that a < /i and \^(B) = T
F iff for all h g there is no ys g h
such that a < and V^(B) = T
is undefined otherwise
Vq:(LB) = T iff for all h g and for all g g ^ct,
vy(B) = T (iff for all q e
V^(B) = T)
= F iff for all h g there is a g g
such that V^CB) - F (iff there is a
g € such that V^(B) = F)
is undefined otherwise
Thus, FB is true at a if in all histories through a, B is
true at some time later than a. FB is false at a if in all
histories through a, B is true at no times later than
If B is true at a later time in some histories but not
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others, then FB is neither true
happens in the following
supervaluation.
nor false at This
model structure and
Figure One
FQ is true at a in history h, but false at a in history g.
Thus FQ is neither true nor false at LB is true at a
if, in all histories through a, B is true at LB is
false at a if in some history through a, B is false at a.
A formula A is a semant i c consequence of a set p of
formulas, written p Ih A, if and only if for all model
structures for all points of reference a of 9t)
,
and
for all supervaluations V on if V«(B) = T for all B in
P then Vq:(A) = T. A formula A is valid if and only if
IH A. (274)
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3
. Formn 1 ah
i nq thft Vi pw
The principal contribution of Thomason’s paper, by
his own account, is a rigorous formulation of the view
that future contingents can be neither true nor
false. (265) However, he does not explicitly state that
view in terms of his theory. Instead he gives us enough
machinery to do so. with Thomason’s machinery we can
state the view that future contingents are neither true
nor false, and also the stronger thesis that I have called
open semantic indeterminism. For our purposes, a more
useful statement of the former view is the following.
6. For any formula of the form FA, if it is open
that FA, then it is neither true that FA nor
false that FA.
An analogous version of the latter view can be put as
follows
.
7. For some formula A, it is open that A; and for
any formula A, if it is open that A then it is
neither true that A nor false that A.
Our principal task in this section is to use Thomason’s
theory to formulate (6) and (7).
Four of the concepts used in (6) and (7) are open to
interpretation: ”it is open that,” ”it is true that," "it
is false that," and "if ... then." Given Thomason’s
theory, "it is open that FA" can be expressed in the
object language by the formula: ( -LFA & -L-FA) . It can
also be expressed in the metalanguage by saying that for a
116
given model structure -Jr,, for a given point of reference «
of and for a given supervaluat ion V on
Va(-LFA &
-L-FA) = T. To express "it is true that FA" in
the object language, we can introduce a new sentential
operator As Thomason points out, the truth condition
for this operator is evidently the following.
V«(TA) “ T iff vj^(A) = T
= F otherwise
It is true that FA" can then be expressed in the object
language by the formula: TFA. It can also be expressed in
the metalanguage by saying that for a given model
structure for a given point of reference a of 9>i, and
for a given supervaluat ion V on 9??, V«(FA) = T. To
express "it is false that FA" in the object language, we
introduce a new sentential operator, F, with the following
truth condition:
vij(FA) « T i ff \^(A) » F
= F otherwise
"It is false that FA" can then be expressed in the object
language by the formula: FFA. It can also be expressed in
the metalanguage by saying that for a given model
4. Thomason uses T instead of T.(278) I use T because
it is analogous to F . I use F for "it is false that,"
because F is already used to mean "it will be the case
that . "
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structure 9>,, for a given point of reference « of and
for a given supervaluation V on V«(Fa) = F. Finally,
"If a then B" can be expressed In the object language by
the formula, a n B. It can also be expressed in the
metalanguage by writing A llB.
The above options produce one interesting interpreta-
tion of the claim that some propositions are open:
8.
For some formula h, for some model structurefor some point of reference « of and for
some supervaluation V of
Va(-LFA &
-L-FA) = T.
This is an interpretation of the first conjunct of (7).
(8) is a result of Thomason's theory. This can be seen by
considering again the model structure and supervaluation
depicted in figure one. There, (Q) - t and V^(Q) - f.
Thus V^(FQ) = T, and V^(F£j) = F; this means that
V^(-FQ) = F and V^(-FQ) = T. Therefore V^(LFQ) = V^(LFQ)
= V^(L-FQ) = V^(L-FQ) = F. Hence V^(-LFQ) = V^(-LFQ)
V^(-L-FQ) = V^(-L-FQ) = T. Thus \^(-LFQ & -L-FQ) =
Vj^(-LFQ & -L-FQ) = T. Thus V«(-LFQ & -L-FQ) = T. Letting
A be the formula FQ, we see that (8) holds.
These options produce three noteworthy interpreta-
tions of the second conjunct of (7).
9. For any formula A, (-LA & -L-A) => -(TA v FA).
10. For any formula A, ( -LA &
-L-A)(f- -(TA v FA).
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11 . For any formula A, for any model stfor any point of reference a of ^
supervaluation V on
,
r uctur
e
and for any
if Vq!(-la &
-L-A)
Va(A) F .
T then Vaih) f T and
Only the third of these three statements is a result of
Thomason's theory.
Before explaining why ( 11 ) holds, it will be
worthwhile pausing to explain why (9) and (10) do not.
For any formula h, the truth condition for Ta is identical
to the truth condition for a. Thus T can be deleted from
(9) and (10) without harm. Similarly, the truth condition
for Fa IS Identical to the truth condition for
-a. Thus ?
can be replaced by - in (9) and (10) without harm. The
results are:
9a. For any formula h, Ih (-LA & -L-A) =>
-(A v
-A).
10a. For any formula A, (
-LA &
-L-A)|I--(A v
-A).
Both of these statements fail in Thomason's theory, and
for essentially the same reason. (9a) says that for any
model structure for any point of reference a of 9??,
and for any super valuat ion V on 9>7
,
Va[(-LA & -L~A) ^ “(A v
-A)] = T. But consider again the
5. Strictly speaking, each of these interpretations
does not say merely that open propositions are neither
true nor false,- each asserts the stronger claim that open
propositions iian iae neither true nor false.
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model structure and supervaluation depicted in figure one.
call (-LFQ s
-L-FQ) s^, and call
-(FQ v
-FQ) sally
. sam
says that it is open that a, while Sally says that it is
undetermined that a. In this case, v£(Fa) - T but
v3(Fa) - F. Hence V^(LFa) " V^CLFa) - F, and \^(-LFe) -
V®(-LFa) - T. Also, \^(-Fa) - F and v9(-Fa) - T. Hence
'd'(L-Fa) - v9(L-Fa) - F, and i^(-L-Fa) - v9(-L-Fa) - T.
Therefore i^(-LFa S
-L-Fa) - v9(-LFa S
-L-Fa) - T.
However, v5(-Fa) - F and v9(-Fa) - T. Thus i^(Fa v
-Fa) =
V
-Fa) = T. Therefore
'^(-(Fa v
-Fa)]
M?t-(Fa V -Fa)] - F. From all of this it follows that
\^(Sam D Sally) - v9(Sam o Sally) - F. Thus
Va(Sam o Sally) - F. That suffices to show that
jy (Sam D Sally). Hence (9a) does not hold? nor does (9).^
The same model structure and supervaluation will show
that (10a) does not hold. (10a) says that for any model
structure for any point of reference a of and for
any super valuat ion V on
,
if Va(Sam) = T then
Va(Sally) = T. But on the model structure and
supervaluation depicted in figure one, V^(Sam)
V^(Sam) = T; hence Va(Sam) = T. Yet, V^(Sally)
6. If we let V be a supervaluat ion just like V
except that v;^ (Q) = F, then we get V'a(Sam 3 Sally) = T,
and V'o;[-(Sam d Sally)] = F. Thus -(Sam 3 Sally). This
means that neither (Sam 3 Sally) nor -(Sam 3 Sally) is
valid.
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V^^(Sally) - F; hence Va(Sallv) = F a ^ -i- f. Accordingly,
SamjJ'Sally. Thus (10a) does not hold; nor does (10).
Although (9) and (10) do not hold in Thomason's
semantic theory, (11) does. To see this, let ‘fn be any
model structure, let a be any point of reference of
and let V be any supervaluation on fb,. Assume that
Va(-LA s
-L-A) - T; we need to show that Va(&) y t and
Vor(A) / F. If Va(-LA s
-l-A) - T, then v£(-LA S
-L-A) - T
for all h c Thus V^i-LA) = V^J(-L-A) = T for all
h
€ Thus i^(LA) . vi(L-A) - F for all h e %. Hence
for some h c '^a, \£(A) - F; and for some g e ‘^a,
V^(-A) - F. Therefore v9(a) = T. But then V«(A) / T and
Vq:(A) f F. Q.E_.D.
We have seen that (11) is a result of Thomason's
theory, but (9) and (10) are not results of his theory.
For this reason, I take it to be clear that Thomason
intended that (11) be used to express the view that con-
tingent statements are neither true nor false.
^
Open semantic indeterminism can now be stated in
Thomason's theory. It amounts to the conjunction of (8)
7. Another possible interpretation of the claim that
contingent statements are neither true nor false is the
following: for any formula A, if Ih (-LA & -L-A) then
neither /f- A nor Ih -A. However, this is an empty truth;
there are no formulas A that are such that Ih (-LA & -L-A).
What this means is that no formula is forced to be open.
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and ( 11)
.
true nor
The view that future contingents are neither
falee can be expressed by altering ( 11 ): simply
replace
of FA.
all but the first occurrence of A by an occurrence
We noted in section one of this chapter that
endorsing open semantic indeterminism would force one to
give up the law of excluded middle. There are two ways to
express this law in Thomason's theory. First, it can be
expressed by saying that for any formula A, /f- A v
-a.
(This is equivalent to saying that for any formula A,
IHTA V FA.) This statement is a result of Thomason's
theory, because every bivalent valuation is classical.
Thus Thomason does not have to give up this version of the
law of excluded middle. However, the law can be expressed
in a second way by saying that for any formula A, for any
model structure 9?7, for any point of reference a of 9?),
and for any supervaluat ion V on either V«(A) = T or
Vq:(A) - F. This claim is false in Thomason's theory; the
model structure and supervaluation depicted in figure one
show that it is false when A is FQ.
We also noted in section one that unalterabilism is a
consequence of open semantic indeterminism. There are two
ways to express unalterabilism in Thomason's theory. It
can be expressed either as the claim that for any formula
A, Ih A ^ LA, or as the claim that for any formula A,
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aiHLA. As Thomason notes, only the latter Is a result of
his theory. (275)
®
We have seen that open semantic Indeterminism can be
stated in Thomason's theory as the conjunction of (8) and
(11). I now want to raise the question: Is Thomason's
formulation of open semantic indeterminism true? By this
I do not mean to ask whether (8) and (11) are tiai£
thfibry. we have already seen that the answer to
that question is yes. Rather, I want to raise the
question: is Thomason's formulation of open semantic Inde-
terminism real ly true? or perhaps: is there any reason to
Thomason's theory? Does his theory accurately
represent reality so far as future contingents ate
concerned ?
Thomason does not attempt in his article to argue for
open semantic indeterminism. In the next section I present
two objections to this view, and I show how they apply to
Thomason's formulation of it. Both are simple objections,
and I doubt that they will surprise an open semantic inde-
terminist; but I find them convincing.
8. To see that for some formula A, jK A => LAr see
Thomason, p. 275. To see that for all formulas A, A IfLA,
let *>>1 be any model structure, let a be any point of
reference of “Tt)
,
and let V be any supervaluation on 9?).
Suppose that Va(^) ? T; we need to show that Va(LA) = T.
If Va(A) = T then V^(A) = T for all h e “Va. Hence
Va(LA) = T.
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4. Qbjeci- i npH
A. Ihfi EJJ^ Qnfi. one objection to open semantic indeter-
minism can be put as follows. if open semantic indeter-
minism is true, then the law of excluded middle is not
true; the law of excluded middle is true; therefore, open
semantic indeterminism is not true. This argument is
valid, and the first premise is clearly true. (An argu-
ment for the first premise was given in section on§ of
this chapter.) Hence the objection turns upon the second
premise. What can be said in favor of the law of excluded
middle?
I have no deductive argument to offer in favor of
this law. However, the natural light of my reason shines
brightly upon it. Consider a putative counterexample: I
will be drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. The open seman-
tic indeterminist and I may both agree that this proposi-
tion is open. I say it is also either true or false; but
the open semantic indeterminist disagrees. Why do I think
it is either true or false? Because it seems to me that I
now have only three alternatives: either I wait until
8 P.M. and then drink, or I wait until 8 P.M. and then
abstain from drinking, or I cease to exist by 8 P.M.
There is simply nothing else that can happen to me. Since
these are the only alternatives I have now, either I am
*
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now taking the flrat one, or
. am now taking the second
one, or I am now taking the third one. There is simply no
other course of action I can be taking now. if i am now
taking the first alternative, then it is true that I will
be drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. If i am now taking
the second alternative, then it is false that I will be
drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. If i am now taking the
third alternative, then again it is false that I will be
drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. This is the best I can
do to explain why I believe that the law of excluded middle
holds in this case.
This objection can be applied directly to Thomason's
theory. if his theory is true then the law of excluded
middle is not true; the law of excluded middle is true;
therefore his theory is not true. To see the details of
such an application, let Q be the proposition that I am
drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. (June 2, 1983). Then FQ
says that I will be drinking water at that time. Let 9ti
,
V, and a be such that is a model structure, V is a
supervaluation on 97}
, « is a point of reference of that
is intended to represent now (noon on June 2, 1983), and
Va(-LFQ & -L-FQ) = T. Our intuitions tell us, or at least
my intuitions tell me, that either I will be drinking
water tonight at 8 P.M. or I won't. Thus it should be
that either Vq:(FQ) = T or V«(FQ) = F. But that cannot
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happen in Thomason's theory. If Va(-LFQ & -L-FQ) = t then
Vq;(FQ) f T and Va(FQ) F.
There is a reply that Thomason can make to this
objection. He could distinguish between the timp
valuation and the iLime oL if i cat, 1 on of a given state-
ment.^ Thomason could say that if l assert now (at noon
June 2, 1983) that I will be drinking water tonight at
8 P.M., then noon is the time of evaluation of my state-
ment, and 8 P.M. is the time of its verification. Then if
I insist that either I wait until 8 P.M. and then drink,
or I wait until 8 P.M. and then abstain from drinking, or
I cease to exist by 8 P.M., Thomason has a reply. He can
say that if my statement is to be true, then it must mean
the following: either 1 fixlst and am dr inking will be true
at the time of verification; or l exist and am not
dr ink ing will be true at the time of verification; or J. do
nnt ax i s
t
will be true at the time of verification. With
that- statement Thomason can agree; afterall, the
assignments made by V to atomic formulas must be
bivalent
.( 277 ) If we let £ stand for 1 exist ton i ght at
^ and if we let Q stand for £ am dr i nk i ng water
9. Thomason does not use this terminology; however,
that he had the idea for this distinction is suggested by
his remarks on p. 279 about truth being relative to events
up tn tiifi present vs. Inevitability being relative bn some
time In bhe past .
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toiiiailt at a then Thomason could (indeed, must)
agree with the following. No matter which history we
follow from how on, If ^ 13 the point of reference on that
history corresponding to 8 P.M. tonight (the time of
verification), then either V^(£)-t or (£) . f and
either V^(Q) • t or Vg (Q) = f. if 30, then (E S Q) = T
^ ^
^ ^ ^ ) ” T or v« C—P't—T fTt-^ ^ iij - T. (It 13 a result of
Thomason's theory that for any model structure
, for any
point of reference a of 9>)
, and for any supervalutat ion V
on 'h), Va(A & B) = T if and only if V«(A) = V«(B) = T;
also, Va(-A) = T if and only if v«(A) = F.) However,
Thomason will no doubt insist that if « is the point of
reference on that history corresponding to now (the time
of evaluation), then Vq;(fq) y t and Va(FQ) y f.
I am not convinced by this reply. i accept the
following principle:
Al: If h, B, and £ will be the only alternatives at
t, then it will be the case at t that either h
is true or B is true or £ is true.
Thus I agree that if B & Q, p & -q, and -£ will be the
only alternatives tonight at 8 P.M. (the time of
verification), then no matter which history we follow,
either (p & q) = t or (P & -£) = T or V^(-p) = T where
p represents 8 P.M. on that history. However, I also
assert the following principle:
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A2! If A, B. and C are the only alternative.! at tthen rt
^
the ease at t that either A !stru4or B IS true or C is true. ~
The only alternatives I have now, at the time of
evaluation, are F(P s, g) , f(P a
-g)
. and F(-P). Thus, if
a represents now (the time of evaluation), then it should
be that either Va[F(P & Q)] = T or Va[F(P £,
-g)] = t or
Va(F-p) = T. First, if va[F(p s. Q)] = t then Va(FP) =
Va(FQ) = T. Second, if Va[F(P s.
-g)] = t then Va(FP) =
Va(F-Q) = T. To say that Va(F-Q) = T is to say that it is
true now that it will be the ca^ that itisnot the
ca^ I am drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. if that
IS true, then it is true now that it is ^ ^ case
it will ^ I am drinking water tonight at
8 P.M. Thus Va(-F^) = T, and Va(F^) = F. Third, if
Va(F-P) = T, then it is true now that it will be the case
that it is not the case that I exist tonight at 8 P.M. If
so, then surely it is true now that it is not the case
that it will be the case that I am drinking water tonight
at 8 P.M. Thus Va(-FQ) = T and Va(FQ) = f. Therefore no
matter which of the three alternatives I am taking now at
a, either Va(FQ) = T or Va(FQ) = F. That is why it seems
to me that it should be that as of now--the time of
evaluation--either F^ is true or FQ is false.
I have no arguments for A1 and A2. Both seem to me
to be conceptual truths about the relevant concept of an
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alternative. i suspect that an Indeterminlst would agree
that these principles hold when A, B, and £ are not con-
tingent statements about the future. i suspect further
that the indeterminlst would say that with respect to con-
tingent statements about the future, these principles do
not hold.
A1 and A2 can be expressed in Thomason's theory as
follows
:
To use A3 to express Al, we let « represent some time in
the future; to use A3 to express A2, we let « represent
now. According to Thomason's theory A3 is true when the
formulas A, B, and £ contain no occurrences of the
future-tense operator. However, A3 does not hold in
general when the formulas in question contain occurrences
of the future-tense operator, what reason is there for
thinking that Al and A2 do not hold in the case of future
contingents? Or, what reason is there for thinking that a
semantic theory in which A3 fails for formulas containing
the future-tense operator represents reality accurately,
so far as future contingents are concerned?
An indetermin ist could say that contingent statements
about the future are exceptions to Al and A2 because as of
now, there is no "fact of the matter" regarding future
contingents—their truth-values are "not yet determined."
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This reply does not amount to much— It simply raises
more questions. First, by saying that the truth-values of
future contingents are "not yet determined," an
indeterminlst might mean that for a given future contin-
gent, It is not unalterable that It is true that A and
not unalterable that it is false that A. With that I
agree; but that claim gives us no reason to question A1
and A2
.
Second, by saying that the truth-values of future
contingents are "not yet determined," an indeterminist
might be merely reasserting the thesis that future contin-
gents are neither true nor false. Now I agree that H
future contingents are neither true nor false, then Al and
A2 do not hold. But what is at issue is the assertion
that future contingents are neither true nor false. if
that assertion is to give us a reason for rejecting Al and
A2, it must be accompanied by some reasons for thinking
that it is true. Why believe that contingent statements
about the future are neither true nor false? That is a
question for the indeterminist.
Third, the claim that the truth-values of future con-
tingents are "not yet determined" could mean something
else. What else could it mean? Again, that is a question
for the indeterminist.
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I know of no answers to these questions. Indeed, i
know of no reasons to think that A1 and A2 do not hold
with respect to future contingents. Accordingly, I gee no
reason to think that a semantic theory in which A3 falls
for formulas representing future contingents represents
reality accurately, so far as future contingents are
concerned
.
B. Tilfi ^cond One. Another objection to open semantic
indeterminism can be stated as follows. if open semantic
indeterminism is true, then unalterabilism is true; unal-
terabilism is not true; therefore, open semantic indeter-
minism is not true. This argument is valid, and the first
premise is clearly true. (An argument for the first
premise was given in section one of this chapter.) Hence
the objection turns upon the second premise. What can be
said against unalterabilism?
If there is anything anyone can do but will not do,
or will do but can avoid doing, then unalterabilism is not
true. I think examples of such things are plentiful. For
instance, it is true that I will drink some water tonight
at dinner (on June 2, 1983); but it is not unalterable
that I will do so. Examples like this convince me that
some true propositions are not unalterable.
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Why do I believe it Is true that I will drink some
water tonight at dinner? Because I want to drink some
water tonight at dinner; I know how to drink some water; I
am physically and psychologically able to drink some
water; I believe that I will not lose those abilities by
dinner time; I plan to dine at some place where I can
obtain some water; I believe that my plan will not be
thwarted (afterall, water is easy to come by); I doubt
that I will forget to drink some water tonight at dinner
(afterall, this example has been on my mind all
afternoon); I want to be able to say truthfully that the
prediction I made in the preceding paragraph was true.
These claims are not intended to be the premises of a
deductive argument for the conclusion that I will drink
some water tonight at dinner. I have no deductive
evidence to offer in support of that conclusion. Making
the above remarks is the best I can do to explain why I
believe it is true that I will drink some water tonight at
d inner
.
Why do I believe it is not unalterable that I will
drink some water tonight at dinner? Because I could
change my mind perhaps someone will convince me that my
example about drinking water is a bad example, or perhaps
someone will suggest a better example; perhaps I will find
out that the water here (in Amherst, Massachusetts) is
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temporarily undrinkable-such things happened in Amherst
during my years as a graduate student; perhaps I will
forget, for some unforeseeable reason, to drink some water
tonight at dinner; perhaps the people with whom I dine
tonight will maliciously prevent me from drinking water in
order to refute the prediction that I made three
paragraphs above— stranger things have happened.
Of course I am not suggesting that any of these
eventualities will become actual; all I am saying is that
they What sense of 'could' do I have in mlhd? The
could of accessibility. I claim that it is accessible
that such things happen. There is some thing some group
of persons can do such that were they to do it, some such
thing would happen.
This objection also can be applied directly to
Thomason's theory. if his theory is true then unaltera-
bilism is true; but unalterabilism is not true; therefore,
his theory is not true. To see the details of such an
application, again let Q be the proposition that I am
drinking water tonight at 8 P.M. (on June 2, 1983). Then
FQ says that I will be drinking water at that time. Let
,
V, and a be such that is a model structure, V is a
supervaluation on « is a point of reference of ‘>yj that
is intended to represent now (noon on June 2, 1983), and
Va(FQ) = T. My intuitions tell me that it is true but not
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unalterable that I will drink some water tonight at
dinner. Thus it should be that Va(FQ) - t but Va(LFSJ) ^ t
But that cannot happen in Thomason's theory. if
V<r(FQ) . T then v£(FS2) - T for all histories h through a.
Thus y^(LF£2) = T for all histories h through «, and
Vcr(LFQ) - T. In short, hslm txiia is different from being
ima lterahle
; yet, Thomason's theory does not allow such a
d if f er ence
.
5 . Cone 1 iia i r>n
I am sure Thomason realizes that his theory precludes
the law of excluded middle: for any formula h, for any
model structure for any point of reference a of
and for any supervaluat ion V on 9>?, either Vaih) = T or
Vq;(A) - F. He acknowledges that his theory requires unal-
terabilism: for any formula A, A II- LA. For these reasons I
doubt that either of the above objections will surprise
Thomason. But they might convince him; and then again,
they might not.
In any event, I am persuaded by both of these
objections. Of course an open semantic indeterminist
10. Thomason's theory does, however, allow us to say
that h.a.y Ing been inLue is different from hav i ng been unal -
ter ab l e . ( 279
)
See section eight of his article for a dis-
cussion of this point.
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could deny the second premise in each case. Regarding the
first objection, an indeterminist could reject principle
A2 as well as my intuition that either it is true, or else
It IS false, that I will drink some water tonight at
dinner. Regarding the second objection, an indeterminist
could reject my intuition about unalterabilism; in spite
ot my remarks, an indeterminist could simply insist that
If it is true that l will drink some water tonight at
dinner, then it is unalterable that I will do so.
What reason could be given for denying the second
premises of these objections? An indeterminist could
claim that open semantic indeterminism is the only escape
from fatalism. if go, then we face a dilemma: either we
accept fatalism, or we give up the law of excluded middle
and accept unalterabilism. An indeterminist could agree
that the law of excluded middle is intuitively attractive.
He or she could agree further that unalterabilism is
intuitively unattractive. But as I myself have argued in
chapter two, fatalism is intuitively unattractive. The
indeterminist could suggest, with plausibility, that our
intuition that fatalism is bad is more dear than our
intuition about the law of excluded middle, and more dear
than our intuition about unalterabilism. For this reason,
the indeterminist could say, we should swallow hard: open
indeterminism is the best we can do, andsemantic
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endorsing It requires that we reject the law of excluded
middle and accept unalterabilism.
In the next chapter I will refute the claim that open
semantic indeterminism is the only alternative to
fatalism. I will argue that Ockhamism accommodates our
intuition that fatalism is bad, our intuition that unal-
terabilism is bad, and our intuition that the law of
excluded middle is good. At the end of that chapter I
will argue that Ockhamism does not charge a price tor
these intuitions.
CHAPTER V
OCKHAM ISM
The fourth solution to our puzzle consists in denying
that every proposition about the past is unalterable.
This solution was suggested by William of Ockham in the
fourteenth century. ^ Ockham distinguished propositions
about the past from those about the present, and from
those about the future. He held that some true proposi-
tions about the past are necessary, and others are not.
In our terminology, the former truths would be unalter-
able, and the latter would be open. Philosophers who
share this position have called the former hard and
the latter aofh l acts . Recent discussions of Ockham's
response have quite properly centered upon attempts to
articulate the distinction between hard and soft facts.
Marilyn McCord Adams has attempted to characterize this
distinction, and John Martin Fischer has criticized her
2
attempt. Fischer has also presented a general challenge
1. See chap. 1 sec. 5 above.
2. Marilyn McCord Adams, "Is the Existence of God a
'Hard' Fact?" Philosophical Review 76 (1967): 492-503;
John Martin Fischer, "Freedom and Foreknowledge,"
Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 67-79.
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to any sort of Ockhamlst attempt to explain this
distinction. In this chapter, i explain why moat of
Fischer's objections to Adams miss the mark. I argue,
however, that her account of this distinction is indeed
defective. I then attempt to meet Fischer's challenge by
offering an alternative characterization of the
distinction between hard and soft facts. I do this by
presenting a semantic theory that accommodates
Qckhamiam--the view that some propositions about the past
are open. Finally, i show that endorsing my version of
Ockhamism does not commit one to the view that we can
literally change the past.
1. liue Elizzle Ref ormn 1
The discussions of Adams and Fischer focus on a
version of our puzzle offered by Nelson Pike.^ In order to
examine Adams's account on her own turf, and to evaluate
fairly Fischer's criticisms, it is best to consider a
reformulation of the puzzle which is modeled after Pike's
argument
.
Central to Pike's version of the puzzle is the
concept of essential omniscience. To say that a being x
3. Nelson Pike, "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary
Action," Philosophic^] Review 74 (1965): 27-46.
138
IS essentially omniscient is to say that at every time in
every possible world, if x exists then x knows all true
propositions, and believes only true propositions. Also
of importance to this version of the puzzle are the
following three assumptions: God is essentially
everlasting, propositions about the future necessarily
have truth values, and the past is fixed. To say that God
IS essentially everlasting is to say that in every possi-
ble world, if God exists at any time then God exists at
every past, present, and future time. To say that propo-
sitions about the future necessarily have truth values is
to say that in every possible world, for any proposition p
and time t, if p is about the future relative to t, then
either p is true at t or p is false at t. The assumption
that the past is fixed can be put as follows.
PI: In every possible world, if a time t is earlier
than a time t' and if a proposition p is true at
t, then it is a hard fact as of t' that p istrue at t.
The puzzle can be stated as an argument for the
incompatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom.
Its conclusion will be that as a matter of necessity, if
God exists and is essentially omniscient then no humans
act freely. Call this conclusion incompat i hn i am
Let w be a world in which God exists and is
essentially omniscient. Let and be times, and let
tj be earlier than Let A be an action that some human.
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say, Sam, performs at t in w t 4- f
i
1-2 It follows from our as-
sumptions that in w, it was true et- i- od at t^^ that Sam would do A
at t^, and that God believed at t^ that Sam would do A at
t2- NOW if it is open as of t^ in w that Sam refrains from
doing A at t^
, then either ( 1 ) it is open as of t^ in w
that God holds a false belief at t^, or ( 2 ) it is open as
of t^ in w that God did not hold a belief at t^ that God
in fact (in w) held at t^. (To see that ( 1 ) and ( 2 ) are
only possibilities, consider for a moment a world w'
in which Sam refrains from A at t^
. In such a world,
either God believed at t^ that Sam will do A at t^ or God
did not so believe. if God believed at t^ in w' that Sam
would do A at t2
, then God held a false belief. For by
hypothesis, Sam refrains from A at t2 in w'
. On the other
hand, if God did not believe at t^ in w' that Sam would do
A at t2, then God did not hold a belief at t^^ in w' that
God in fact (that is, in w) held at But ( 1 ) is ruled
out by God’s essential omniscience in w. And ( 2 ) is ruled
out by our assumption PI that the past is fixed. (To see
this, let t be t^, t' be t2, and let p be the proposition
that God believes that Sam will do A at t2
.
)
Hence it was
^
4 . This reasoning does not presuppose that God exists
in w'
. If God does not exist in w', then God holds no
beliefs in w'. Hence there is a belief God held at t, in w
which is such that it is not the case that God held It at
t in w ' .
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not within Sam's power at t^ In w to retrain from doing A.
If It wasn't Within his power to refrain, then he didn't
do it freely. From all of this it follows that by neces-
sity, If God exists and Is essentially omniscient then no
humans act freely.^
This argument turns upon Pl-^the assumption that the
past is fixed. To assess this principle, we need to
inquire into the nature of hard facts.
2. Mams ' fl Account of. Hard Fact.g
Marilyn Adams, herself an Ockhamist, has proposed a
definition of hard facts. Her basic idea is that hard
facts do not entail anything about the future. she begins
by introducing the notion of a statement being at least in
part about a time.
(B) "Statement p is at least in part about a
time t =df "The happening or not happening,
actuality or nonactuality of something at t
is a necessary condition of the truth of p."
5. I do not claim that this reformulation of the
puzzle is a faithful rendering of Pike's argument. Onedifference, for example, is that I say that a state of
affairs p is open, where Pike would say that it is within
some person's power to bring about p and within that
person s power to bring about -p. Another difference is
that Pike considers not two, but three alternatives that
could result if it is open that Sam refrains f r om doing A
at t^. I believe that his third alternative is merely a
special case of his second.
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(C) "Statement p expresses a 'hard'
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Hence the
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statement "
wrote his
part about
"Caesar died in 44 B c "
a "hard" fact about 44 B.C. ButtheCaesar^^died 2009 years before Saunders
since it is at least in1965 A.D.
Essential to this account is the notion of one thing being
a necessary condition for another. According to
tradition, to say that a proposition q is a necessary
condition for a proposition p is, to say that p entails q.
It is clear from her discussion that Adams follows this
7
tradition. Also important to this account is the notion
of "the happening or not happening, the actuality or
nonactuality of something." Adams does not say what kind
of thing she has in mind. "The happening or not
happening" suggests events, while . "the actuality or
nonactuality" suggests states of affairs. I will consider
6. Adams,
493-94.
7
. Ibid
.
,
"Is God's Existence a 'Hard' Fact?" pp.
see the top of 496 and the bottom of 497.
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both options, because there may be Important differences
between events and states of af f airs-dif f erences that in
part determine the success or failure of Adams's account.
First I interpret her account as being based upon states
of affairs; then I turn to events.
understood in terms of states of affairs, Adams’s
account
,
says that p is a hard fact about t if p does not
entail the future actuality, or the future nonactuality of
any state of affairs. As we know, states of affairs are
intimately related to propositions; for convenience I will
speak as if they propositions. Thus, talk about the
actuality of a state of affairs, say, Caesar's having
died, is interchangeable with talk about the truth of a
proposition, in this case, that Caesar died. Accordingly,
we can paraphrase Adams's account by saying that a hard
fact does not entail the future truth of any proposition.
More precisely,
(D) A proposition p is a hard fact about t =df there
is no time t' later than t and proposition qsuch that p entails that q is true at t'
!i 1. t.
^
^
of "propositions” where Adams speaks of
statements." It is not entirely clear what Adams takes
statements to be. Nearly all agree that sentences are
syntactic items, and that propositions are abstract items
that can be expressed by using sentences. "Statements" can
be regarded either as sentences or as propositions. Adams
speaks of sentences expressing statements, and of state-
ments expressing facts (p. 494). Thus it is not clear what
ontological status she assigns to statements.
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(Since every proposition has a negation, nothing is lost
by failing to say, "or p entails that q is false at f.)
Presumably, p ig a soft fact about t if and only if p is a
fact about t but not a hard fact about t. Adams uses her
account of the distinction between hard and soft facts to
defend an extreme Ockhamlsfs position. on her view, the
claim that God exists and is essentially omniscient and
essentially everlasting, is not a hard fact.
There are two features of Adams's account that are
odd. First, her account does not require that hard facts
are true. Thus hard facts need not be facts at all.
second, on her account, if p is a hard fact about t, then
it has always been and always will be a hard fact about t.
The reason for this is that entailments do not change over
time. If p ever entails q, it always entails q. Thus, if
the proposition that Caesar died in 44 B.C. is a hard
fact about 44 B.C., then it always has been a hard fact
about 44 B.C. In particular, it was a hard fact about 44
B.C. long before Caesar was born. This result is
counterintuitive. First, it was not true before Caesar's
birth that Caesar dl£d in 44 B.C. What was true before
his birth was the future tensed claim that Caesar wi 1 1 d i e
in 44 B.C. Second, even though this future tensed claim
was true before Caesar's birth, from an Ockhamist's point
of view it surely was not a fixed, or hard fact at that
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time
.
Perhaps these oddities could be avoided
minor modifications of Adams's account. i „iu
them aside, and turn to deeper difficulties.
by making
simply set
3 • Qbiect, lonpt tn Adams ' a Anrnimf
F ischer
account of
I n my view,
of the fai
raises a variety of objections to Adams's
the distinction between hard and soft facts,
only one of his objections succeeds. But some
lures are Instructive, and are worth a brief
discussion.
Adams claims that on her account, it is not a hard
fact about 44 B.C. that (3) Caesar died 2009 years before
Saunders wrote his paper. To show this, she must show
that there is at least one proposition q and time t such
that t is later than 44 B.C. and the truth of q at t is
entailed by (3). She says that one such q is the proposi-
tion that Saunders wrote his paper, and one such t is
1965. She is saying, in effect, that the fact that Caesar
died 2009 years before Saunders wrote his paper entails
that Saunders wrote his paper in 1965.^ Fischer's first
criticism is that this entailment does not hold. (3)
entails that Caesar's death and Saunders's writing his
paper be separated by 2009 years, but it does not entail
any two particular dates for the two events. Surely
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Fischer's point is correct: the entailment in question
not hold. But evidently, Fischer concludes from this
that Adams's account fails to show that (3) is not a hard
about 44 B.C. Here he is Incorrect. All Adams needs
for her case is one proposition q and time t later than 44
B.C. such that the truth of q at t is entailed by (3).
Now, Adams suggests a q and a t that do not work. That is
Fischers's point. But there are other examples that work
for Adams. For the sake of clarity, let us take the past
tenses in (3) seriously. So understood, (3) entails that
Caesar died, and also that Saunders aiLote his paper. Thus
(3) cannot be true at any time before Saunders wrote his
paper. Now let q be the proposition that
(4) It is, was, or will be the case that (3).
By necessity, if (3) is true, then (4) is true at all
times. Thus (3) entails that (4) is true in 1965. As
Adams might say, the actuality in 1965 of the state of
affairs expressed by (4) is a necessary condition of the
Saund
there
accur
quest
years
wheth
to t
r
Saund
9. Fischer claims that there is an error in
ers's arithmetic. He is, or course, correct that
is no year zero. However, whether or not it is
ate to say that 2009 years separate the two events inion could depend upon the exact times during the
in question at which the events happened, and upon
er one wants to round to the nearest year, as opposed
iincating. For convenience I will pretend that
ers is correct about the 2009 years.
10. Fischer, p. 73.
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truth of (3). This means
a hard fact about 44
before Saunders wrote his
that Adams wants.
that according to (D)
, it is not
B.C. that Caesar died 2009 years
paper. This is just the result
Fischer raises a second objection to Adams's account:
Consider also the statement, "John F Kennedv waqassassinated." Given [Adams's account thiraLr^
not It does
1961 coursr'”'^^''®
anything subsequent to
But^e:A F- ---V «:rass^-^-^^L
a:::sstn1tL
Fischer claims that the statement in question does not
entail the occurrence of anything subsequent to 1961. But
cons ider
(5) JFK is, was, or will be assassinated.
The truth in 1983 of this proposition is entailed by the
proposition that JFK was assassinated; and 1983 is
subsequent to 1961. Thus, on Adams's account, the propo-
sition that JFK was assassinated is not a hard fact about
1961. Again, this is the result that Adams wants.
A third objection raised by Fischer concerns complex
statements. Consider,
11. Fischer, p. 74.
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(6) Eith©r Smith knew at" t t
T T L 7 Jones would do X ah
i-
y f or Jones believed at t tK^<- t ^
X^at T
^-Liev a that Jones would do
2
According to Fischer, if the second disjunct of (6) is in
fact false (if Jones did not so believe), then (6)
would be false Y^t on ah
is;) unct ive statementl i . g Adams' account, the statp-ment expresses a haxd fact about T,
, since its truth
truth"°of®"th“a^'’^*^
anything happiAs after t 7- the
1,
^ disjunction does not entail that anv-thijg happens (or falls to happen, etc.T aftL
1
-
It is true that (6) does not entail that Jones will do x
at T^. Nor does it entail that Jones will refrain from X
at T^. However, because both disjuncts are time-indexed,
(6) entails that (6) Itself is true at T^. By hypothesis
is in the future of T^. Hence, on Adams's account, (6)
Is not a hard fact about
Each of Fischer's first three criticisms alleges that
Adams's account of hard facts is too broad; each alleges
that some proposition that from an Ockhamist's point of
view shou 1 d be a soft fact, turns out on her account to be
a hard fact. Fischer's fourth criticism alleges that
Adams's account is too narrow. He gives an example of a
proposition that from an Ockhamist's point of view should
12. Fischer, "Freedom and Foreknowledge," p. 74.
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be a hard fact, but on Adam's account is not.
says Fischer, that "Smith existed at T^" is true
is earlier than T
2
-
Suppose
,
and that
existed for the first time^at -
*
Smith's existing at T, entailsfor the first time af^ T
statement "Smith existed at’
T_
. It
that
is obvious that
he doesn't exist
Thus, by (B), the
about T„. by-,crtj;rs^rte::n?iLlL^\^^^:^pj:3r^a
-Ltialir"
hard fact
eternal (or omndisastrous result for Adams's account
iscient)j^2
With this objection I agree. From an Ockhamist's point of
View, it should be a hard fact about that Smith existed
at T^. But this fact entails that at T
2 ,
it is not the
case that Smith existed for the first time at T
2
. It
follows from the present interpretation of Adams's account
that the proposition that Smith existed at is not a
hard fact about T^. Thus, Fischer has uncovered one
problem with the "propositional interpretation" of Adams's
account. He has found a proposition that should be a hard
fact, but is not on her account.
There is, however, a deeper problem for Adams's
proposal--a problem that is suggested by the failure of
Fischer's first three criticisms. Those criticisms allege
that some proposition that should be a soft fact, turns
13. Fischer, "Freedom and Foreknowledge, p. 75.
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out on her account to be a hard fact. m each case we
found that according to Adams's account, the proposition
in question was indeed a soft fact. The reason for this
result is that it is quite easy to find a q whose future
truth is entailed by the proposition p in question. m
fact it seems too easy to find a suitable q in these
cases. In one case (the third objection) p itself serves
a suitable q. in the other cases, minor modifications
of p produce a suitable q. it is noteworthy that in all
three cases, the q in question is a temporally stable
proposition; that is, either q is always true or q is
always false. This suggests a strategy by which we can
always find a q whose future truth is entailed by a given
proposition p. Let p be any proposition, let t^^ be any
time, and let be any time later than t^. Then let q be
the temporally stable proposition that p is, was, or will
be true. It follows that p entails that q is true at t^.
Alternatively, the actuality of q at is a necessary
condition for the truth of p. Thus on Adams's account, p
is not a hard fact about tj^. This strategy will work for
any proposition and any time. Hence it shows that the
propositional interpretation of Adams's account is much
too narrow: on this interpretation, there are no hard
f acts
.
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4. Adams ' Account Reint-.f^rpr^f
Adams might try to overcome these difficulties by
framing her definition in terms of events rather than
states of affairs or propositions. Instead of saying that
a hard fact does not entail the future truth, or future
falsehood, of any proposition, she could say that it does
not entail the future occurrence, or future nonoccurrence,
of any event. More precisely, she might suggest:
(E) A proposition p is a hard fact as of t. =df p istrue at t^^ and there is no event e and^time tlater than t^^ such that either by necessity, ^f
p is true at t, then e occurs at t~, or by
necessity, if
^ is true at t, thence does not
occur at t^. ^
On this proposal, to say that it is a hard fact as of 1983
that Caesar died in 44 B.C. is to say first, that it is
true in 1983 that Caesar died in 44 B.C., and second, that
the proposition that Caesar died in 44 B.C. does not
entail the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any event
subsequent to 1983. This formulation avoids some of the
oddities of its predecessor. On this account, hard facts
must be facts. Also, this account in principle allows a
fact to be hard at some times but not at others. The
structure of (E) allows a proposition such as that Caesar
died in 44 B.C., to be soft at times before 44 B.C., and
hard thereafter. We may presume that a proposition true
at t is a soft fact as of t if and only if it is not a
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hard fact as of t.
This "events-interpretation" of Adams's account might
allow her to escape objections such as those raised above.
My objection to the propositional interpretation rests
upon the assumption that for any proposition p, there is a
temporally stable proposition expressed by saying that p
IS, was, or will be true. It is not as obvious that a
similar assumption holds for events. Adams could claim,
with some plausibility, that while Caesar's death is an
event that corresponds to the proposition that Caesar
dies, there is no event that is always happening, and that
corresponds, in the same way, to the disjunctive proposi-
tion that Caesar died, dies or will die. in reply to
Fischer s objection, Adams could claim, perhaps plausibly,
that while Smith's existing for the first time might be an
event, there is no time-indexed event such as Smith's
existing for the first time at T^. If such claims were
true, then the events-interpr etation might escape the
difficulties faced by the propositional interpretation of
Adams's account.
It is not easy to evaluate (E) without the aid of a
theory of events. If (E) is to be useful to an Ockhamist,
then the following things must be true of events. There
must be no time-indexed events, and there must be no tem-
porally stable events analogous to disjunctive proposi-
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tions such as that Caesar died, dies, or will die.
Otherwise, (E) will „.eet the same fate as (D)
. There must
be no logically necessary events, such as the sky's being
blue or not blue, or the earth's existing or not
exlstlng-events that by necessity are always happening.
Otherwise, there will be no hard facts, because every
proposition entails the future occurrence of such events.
There must be no logically impossible events, such as your
writing a book that you do not write-events that by
necessity never happen. Otherwise, there will again be no
hard facts, because every proposltioh entails the future
nonoccurrence of such events.
Perhaps there is a defensible theory of events that
meets these requirements. Still, I believe there are
further difficulties with (E) that arise from natural as-
sumptions about events. It is natural to believe that any
change is an event. I am inclined further to believe that
the acquisition of a property is a change. That is, if a
thing acquires a property, no matter the sort of thing or
property, this acquisition constitutes a change in the
thing, and hence an event. The notion of
property-acquisition involved here may be defined as
follows
.
Dl: X acquires property p at time t =df there is an
interval of time such that t is the last moment
in the interval, and t is the only moment in the
interval at which x has p.
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(For our purposes, i assume that all intervals contain
more than one moment of time. ,f there are momentary
Intervals, then ,D1 should be revised to speak only of
honmomentary intervals.) I am also inclined to believe
that there are moments of time, and that being present is
a property that every moment has at that mbment
, and only
at that moment. For example, noon on January 1, 2001 will
px esentnftsf^ at noon on January 1, 2001, and at no
other time. But then by Dl, every moment acquires
presentness at itself. Thus on my view, any moment's
acquisition of presentness is an event. It is common to
speak of such an acquisition as the A£riva.l of the moment
in question, and it seems quite natural to speak of such
arrivals as events. For example, a prisoner might wait
with anticipation for his first moment of freedom to
arrive. The arrival of that moment is no doubt an
important event in his life. An adolescent might look
forward to the moment at which she becomes sixteen. The
arrival of that moment might be an important event for
her; it might open a new chapter in her social life.
If the arrival of a moment of time is an event, then
the arrival of an interval of time is also an event. Not
all intervals arrive, of course; some stretch infinitely
far into the past. An interval arrives if and only if it
has an earlier bound. (A moment of time, t, is an earlier
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bound of an interval, 1, if and only It no moment earlier
than t is in i, in formal symbols,
-3s(s < t s s e !).)
If we assume that moments of time are structured like the
real numbers, then if an Interval of time has an earlier
bound. It has a latest earlier bound. The latest earlier
bound of an Interval is the moment at which' the Interval
begins, or arrives. For example, a day is an interval
whose latest earlier bound is midnight. when midnight
becomes present, a new day arrives.
If the arrival of an interval is an event, then a
serious problem arises for Adams's account of hard facts.
An anniversary is an interval of time, usually an entire
day, that transpires n years after some notable event.
For example, the twentieth anniversary of Caesar
is a day that transpires twenty years after
death. Now, the proposition that Caesar died in
's death
Caesar '
s
44 B.C.
14. Some intervals that have a latest earlier bound,
contain their latest earlier bound; such an interval is
c losed liC iJie left Other intervals that have a latest
bound, do not contain their latest earlier bound;
such an interval is open to. tlm left . If an interval is
closed to the left, then it contains a first moment,
namely its latest earlier bound. Obviously, such an
interval arrives at its first moment. If an interval is
open to the left, it has no first moment. Still, such an
interval arrives eventually; it is natural to say that it
arrives at its latest earlier bound. Thus, for our
purposes it does not matter whether midnight is the first
moment of a new day, or the last moment of an old day. In
either case, a new day arrives every day at midnight.
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entalla that the twentieth annivereary of Caesar's death
arrives In 24 B.C. Thus according to (E), the proposition
in question is not a hard fact as of, say, 34 B.C.
Similar examples will show that the proposition in
question is not a hard fact as of any time subsequent to
44 B.C. In general, no proposition that corresponds to
some event, e, (in the way that Caesar died in n r p
corresponds to Caesar's death) will be a hard fact on
Adams's account. For it will entail the future occurrence
of e's anniversaries.
It is also natural to assume that the coming into ex-
istence of a person or a thing is an event. This implies
that one of Fischer's examples will also cause trouble for
Adams's account. Call the event consisting of Smith's
coming into existence for the first time, Smith's
J.ficept i on • (I leave it open whether one's inception
coincides with one's conception, one's birth, ' or perhaps
some other event in one's development.) Let < t
2 <
t^,
and assume that Smith exists at t^. Then it is true at t
2
that Smith exists at tj^. Further, it is necessary that if
it is true at t
2
that Smith exists at t^, then Smith's
inception does not occur at t^ . Hence according to (E), it
is not a hard fact as of t
2
that Smith exists at t^^. In
general, any proposition that attributes a property to a
thing at tj^ will not be a hard fact as of t
2 -
For it is
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necessary that if y r, +- j-u/ idL It X has p at then x's inception does
not occur at t^
.
Finally, it is natural to assume that any act of
believing is an event. m the presence of this assump-
tion, however, principle (E) has a consequence that many
Ockhamists will find unwelcome. m effect, principle (E)
does not allow an Ockhamist to hold that by necessity, God
i 3 omniscient and everlasting. To see this, we must keep
in mind that any sensible Ockhamist needs an account of
hard facts according to which some facts are hard and
others are not. But according to (E), if God is omni-
scient and everlasting in every possible world, then there
are no hard facts. For let p be any proposition and let
< t2- By necessity, if p is true at t^^ then God
believes at t2 that p is true at t^. The occurrence at t2
of the event, God's believing that p is true at t^, is
entailed by the proposition that p is true at t^^. Hence, p
is not a hard fact as of t^. As a result, any Ockhamist
who adopts principle (E) is thereby forced to give up the
claim that by necessity, God is omniscient and
everlasting. Perhaps that claim is not essential to the
Ockhamist's position. Still, an Ockhamist should not be
forced to abandon it.
Adams's account of hard facts faces serious problems.
If it is interpreted in terms of propositions, then her
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account I3 much too narrow; it implies that there are no
hard facts. On the other hand, If her account is inter-
preted In terms of events, then again it is too narrow.
In that case, her account implies that no propositions
that correspond directly to events are hard facts. it
also Implies that no proposition that attributes a
property to a thing at a time is a hard fact. Finally, it
does not allow an Ockhamist to hold that as a matter of
necessity, God is omniscient and everlasting. i see no
easy way for Adams to solve these problems.
5. A NfiW Approach Ld. Qckhami sm
The idea behind Adams's account is that hard facts
are propositions that do not entail anything about the
future. It seems wise to abandon this idea because almost
any proposition entails something about the future. l
suggest a new approach to the Ockhamist 's task of
distinguishing hard and soft facts. As we said, hard
facts are true propositions that are unalterable? soft
facts are true propositions that are not unalterable. To
clarify this distinction, we need to explain unalterabil-
ity? to do that, I will present a semantic theory that
construes unalterability as truth in all accessible
wor Ids
.
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We will use a formal language L that contains the
sentence letters E, Q, R, etc. a, B, C, etc., will be
used as metavariables ranging over formulas. The
connectives are - and
— the future-tense operator F,
the past-tense operator P, and the unalterablllty operator
L. The sentences are formed In the usual ways; every
sentence letter is a sentence, if A and a are sentences,
then so are A, (A >B)
, FA, PA, and LA; nothing else is a
sentence
.
To interpret F and P we need a set of moments M, and
a binary relation < on M which is intended to represent
the earlier-than relation. To interpret L we use a set of
possible worlds W, and a reflexive relation A on WxM (the
set of "world-times"). it is required that if
A([w,t],[w',t'J) then t = f. A([w,t],[w\t]) is intended
to mean that w' is accessible from w as of t. The latter
locution will be discussed in section seven.
In developing a semantic theory that can accommodate
Ockhamism, it is not necessary to invoke branching time.
For this reason, we require that < is connected: for any
moments s and t in M, either s = t or s < t or t < s . It
is also reasonable to require that < is asymmetric and
transitive: for any s and t in M, if s < t then -(t < s);
and for any r, s, and t in M, if r < s and s < t then
r < t. These requirements guarantee that time is linear.
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It will be useful to select a privileged member a of
W to represent the actual world, and a privileged member n
of M to represent now. we can now say that a model
^ sextuple (W,M,^,n,A,<) where W is a set of
worlds, M is a set of moments, a is a member of W, n is a
member of M, A is a reflexive relation on WxM such that if
A([w,t],[w',t']) then t = f, and < is a binary relation on
M that is asymmetric, transitive, and connected.
We say that a tJaeory is a nonempty set of formulas;
Its YQcabulriry is the set of sentence letters occurring
among its members. To assign truth values to the formulas
of a theory T with vocabulary V, we use an inter prpf^t- i nn
of T on a model structure (W,M,a,n, A, <)
,
which is a
function (p from VxWxM into {T,F}. The truth conditions
for formulas of the form FA, PA, and LA, are straight-
forward. Let w be a member of W and let t be a member of
M. Then,
FA is true at t in w under (p if and only if for
some s in M, t < s and A is true at s in w under
Cp ; otherwise FA is false at t in w under (p .
PA is true at t in w under (f) if and only if for
some s in M, s < t and A is true at s in w under
Cp
; otherwise FA is false at t in w under <p .
LA is true at t in w under (p if and only if for all
w' in W such that A( [w, t ] , [w' , t ] )
,
A is true at
t in w' under (p
;
otherwise LA is false at t in
w under (p .
Thus unalterability is truth in all accessible worlds.
A
formula A is true under Cp if and only if A is true at n
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in a under <P (true now in the actual world); otherwise, a
is £aia£ undej: tp, ^ formula a is a aemantin consennenc,
of a set r of formulas, written r It a, if and only it
for all model structures >n, and for all interpretations
of r W(a) on ‘»7
, if a is true under Cf for all B in n
then a is true under
. a formula a is jralid if and only
if II- a.
One Important result of this theory is that
P^FZ—^LFE. To see this, consider a model structure and
interpretation of the following sort.
Figure One
s n t
w: 0 (p(£,w,n) = 4^(£fW,t)
a: 0 0
A( [a, n] , [w, n]
)
^(ErRrn) - <P(JBfa,t)
In such a case, F£ is true at n in a, but false at n in w.
Hence LF£ is false at n in 3.. Another result is that
^ PF£ ^LPF£f which can be seen by considering the same
example. In the above situation, PF£ is true at n in a,
15. I borrow the idea that unalterability is truth in
all accessible worlds from Fred Feldman, Do
i
ng the Beat We
Can (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel, forthcoming), chap. 1.
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but false at n in w. Hence LPF£ is false at n in a.
A third result is that P£->LP£. This can be seen
by considering a model structure and Interpretation of the
following sort.
Eigurft Two
t n
w: o o Cp(R,w,t) = F
o o (p (£,a,t) = T
A( [a,n]
,
[w,n]
)
In this case, P£ is true at n in a but false at n in w.
Hence LP£ is false at n in a. If we think of atomic
formulas as the translations of ordinary present-tensed
sentences such as "Sally is sailing," then this result may
seem counterintuitive. The only model structures and
interpretations on which P£-->LP£ is false are those on
which some accessible worlds have distinct pasts. To rule
out such cases we could require that for any worlds w and
w', for any time t, and for any atomic formula h, if
A( [w, t] , [w' ,t]
)
then for all s < t, ^(A,w,s) =
(p(A,w',s). If a model structure and interpretation
satisfy this condition, then no accessible worlds differ
with respect to the assignments given to atomic formulas
in the past; that is, if w' is accessible from w as of t,
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then the aseignmente of truth-valuee to atomic formulas In
w up until t are the same as the assignments of truth-
values to atomic formulas in w’ up until t.
These three results show that A—>LA. That is, if a
is F£, or PFP, or PE, then we get a counterexample to the
claim that Ih A-->LA. Figure one shows that £ itself is
another counterexample.
The second and third results show that PA-->LPA. if
A is F£ or E, then we get a counterexample to the claim
that Ih PA— >LPA.
Another important result of the present theory is
that if then r||-A— In particular, if
AIHB then Ih A >B. When combined with our earlier results,
we get the following facts:
FE LF£
PFE I^LPFE
P£ ^ LPE
PA 11^ LPA
Ali^LA
Finally, two versions of the law of excluded middle
are results the present theory. First, for any formula A,
IhA V -A. (A V B is an abbreviation of
-A~->B. ) Second,
16. This is the semantic counterpart to the deduction
theorem of proof theory: if r W {A} h B then r h A— >B.
1^3
for any formula a, for any model structure containing a
world w and a time t, and tor any interpretation rp of (a)
on “ly,
, either a is true at t in w under 4> , or a is false
at t in w under cp
.
6. Qgkhamist. 1 r Semantir.g
The full details of the semantic theory described
above are given in this section. Those not interested in
these details are encouraged to skip the rest of this
sect ion
.
The pr im i t i ve symbols of L are the following.
1. Sentence letters: £, Q, r, etc., with or without
subscripts drawn from the natural numbers.
2. Connectives: F, P, L
3
. Parentheses
: ( , )
sentencsa of L are defined as follows.
4. Every sentence letter is a sentence.
5. If A and fl are sentences then so are
-h,
, FA, PA, and LA.
6. Nothing else is a sentence.
A mode l structure is a sextuple (W,M,a,n,A, < ) where W
is a set of worlds, M is a set of moments, a is a member
of W, n is a member of M, A is a reflexive relation on WxM
such that if A( [w, t ] , [w' , t ' ]
)
then t = t', and < is a
binary relation on M that is asymmetric, transitive, and
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connected. if a is reflexive and transitive then
(W,M,a,n,A, <) is called an moiifil .structnrp if a is
reflexive and symmetric then (W,M,^,n,A,<) is called a
BjQuwersche mod&l ai^ructure . if a is an equivalence
relation then (W,M,a,n,A,<) is called an ^ msid&l
aliructure . If A is such that for all w and w' in w, and
for all t and t ' in M, if a(
[
w, t
' ] , [w* , t
' ]
)
and t < t
'
then A([w,t],[w',t]), then (W,M,^,n,A,<) is called a
nonexpandinq mode l structure . On such a model structure,
"the set of accessible worlds never expands." That is,
the set of worlds accessible as of t from w is always a
subset of the set of worlds accessible as of any time
earlier than t from w.
A theory is a nonempty set of formulas; its
vocabu lary is the set of sentence letters occurring among
its members. An Interpretation of a theory T with
vocabulary V on a model structure (W,M,a,n,A, < ) is a
function (p from VxWxM into {T,F).
Let (W,M,a,n,A, < ) be a model structure, let w be any
member of W, and let t be any member of M. Then a
sentence letter A is tr ue ah t in w under an interpreta-
tion Cp (on (W,M,a,n,A, < ) ) if and only if <^?(A,w,t) = T;
otherwise A is LaXse ah t In w under (p. where A and B are
any formulas.
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“A i S .true ei t Jj;i W undp»r (p
false at t in w under (P ;
.at. t Jji W undpr (p
.
if and only if ^ is
otherwise
-h is fa 1
(A >B) is true
. ^ t Jj:i w undpr (p if
either A is false at t in w under
true at t in w under Cp
;
otherwis
I a l sfi At t in w undpr <p
,
and only if
or B is
e (A— >B) is
FA is tiue At t In w
some s in M, t <
<P; otherwise FA
iinder cp if and only if
s and A is true at s in
i s £ a l a e At t in w undp>r
for
w under
PA is txiiA At t in w under (P if and only if
some s in M, s < t and A is true at s in
<P; otherwise PA ig false at t in w nnrier
£
W
or
under
O'-
LA IS iiLUA At t in w under (p if and only if for
w in W such that A( [w, t ] , [w* , t] )
,
a is true
t in w under (p
;
otherwise LA is fa 1 sp at t
w under (p
.
all
at
in
True under
, 'false under (p \ 'semantic consequence',
and 'valid' are defined in the preceding section.
Some results of the present theory are the following.
1. F£-->LFB
2. PF£-->LPF£
3. P£— >LP£
4. PA-->LPA
5. IP A-->LA
6- If r \7 {A} II- B then
7. FRjpLFR
8. PF£|#^LPF£
9 . PR IP LPR
10. PAI^LPA
11. Aj/LA
r Ih A-->B
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This theory can be extended so that the object
language can be used to refer directly to particular
moments of time. This is done by adding to the language
some constants r, s, t, etc. (with or without subscripts
drawn from the natural numbers), and three functors, F, N,
and p, for the future, the present, and the past
respectively. To the definition of a sentence we add that
If A IS a sentence and if m is a constant then FmA, NmA,
and PmA are sentences. The vocabulary of a theory becomes
the set of all sentence letters and constants that occur
among its members. An interpretation becomes a function
(P from VxWxM into {T,F)xM such that for all sentence
letters A in V, for all constants m in V, for all w and w'
in W, and for all t and f in M, (1) gP(A,w,t) e {T,F},
(2) <^(m,w,t) e M, and (3) (p(m,w,t) = <^(m,w',t'). To
the truth conditions for formulas we add the following:
FmA is true at t in w under CP if and only if
t < <p(m,t,w) and A is true at <^(m,t,w) in w
under (p .
NmA is true at t in w under Cp if and only if
t = (p(m,t,w) and A is true at ^(m,t,w) in w
under (p .
PmA is true at t in w under Cp if and only if
<P(m,t,w) < t and A is true at ^(m,t,w)
under (p .
in w
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. Access i hi 1 1 f y
The semantic theory presented above is based upon the
concept of accessibility. m this section I attempt to
clarify this concept. In its fundamental form, accessi-
bility 13 expressed by saying that a state of affairs p,
IS accessible to a group g of people, as of a time t, from
a world w; this can be abbreviated by writing Ag,t,w,p.
I take accessibility to be an undefined notion; the
only way I can explain it is by giving examples. The most
intuitive examples arise in the special cases where the
group in question has only one member, and the world in
question is the actual world. In these cases, we say that
p is accessible to a person s at t, abbreviated As,t,p.
Your reading the rest of this chapter is accessible to you
as of now. Your swimming the Atlantic during the next
hour is not accessible to you as of now. Suppose that
were Sally to suggest to Sam that they sail tomorrow, Sam
would agree and they would sail tomorrow. Then Sam's
sailing tomorrow is accessible to Sally as of now. There
is something she could do, namely make the appropriate
suggestion, such that were she to do it, Sam would sail.
Suppose also that on this particular occasion, if Sally
17. My attempt is inspired by Feldman's discussion of
accessibility in chapter one of Doing the Rest We Can .
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not suggest sailing to Sam, Sam would not sail
tomorrow; he is willing but not eager, we may suppose, and
will go only if Sally suggests it. Then Sam's not sailing
tomorrow is also accessible to Sally as of now. There is
something she could do, namely refrain from making the
appropriate suggestion, such that were she to do it, Sam
would not sail. Let us suppose further that Sally abso-
lutely refuses to go hiking tomorrow. she could, but she
does not want to. Nothing Sam can do would convince her
to hike, and Sam is neither willing nor able to force her
to do so. In this case, Sally's hiking tomorrow is acces-
sible to Sally as of now, but that state of affairs is not
accessible to Sam. Nothing he can do is such that, were
he to do it, Sally would hike tomorrow.
To continue our story, suppose that Sam and Sally
will in fact sail tomorrow, and will not hike tomorrow.
Suppose also that tomorrow is Saturday. Then as of today
(Friday), Sally's hiking on Saturday is accessible to
Sally., On Sunday, however, the state of affairs in
question will no longer be accessible to Sally. By then
it will be too late for her to take that course of action.
To take another example, suppose there is a farmer in
North Dakota who has never seen or heard of Sally.
Suppose further that this farmer will plant wheat this
Spring no matter what Sally does. In this case the
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farmer's planting wheat in the Spring is accessible to
Sally. The state of affairs in question does not involve
her in any way, since it is the farmer who will do the
planting. Nor is there any causal connection between the
farmer's planting and any of Sally's actions. Whether the
farmer plants wheat is not up to Sally. Nevertheless, the
farmer's planting wheat in the Spring is accessible to
her, in the sense in question. if she bides her time
until Spring, the farmer will plant wheat. Thus, there is
something she can do such that if she does it, the farmer
will plant wheat. Indeed, by hypothesis, everything she
can do has that feature. So, the state of affairs in
question is accessible to Sally now, though in a somewhat
trivial fashion.
It is important to emphasize that on my view, acces-
sibility is undefined. I do not regard the phrase, 's has
the power as of t so to act that p obtains,' or the
phrase, 'there is something s could do as of t such that,
were s to do it, p would obtain, ' as a definition or an
analysis of the phrase, 'p is accessible to s at t.' Such
a counter f actual analysis would not accurately express the
concept of accessibility I have in mind. The phrases in
question are offered merely as informal characterizations
of accessibility. They are heuristic devices which are
intended to guide the intuition.
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It is also important to avoid confusing accessibility
with the related but much narrower notion of power. in
many cases, what is accessible to one coincides with what
Is within one's power. As of now, your reading the rest
of this chapter is accessible to you and within your
power. Sally's hiking tomorrow is accessible to Sally and
within her power. Sally's hiking tomorrow is neither
accessible to Sam nor within his power. On the other
hand, there are many cases in which what is accessible to
one does not coincide with what is within one's power.
The farmer's planting wheat in the Spring is accessible to
Sally; but it is not within her power. Nothing she can do
will have any causal connection to the farmer's actions.
What the farmer plants is not up to Sally, or under her
control. To take another example, tomorrow's sunset is
not within your power; you cannot bring it about that the
sun sets tomorrow. Nothing you can do would have any
causal effect upon the motion of the sun or the earth; the
matter is simply out of your hands. Nonetheless,
tomorrow's sunset is accessible to you in the sense in
question. If you merely go about your own business
tomorrow, the sun will set. In a like manner, all of the
necessary states of affairs are accessible to all of us at
all times. If p is necessary, then everything we can do
IS such that if we do it, p obtains.
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Suppose now that we have an intuitive understanding
of what it is for a state of affairs to be accessible to a
person at a time. it is then easy to explain the notion
of an accessible world. A possible world, on the view i
endorse, is merely a state of affairs of a special sort,
to wit, one that is maximal and possible.^® Thus we can
speak sensibly of a possible world being accessible to a
person at a time, in abbreviated form, As,t,w. a world w
IS accessible to you now if, loosely speaking, there is
something you can do as of now such that were you to do
it, w would be actual. There are worlds accessible to
Sally now in which Sam sails tomorrow, and worlds accessi-
ble to her in which he does not. There are no worlds
accessible to Sam in which Sally hikes tomorrow.
In the examples discussed above I assumed, for
instance, that Sam's sailing was accessible to Sally as of
now Irom tiie actua l wor Id . But similar examples could be
generated for other possible worlds. if we understand
As,t,p then it should be easy to understand As,t,w,p,
which says that p is accessible to s as of t from w. The
18. A state of affairs, p, is maximal if and only if
for any state of affairs q, either p includes q or pprecludes q. p includes q if and only if it is impossible
that both p obtains and q does not obtain, p precludes q
if and only if it is impossible that both p obtains and q
obtains. See Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Neces s i ty(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), ch. 4.
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former is the special case of the latter in which w is the
actual world. Furthermore, examples could be generated in
which p is accessible to a group of more than one person
of t from w. For instance, Sam and Sally's sailing
tomorrow is accessible to the pair of them as of now in
the actual world. Thus, if we understand As,t,w,p then it
should be easy to understand Ag,t,w,p. The former is the
special case of the latter in which s is the only member
of g. For the special case in which g is the group of all
human beings, and p is a possible world w', we write
A,t,w,w'. In the semantic theory presented above this was
written A( [w, t ] , [w* , t] )
.
Thus far we have treated accessibility as a relation.
Ag,t,w,p has been treated as if it were a formula of first
order logic in which A is a four-place predicate letter,
and g, t, w, and p are variables. Accessibility can also
be treated as a modality. This can be done by introducing
a sentential operator A, into our formal language. AA is
defined as
-L-A. Thus AA is true at t in w under (p if and
only if for some w' in W such that A ( [ w , t ] , [ w ' , t ] )
,
A is
true at t in w' under
. Unalterability is truth in all
accessible worlds, whereas accessibility is truth in some
accessible worlds.
On my view, when accessibility is taken to be a
binary relation on world-time pairs, it is an equivalence
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relation (it is reflexive, transitive, and symmetric).
Moreover, on my understanding, "the set of accessible
worlds never expands." That Is, the set of worlds acces-
sible to g as of t from w Is always a subset of the set of
worlds accessible to g as of any time earlier than t from
w. For these reasons, i believe that nonexpanding S5
model structures are the only model structures that can be
used to represent reality accurately. i am inclined
further to agree with Feldman that "the set of accessible
worlds always shrinks. That is to say, the set of
worlds accessible to g as of t from w is always a proper
subset of the set of worlds accessible to g as of any time
earlier than t from w.
8. Some Comment a about Qckhamistir semantirc;
Some comments are in order regarding the
philosophical significance of the semantic theory
presented in section six, where accessibility is
understood as explained in section seven.
First, the semantic theory presented above— call it
Q-okham i at i c aomantica
—
provides an escape from fatalism.
Fatalism is the view that no propositions are open; it can
19. Feldman, Doing the Best Ke Can, chap. 1.
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be expressed by the schema (LA v L-A) and also by the
equivalent schema
-(-LA &
-L-A)
. On model structures and
interpretations of the sort depicted in figure one, it is
open that R. That is, (LE v L-R) is false at n in ^ (false
now in the actual world) under cP ; also, (-L£ & -L-£) is
true at n in ^ under Cp
. Thus fatalism is invalid in
Ockhamistic semantics: that is, (LA v L-A) and
|^-(-LA &
-L-A). Although we are allowed to escape from
fatalism, it is important to note that Ockhamistic
semantics does not force us to do so. There are model
structures on which (LA v L-A) is true for all formulas A
at all times in all worlds under all interpretations. Any
model structure in which the only world accessible from w
as of t is w itself, is an example; such structures are
-£ a.ta li at ic mode l structures
. indeed, fatalism can
be formulated as the claim that for any world w and time
the only world accessible as of t from w. A
fatalist can therefore accept Ockhamistic semantics; any
fatalist who does so will no doubt insist that if we want
to represent reality accurately, then we should restrict
our attention to fatalistic model structures. So,
Ockhamistic semantics allows us to deny fatalism, but does
not make it a law of logic that fatalism is false. This
is as it should be. My intuitions tell me that it is not
a law of logic that there are free agents. If so, then it
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should not be a law of logic that there are open propos i-
t ions
.
Second, Ockhamistic semantics allows us to avoid
unalterabilism—the view that whatever is true is unalter-
able. This view can be expressed by the formula A— >LA;
it can also be expressed as the claim that AIhLA. In model
structures of the sort depicted in figure one, F£ is true
at n in ^ under cp, but LF£ is false at n in a under (p
.
Thus FE-->LF£ is false at n in ^ under Cp
. This shows that
A->LA is invalid, and that Again, it is important
to note that Ockhamistic semantics allows but does not
require that we give up unalterabilism. On any fatalistic
model structure. A— >LA is true for all formulas A at all
times in all worlds under all interpretations. Again this
is as it should be. it should not be a law of logic that
unalterabilism is false; if there were no free agents then
every truth would be unalterable.
Third, Ockhamistic semantics not only allows but
requires two versions of the law of excluded middle.
First, for any formula A, //- A v -A. Second, for any
formula A, for any model structure containing a world w
and a time t, and for any interpretation <p of {A} on 9^,
either A is true at t in w under or A is false at t in
w under (^
.
This too is as it should be, or so it seems to
me
.
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Fourth, Ockhamistic semantics accommodates Ockhamism
(and hence deserves its name). Ockhamism is the view that
not all propositions about the past are fixed; some propo-
sitions about the past are open. An Ockhamist denies not
only unalterabilism but also unalterabilism with respect
to the past--the view that whatever is true about the past
IS unalterable. Model structures and interpretations of
the sort depicted in figure one show that Ockhamism can be
accommodated. In such cases, PF£ is about the past (it is
of the form PA), and PF£ is true at n in ^ under (p but
false at n in w under Thus it is open that PF£ at n in
^ under (p : that is, (-LPF£ & -L-PF£) is true at n in ^
under <p . it is important to note that Ockhamistic
semantics does not require that there be open propositions
about the past. As we have seen, it does not require that
there be any open propositions. Again this is as it
should be. Ockhamists should be allowed to believe that
all free agents could cease to exist, and that if that
happened then there would be no open propositions about
the past, present, or future.
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^ Qckhami q1- i ^ So1 nf i nn
We return now to hard facts and the puzzle presented
in section one. Saying that it is a hard fact as of t in
w that A is another way of saying that it is unalterable
as of t in w that h. On this account, it is a hard fact as
of 1983 that Caesar died in 44 B.C. There is nothing any
group can do as of now such that, were that group to do
it, it would not be true that Caesar died in 44 B.C. This
proposition is true in all worlds accessible to any group
as of now. However, the corresponding future-tensed prop-
osition, that Caesar will die in 44 B.C., may not have
been a hard fact as of, say, 45 B.C. There may have been
someone at that time who could have hastened Caesar's
death, or someone who could have delayed Caesar's death.
If so, then there would have been worlds accessible to
such a person as of 45 B.C. in which Caesar did not die
in 44 B.C.
If Sam and Sally sail tomorrow, then it is a soft
fact as of now that they sail tomorrow. For there are
worlds still accessible to Sally as of now, in which she
does not suggest to Sam that they sail. In such worlds,
they do not sail tomorrow. Let us suppose that Fischer
wrote his paper in 1982. Then on our account, it is a
soft fact as of, say, 1981, that Caesar died exactly 2025
years before Fischer wrote his paper. In all worlds
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accessible to Fischer as of 1981, Caesar died in 44 B.C.
But in some worlds accessible to Fischer as of 1981,
Fischer does not write his paper in 1982. m those
worlds, it is not true that Caesar died exactly 2025 years
before Fischer wrote his paper.
The puzzle with which we started turns upon the as-
sumption that the past is fixed.
PI: In every possible world, if a time t is earlierthan a time t' and if a proposition p is true att, then it is a hard fact as f that p is true
at t
.
In terms of Ockhamistic semantics, this could be expressed
by saying that for any formula A, for any model structure
and for any interpretation (p of {A} on ‘Hi, if % and
^ represent reality accurately then PA— >LPA is true at
all times in all worlds under Cf
.
The Ockhamist has a powerful objection to this
principle. If there are any soft facts at all, then PI is
false. Suppose it is a soft fact that Sam will sail at
noon tomorrow, on June 3, 1983; in laymen's terms, Sam
''/ill sail tomorrow at noon, but he could refrain. For
convenience, let t be noon on June 3, 1983, let t» be
2
noon today, on June 2, 1983, and let tj^ be noon yesterday,
on June 1, 1983. Then in the actual world, Sam sails at
t^ (tomorrow); but there is some world w accessible to Sam
as of (today) in which he does not. Moreover, it is
true at tj^ in the actual world that Sam will sail at t^.
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but false at in w that Sam will sail at t^
. Thus
contrary to PI, it is a soft fact as of t^ that "Sam will
sail at t^” is true at tj^.
Are there any soft facts? It is no surprise that my
answer is yes. I suggested in chapter two that as of
Friday afternoon, “I will eat at Joe's on Friday night"
was a soft fact. I argued in chapter tour that it is a
soft fact as of now that I will drink some water tonight
at dinner
. Other examples abound.
An incompatibilist could respond to this objection by
revising his argument. For there is a principle weaker
than PI that will serve his purposes. What is really at
issue, an incompatibilist might insist, is the claim that
past beliefs are fixed. More precisely,
P2
. In every possible world w, if t is earlier than
t' and if s believes p at t in w, then it is a
in w that s believes p at
t
.
P2 will work in the incompatibilist
' s argument just as
well as PI. If P2 is true then contrary to (2), it is not
open as of t« in w that God did not hold a belief at t,
^ 1
that God in fact (in w) held at t^.
20. Compare Pike, "Divine Omniscience," p. 34: "4. It
is not within one's power at a given time to do something
that would bring it about that someone who held a certain
belief at a time prior to the time in question did not
hold that belief at the time prior to the time in
question .
"
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The Ockhamist has an objection to this principle as
well. If there are any soft facts, and if God is
essentially omniscient and everlasting (as is assumed in
this context by the incompat ibilist himself for the sake
of argument) then P 2 is false. Suppose again that it is a
soft fact as of (now) that Sam will sail at t^
(tomorrow). Then it was true at (yesterday) in the
actual world that Sam will sail at t3
. if God is omni-
scient and everlasting then God knew, and hence believed,
at tj^ that Sam will sail at t^
. Moreover, if it is a soft
fact as of that Sam will sail at t^
,
then there is a
world w accessible to Sam as of t2 in which he does not
sail at t^. In w it was false at that Sam will sail at
t^. Presumably there is nothing Sam can do as of t2 such
that, were he to do it, God would not exist. If so, then
God exists in every world accessible to Sam as of t2* If
God is essentially omniscient and everlasting, then God is
omniscient and everlasting in every world accessible to
Sam as of t2 • Thus in w God knew, and hence believed, at
that Sam will not sail at t^ . Accordingly, P 2 is false.
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10. LLscher Conshr;^inf
In section 1 1 1 o£ his article, Fischer presents a
constraint which he thinks an incompatlbllist might use to
defeat any account of the distinction between hard and
coft facts. He holds that on any account of this
distinction that meets his constraint, God's prior beliefs
are hard facts. According to Fischer's constraint,
the only way in which God's belief at T, about Jones
^^2 "“did be If one and the same state of the mindof the person who was God at T would count as onebelief If Jones did X at T
, but a different belief(or not a belief at ally if Jones did not do x at
T-2' (P- 76)
Fischer's idea seems to be this: on any acceptable account
of hard facts, past states of mind are hard facts. (This
13 the incompatibilist
' s constraint.) If past states of
mind are hard facts, but past beliefs are soft facts, then
in some situations, one and the same state of mind at t
would count as different beliefs given different events
subsequent to t. But this is implausible; hence it is
implausible that past beliefs are soft facts.
Consider an example in which it is alleged by the
Ockhamist that past beliefs are soft facts. Suppose again
that Jones does X at T
2 r
but that he could refrain. God,
being omniscient, believed at that Jones will do X at
T„. Let's say that God's mind was in state s at T, ; as
Fischer might say, this constituted God's believing that
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Jones-would do X at
. The Ockhamist holds that if Jones
had not done X at
, then God would have believed at T
that Jones would not do X at
. Fischer seems to be
suggesting that if Jones had not done X at it still
would have been the case that God's mind was in state s at
Tj^. Thus, if the Ockhamist is right that in such cases
past beliefs are soft facts, then one and the same state
of mind at T^^, namely s, would count as one belief if
Jones does X at and a different belief if Jones does
not do X at T^. But Fischer denies that s would'count as
one belief in the former situation, and a different belief
in the latter situation. He concludes that contrary to
the Ockhamist, past beliefs are hard facts.
Fischer claims that God's state of mind, s, would not
count as one belief if Jones does X at T^
,
and another
belief if Jones does not do X at T^. This plausible claim
is based upon the intuition that beliefs are intimately
related (if not identical) to states of mind, and that
they would be so related no matter what Jones or anyone
else does. I share that intuition, and am willing to
accept Fischer's claim. I disagree, however, with
Fischer's assumption that past states of mind are hard
facts. Let w be some world accessible to Jones as of
in which Jones does not do X at T^. I presume that there
is nothing Jones can do as of T2 such that, were Jones to
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do it, God would not exist. if so, and if God is
essentially omniscient and everlasting, then God is omni-
scient and everlasting in w. Hence in w, God believed at
that Jones would not do X at
; in the actual world,
God believed at that Jones would do X at T^. Since
God 3 belief at in w is not the same as God's belief at
in the actual world, surely the state of God's mind at
in w is not the same as God's state of mind at in
the actual world. This, too, is based upon the intuition
that beliefs are intimately related to states of mind, and
are so related not only in the actual world, but in every
world accessible to anyone. So, given this intuition
about the relation between beliefs and states of mind— an
intuition to which Fischer himself seems to appeal--
Fischer's constraint is inappropriate. in some cases,
past states of mind are soft facts, as are past beliefs.
Fischer has presented a twofold challenge to the
Ockhamist: "first, to formulate the hard fact/soft fact
distinction in a way which yields Ockhamism, and second,
to explain why the incompat ibilist ' s constraint is
21inappropriate." I have offered an account of hard and
soft facts which, when coupled with the view that there
are some soft facts, yields Ockhamism. That is to say, on
21. Fischer, "Freedom and Foreknowledge," p. 79.
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my account if there are any soft facts then there are some
soft facts about the past. Moreover, my account shows why
the incompatibilisfs constraint Is Inappropriate. It
seems to me that Fischer's challenge has been met.
11. £an
-iie Chang e the Past?
According to Ockhamism, not all propositions about
the past are unalterable. Some propositions about the
past are soft facts. Does this view imply that we can
literally alter or change the past?
What would it be to change the past? Plantinga puts
it simply;
To bring it about, obviously, that a proposition
which is true and about the past before I act, isfalse thereafter. If i were to [change] the past,
then there would be an action I perform at a time L
and a proposition about the past—the past with
respect to t. such that prior to t the proposition
in guestion is true at ti but at some time after i(after I perform the action) it is false at t
Consider an example. Let t^^ be noon on June 6, 1974, and
let p be the proposition that I graduated from high school
at tj^. As of today p is true, let us suppose. Indeed, p
22. "Ockham's Way Out," p. 11. Plantinga does not use
the term 'unalterable' in the way that I do. For him, to
say that the past is unalterable is to say, in my terms,
that the past cannot be changed. When I say that the past
is not unalterable, I mean, in Plantinga's terms, that the
past is not accidentally necessary. Although our terminol-
ogy differs here, we agree on the matters of substance.
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has been true ever since my high school graduation. if i
change the past with respect to p by noon tomorrow, then
there is some action I perform before then such that at
noon tomorrow (after I perform it) p is false. if i do
such a thing, then as of tomorrow afternoon, I will not
have graduated at t^^. That is what it would be like
literally to change the past.
To say that someone
.can change the past, is to say
that there is a possible world accessible to someone in
which he or she changes the past. Are there such worlds?
Is there a world accessible to me, for example, in which I
change the past with respect to my high school graduation?
In a word, no. Suppose for reductio that there is such a
world, say, w. Then today in w, it is true that I
graduated from high school at tj^. Hence in w, I graduate
from high school at t^^. But if I change the past with
respect to my graduation tomorrow at in w, then it is
false at in w that I graduated at t^. Thus, in w it is
false that I graduate from high school at t^^. This is
contradictory.
My version of Ockhamism implies that there are worlds
accessible to each of us now in which the past is differ-
ent from the past of the actual world. But it does not
imply that there is a world accessible to someone in which
the past is different from the past of that world.
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Although some things about the past are
even God, can change the past. For it
impossible to do so.
open, no one, not
is metaphysically
12
. F inal Comments
It 13 worth pointing out that my version of Ockhamism
does not imply that there are worlds accessible to someone
in which God believed something at t^^ that God did not
believe at tj^. Suppose again that Sam will sail at t,
(tomorrow), but that as of t^ (today), it is accessible to
Sam not to sail. Thus God believed at t^ (yesterday) that
Sam will sail at tj. Let w be some world accessible to Sam
as of t^ in which he sails at t m w, God believed at t
1
that Sam would not sail. Thus God believed something at
in w that God did not believe at t^^ in th^ actual
wor Id , but God did not believe something at t^^ in w that
God did not believe at in w.
Further, my version of Ockhamism does not imply that
we cause God to have had the beliefs God actually had.
Consider a question such as, 'What caused God to believe
at tj^ that Sam will sail at Some might speculate
that Sam's sailing at' t^ caused God to have that belief at
Others might speculate that God's having complete
knowledge of the state of the universe at t^^, including
the state of Sam's mind, caused God to have that belief at
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No doubt there are other speculations as well. i have
no desire to take up such speculations here, much less, to
endorse one. Such a question raises deep cosmological and
theological issues. But as far as I can tell, my version
of Ockhamism does not turn upon such issues.
My view has no implications, so far as I can tell,
about the av idencft that God has had for God's beliefs.
Consider a question such as, 'What evidence did God have
at t^ for believing that Sam will sail at t
3
?' Such a
question raises deep epistemological and theological
issues. But again, my version of Ockhamism does not turn
upon such issues.
Some thinkers might allege that Ockhamism is
implausible. It is counterintuitive, some might say, to
think that any propositions about the past are open.
Although Ockhamism does not imply that we can literally
change the past, it seems to imply that we do have some
sort of "control" over the past. The primary examples of
propositions about the past that are open are propositions
that involve human freedom. For instance, I assert that
23. I do not mean to suggest that the issues about
the causes of God's beliefs are unconnected to issues
about the evidence God has for God's beliefs. Indeed, one
would suspect that they are intimately related. But again,
questions such as, 'In what manner are they related?" will
not be discussed here.
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it was true yesterday that I will drink some water tonight
at dinner; I believe nonetheless that it is accessible to
me as of now that it was false yesterday that I will drink
some water tonight at dinner. This seems to suggest that
my actions tonight at dinner will "influence" the past in
some way. An objector might insist that influencing the
past is no less counterintuitive than changing the past.
I agree that it sounds implausible to say that some
propositions about the past are open. Indeed, I believe
that there is a sense of "about the past" in which all
propositions about the past are fixed. l regret that I
cannot explain clearly the sense I have in mind. But in
that sense, the proposition that "it was true that I will
drink some water tonight at dinner" is not about the past;
in some (albeit obscure) sense, that proposition is really
about the future. It is a proposition "about" the events
that will take place tonight at dinner. Given the
relevant sense of 'about the future,' I think it is
helpful to think of such "future-infected" propositions as
propositions about the future that are masquerading as
propositions about the past.
According to the objection under discussion, it is
implausible to assert that some propositions about the
past are open. I agree that in a d if f icult-to-explain
sense, no propositions about the past are open. But this
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objection does not cast any doubt upon the version of
Ockhamism that I have articulated in this chapter. For I
have been using a very broad sense of 'about the. past'.
In the sense that I have in mind, almost any sentence
whose principal verb is past tensed expresses a proposi-
tion about the past when used in a normal way. in the
broad sense of 'about the past', the proposition that "it
was true that I will drink some water tonight at dinner"
IS about the past. Such f utur e- inf ected propositions
about the past have a very superficial pastness; their
pastness is only "skin-deep" so to speak. I see nothing
counterintuitive about the claim that in this broad sense,
some propositions about the past are open. The only
reason such propositions are open is that they turn
essentially upon some events in the future that are not
yet settled.
Some thinkers might allege that the Ockhamistic solu-
tion to our puzzle about foreknowledge and freedom is
implausible. That solution requires not only that there
be propositions about the past that are open; it requires
that some propositions about beliefs that God held in the
past are open. For example, I assert that it is open that
God believed yesterday that I will drink some water
tonight at dinner. An objector might agree that it is not
implausible to assert that some f utur e- inf ected proposi-
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tions about the past are open. An objector might agree
further that propositions expressed by sentences of the
form "it was true that it will be true that ..." are
paradigms of future-infected propositions about the past.
An objector might insist, however, that propositions about
past beliefs are not future-inf ected
.
a
proposition such
as, "God believed yesterday that I will drink some water
tonight at dinner," an objector might claim, is about the
past in a simple and straightforward manner: it simply
reports that a certain binary relation held yesterday
between God and the proposition in question.
To answer this objection completely, we need to
elucidate the concept of f utur e- inf ect ion
. Unfortunately,
I am unable at present to clarify that concept. I can
only make some loose comments regarding my intuitions
about future-infection. It seems to me that whether a
given proposition about the past is future- inf ected or not
depends upon whether it "turns essentially" upon events
that will take place in the future. Consider for example,
the proposition that "it was the case that it will be the
case that I drink some water tonight at dinner." That
proposition "turns essentially" upon the events that will
24. See Pike, "Divine Foreknowledge, Human Freedom,
and Possible Worlds," Philosophical Review 86 (1977):
209-16.
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transpire tonight at dinner. Call the proposition in
question p, and call the event consisting of my drinking
some water tonight at dinner p. p is true if and only if e
occurs tonight. Moreover, in some sense that I cannot
explain, e's occurring tonight would "make it the case
that" p is true. P's being true consists of little more
than e's occurring. Likewise, e's not occur r ing. ton ight
would "make it the case that" p is false. P's being false
consists of little more than e's failing to occur. That
inclines me to say that p "turns essentially" upon e.
Consider now the proposition that "God believed yes-
terday that I will drink some water tonight at dinner."
This too seems to me to "turn essentially" upon events
that will transpire tonight at dinner. If God is
essentially omniscient, then God is omniscient in every
world accessible to me as of now. For every such world w,
whether or not God believed yesterday in w that I will
drink some water tonight "depends" upon whether or not I
will drink some water tonight in w: if I will drink in w,
then in w God believed that I will drink; if I will not
drink in w, then in w God did not believe that I will
drink. It follows of course that whether or not God
believed yesterday in the actual world that I will drink
"depends" upon whether or not I in fact will drink. For
these reasons it seems to me that such propositions about
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the beliefs God held in the past are future- inf ected
. And
If such propositions are f uture- inf ected
, then l see
nothing implausible about the claim that they are open.
Ockhamism is an attractive position. it allows us
simultaneously to accept the law of excluded middle, and
to reject fatalism and unalterabilism. But it does not
demand that we espouse the doctrine that we can change the
past. It accommodates our intuitions, without charging a
price. Is there an argument that can be offered in favor
of this attractive view?
There is something someone can but will not do, or
will do but can avoid doing. If so, then there are some
soft facts. If there are some soft facts then there are
some soft facts about the past. And if there are some
soft facts about the past, then Ockhamism is true.
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GLOSSARY
Accessibility: It is acceasihl ft that A if and only if itis not unalterable that
-A.
Eternalism: God is eternal (outside of time).
Fatalism: No propositions are open.
Fixability: It is f ixed that A if and only if it is not
open that A.
I ncompat ib i lism : As a matter of necessity, if God exists
and is essentially omniscient then no humans act
freely.
Law of Excluded Middle: Every proposition is either true
or false; alternatively, no proposition is neither
true nor false.
Ockhamism: Some propositions about the past are open;
alternatively, not all propositions about the past
are fixed.
Openism: Some propositions are open.
Openness: It is ^ipgn that A if and only if it is
accessible that A and accessible that
—A (if and only
if it is not unalterable that A and not unalterable
that
-A)
.
Open Semantic Indeterminism: Some propositions are open,
and all open propositions are neither true nor false.
Semantic Indeterminism: Some propositions are neither true
nor false.
Unalterabilism: Whatever is true is unalterable;
alternatively, whatever is accessible is true.
(Inalterability: It is unalterable that A if and only if it
is not accessible that
-A.
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4. X is God =df. X is an infinitely perfect being.
r"
5. Therefore, God exists. <3,4,)
cieaJ_L^ of x; a nuuber indicating the position ofX in the scale of ontological rerfection.
The of x: g number indicating the formal
reality that the object repres-nted by x would have, if it c-x.sUt
CacJigsi a n Cnscjolagi-xiiil Acigacv. n .
1 • There I s an i de a with i nf i •; i t e ob j ect've reality.
2. If there is an idea, i, wi ch n degree \ of objective real i tv,
then there is some cause o? i with at least n degrees of
formal real i ty
,
3* X is God -df . x is a bviin ivith inf in te formal reality,
4. Therefore, God exists.
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